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


Photo. Ch. Gerschel

M. GEORGES CLEMENCEAU, PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

FRANCE SINCE WATERLOO

BY

W. GRINTON BERRY, M.A.

WITH ILLUSTRATIONS AND MAPS

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PREFACE

THIS book has been written because I observed that the knowledge of French history possessed by many ordinarily well-educated men and women gathered round Louis xviii., the Revolution, and Napoleon, and that they had only a vague, imperfect, and unsatisfying knowledge of what had happened in France since Waterloo. I thought that a volume which, founded on the best authorities, endeavoured to display and interpret the salient features in the story of our sister land from that date until yesterday, if comprised within a moderate compass, written in a succinct, simple, and interesting manner, and sold at a moderate price, would be welcomed by many.

I have been particularly careful not to overload the narrative with details, while at the same time I have endeavoured to set forth accurately the facts necessary for the understanding of what has really happened in France since Waterloo. I have been audacious enough not to distrust my own judgment in the interpretation of facts, though I am conscious that there is room for

very wide divergence of opinion regarding many matters which are here necessarily handled, owing to considerations of space, in a summary and, it may sometimes seem, unduly dogmatic manner. The intelligent reader will, I am sure, make allowance for this.

W. G. B.

July 1908



FRANCE SINCE WATERLOO

CHAPTER I

THE MORROW OF DISASTER

NAPOLEON'S final overthrow at Waterloo was not unexpected by a large part of the French people, and, so far as the consequences affected the destiny of the Emperor, was not displeasing to them. He stood between the nation and peace ; and peace was what France desired and needed above all things.

It is true that the army for the most part had acclaimed the return from Elba with rapture. Naturally enough, Napoleon's old soldiers were not well disposed towards Louis XVIII., whose return to the throne of his ancestors had been made possible by their defeat and humiliation. It was noted that the troops who lined the streets on the King's entry into Paris in 1814 wore an irritable and gloomy air. As a mark of disfavour and distrust the Old Guard was sent away from the capital to learn loyalty among the garrisons of the north and east, and its emoluments were reduced by a third. The officers of the army who had been placed on half-pay—most of them

destitute of private means—had not disguised their discontent, and eagerly seized an opportunity of revenge. Louis had made the egregious mistake of setting up at great expense the old private military establishment of the Kings of France, with its companies of bodyguards and musketeers, composed of young aristocrats recognised as officers from the first—this, too, in face of an army where, during twenty years, all promotions were from the ranks, bought by blood and toil and skill. The places of the officers dismissed from the regular army were filled by men whose recommendations were high birth and service, generally against their native land, in foreign armies. The conversation of the newcomers, filled with the historic memories of the ancient monarchy, was all about the white plume of Navarre and the Christian virtues of St. Louis—in the hearing of men who, while they had marched behind Napoleon into all the capitals of the Continent, had for the most part never even heard the names of Henry iv. and St. Louis. Thus, during the short period of the first Restoration, Louis xviii. had inflicted so many injuries upon the interests and the pride of the Emperor's veterans that they speedily flocked back to the eagles and the tricolours which they had so often borne to glorious victory.

The return of Napoleon was also welcomed, though with markedly less enthusiasm, by some portion of the masses. The rule of Louis, inevitably odious, to some extent at least, as having been imposed by the armies of the foreigners, had been rendered doubly obnoxious by the

thinly veiled endeavours of his partisans to return as far as possible to the condition of things which prevailed before the Revolution. What France had looked for, and failed to find, was a frank acceptance of the profound and irreversible change which had been wrought in the social spirit of the country by the convulsions which the nation had traversed between the execution of Louis XVI. and the abdication of Napoleon. It was idle to pretend, in the fond folly of the extreme Royalists, that nothing had passed—save twenty-five years. Yet in this childish game the King had been persuaded, against his better judgment, to take a part. For reasons such as these the reappearance of the Emperor, who had been a scourge to the foreigner, had raised France to the highest summit of glory, and was, after all, a child of the Revolution, was welcomed by the masses, who, if they did not hate the Bourbons, heartily distrusted them.

On the other hand, this new and desperate adventure of the Corsican was resented not only by the Royalists, but by a more truly patriotic class, an influential group of thoughtful publicists who, like their followers, were by no means enthusiastic about the Bourbons,—being, indeed, for the most part, Republicans in principle,—but desired a constitutional form of government, and well understood that such could not have a fair trial under the Emperor. These last were confident that the star of Napoleon had set to rise no more again for ever, that this latest enterprise would end in disaster, and that France in its exhausted condition, after an unparalleled

expenditure of blood and treasure, was utterly unfit to cope with the united hostility of Europe. To their eyes the outlook, in any possible issue of the gambler's hazard, was forbidding. "If," said Lafayette on the eve of Waterloo,—“if Napoleon triumphs, it is the ruin of our liberty; if he is defeated, it is the ruin of our country.”

Deeply disquieted also was the bourgeois aristocracy, erected on the ruins of the old nobility and on the opportunities opened by the wise social laws of the Revolution to ability, enterprise, and industry. These people had outlived their fondness for change and adventure; the gratification of the strong passion of acquisition had made them conservative. They desired nothing more than the secure possession of their property under a constitutional form of government. They dreaded the tyranny which the Emperor was likely to re-establish, the drain on the resources of the nation, the injury to commerce, and the disturbance of all settled rights and possessions which the renewal of hostilities would involve.

Paris was acquiescent rather than enthusiastic. An ever-swelling chorus of acclamation had accompanied the Emperor during the whole of his progress from the south, but the volume of sound died away to a modest, timid, quivering cadence at the gates of the capital. The Chamber of Deputies, which had been elected on a very restricted bourgeois franchise, showed its hostility to the Emperor, at its very first sitting, in the most significant way by nominating as President M. Lanjuinais, one of those who had drawn up the document in which the downfall of the year before



NAPOLEON ON THE "BELLEROPHON"

From a drawing by J. Eastlake, engraved by C. Turner

THE MORROW OF

was proclaimed. The elected included Lafayette and two others for their enmity to the Empire the representatives of the nation Napoleon their moral support which was bound to be of untold is shown by the fact that the made on the eve of the Empire place himself at the head of his Prussians and the British.

Even the Bonapartists in their moments did not give to this Emperor a duration of more than a matter of fact, it lasted exactly Napoleon arrived in Paris from of March 1815, and Waterloo on the 18th of June. Two days later Napoleon arrived at the Tuileries, covered with dust, broken with fatigue and despair. He was immediately made to understand that but two things were expected of him,—his abdication and his disappearance. He fenced with the inevitable for a few days, but the force of fate was against him, and he was compelled to lay down the Imperial Crown. His offer to serve against the invaders in the capacity of General Bonaparte was rejected. On the 15th of July he gave himself up to the captain of the *Bellerophon*, and three weeks later he was on his way to his prison and his tomb in St. Helena. One last glimpse he was permitted to enjoy of the shores of France, but this sentimental solace only suggested to the colossal egotist the reflection that he had been sacrificed to treachery and the factions which divided his country. It is a lamentable

FRANCE SINCE WATERLOO

of Frenchmen, as of others, when an event in which their hopes and fears and interests are engaged has gone awry, to wring their hands and exclaim, "We are betrayed!"

Four days after Waterloo, Louis XVIII., who had remained at Ghent while Prussians and British were winning back his throne for him, was on his way to Paris. Three months before, on a bleak stormy night, he had stepped out of the Tuileries, and by the light of flaring torches, keeping up a wavering contest with the wind and rain, found his way to a carriage which whirled him off to the northern frontier. The first Restoration had lasted less than a year; and Louis, under the sway of counsellors of a more vigorous character but of less wisdom than he possessed, had contrived to make nearly as many mistakes as the time allowed. He was returning a sadder and a wiser man. At Cambrai he issued a proclamation admitting that perhaps he had made mistakes, and declaring that the lessons of his experience would not be lost. He also was wise enough to point out that during the Hundred Days no prince of his family had served in the ranks of the foreigners.

Louis was now sixty years of age, corpulent, feeble, gouty, with hair almost white. Nevertheless, in his blue uniform with its gold epaulettes, he presented a dignified appearance. His manners were gracious, his spirit was affable, and his countenance not wanting in nobility. He had spent the most vigorous years of his life in an exile which, to the chief of a family so ancient, so renowned, and of so sensitive a pride as the Bourbons, was embittered by many humiliations. When

in 1793 the head of his brother fell under the guillotine, amid the exultant shout of the Paris mob, Louis was on the Prussian side of the Rhine. Three years later, on the death of the child Dauphin, he became, in the eyes of the Royalists, King of France. But nowhere on the continent of Europe could he find rest for the sole of his feet. A game of battledore and shuttlecock was played with his sacred person. The reigning sovereigns were profuse with gracious and courteous facilities for his removal from their territories.

Towards the end of 1807 a Swedish vessel, with Louis on board, arrived off Yarmouth. The British Government sent instructions that the ship was to be directed towards Leith, whence Louis was to be conveyed to asylum in Holyrood House, the ancient palace of the Kings of Scotland. Louis sent a dignified remonstrance, saying that he would rather return to Russia than face the horrors of exile in Edinburgh! At length "the head of the family of the Bourbons"—that was the extent of the recognition afforded him by the British Government—was permitted to land on his undertaking that his manner of life would be in conformity with his actual situation. By the hospitality of the Duke of Buckingham, Gosfield Hall, Essex, was placed at his disposal. Here he resided until the beginning of 1811, when he removed to Hartwell in Buckinghamshire. On his income of £24,000 a year, provided by the Governments of Great Britain and Brazil, he maintained a modest state, having perforce to be content, in view of the other expenses incident to the maintenance of his royal pretensions, with a pair of horses and a

single hired carriage. He was compelled, of course, to put a bold face on the blackest circumstances, but there is reason to believe that in his heart he had abandoned all hope of setting foot in France again; and he was spending his days in quiet study. He was not cast by nature for the part of intriguing Pretender, and the merely feeble machinations of which he was capable would never have engineered his return to the throne of his fathers. If the ambition of Napoleon had not become madness, Louis would without doubt have ended his days in exile.

When, after the first abdication of the Emperor in 1814, Louis passed through London on his return to France, he was received by the people of the metropolis with respect and a tempered enthusiasm. He was to the London crowd a symbol of peace, of relief from a long, bloody, and expensive war which had wearied them and, as it seemed in their present mood, brought burdens so heavy that they sank the glory altogether out of sight. Louis and the Prince Regent—two stout, elderly, unheroic figures—made themselves ridiculous by a laborious endeavour to turn their meeting into an occasion of high sentiment. The attempt failed as ludicrously as the efforts of ambitious barn-door fowls to fly high.

And now, after a brief second exile in Belgium, Louis XVIII. was again in Paris. The circumstances of the hour possessed the most poignant bitterness for France. The presence of the invaders in the capital severely limited the amount of happiness which even the most enthusiastic partisans of the Bourbons could enjoy in welcoming

the royal family. From the balcony of the Tuileries, upon which the King stood in order to reply to the acclamations of the crowd assembled under his windows, he could see the Prussian cannon trained upon his palace; while the French army had been withdrawn behind the Loire in order that, as Wellington had stipulated, Louis might not be at its mercy when he entered his capital! Presently the Powers resumed the Congress (which Napoleon had so rudely interrupted) to settle the account between themselves and the poor, distracted kingdom to which the Bourbons had returned. It was determined that France, which was now brought back to the territorial limits of January 1792, should incur an indemnity of £28,000,000 and maintain, for a term not exceeding five years, an army of occupation of 150,000 men; the money was to be paid within the same period by equal daily portions, just as a poor man repays a loan from a usurious money-lender. This meant that the annual expenditure of the country would be increased by nearly one half. So weak was the credit of the new Government that it was compelled to pay interest at the rate of 10 per cent. on the bonds which were issued to meet the heavy fine imposed upon it by the Chancelleries of the capitals whither the eagles of the legions had been borne in splendid triumph.

What was the situation which faced the restored monarch? France was in a state of exhaustion. The blood of two million men had flowed during the Napoleonic campaigns. The commerce of the country, especially that of the great towns in the south, such as Bordeaux and Marseilles, was

straitened, and there were serious apprehensions of a scarcity of food among the masses of the people. Though not brilliant, Louis was a man of sense, ready to understand that the great need of France was a period of peace and domestic concord during which to recuperate her exhausted strength. He was not weak-minded enough to share the idea of his too ardent supporters, that the years which had passed between the taking of the Bastille and his own return could be blotted out, could be treated as though they had never been; that the condition of things created by the Revolution and the Empire could be met by merely pretending that they had never existed. It was futile to think of picking up the thread of history at the point where it had been cut by the Revolution, for the old hank had not been merely entangled, it had been thrown away. Accordingly, during the first Restoration it had pleased Louis, in the execution, as he would have claimed, of his autocratic rights, to grant his people a Charter which guaranteed personal liberty, equality before the law, equal liability to taxation, equal eligibility to all civil and military offices, freedom of the press, of thought, and of religion. As Madame de Staël said, he claimed to grant the Charter, while the view that the nation wished to take of the matter was that he had agreed to it as a condition of his acceptance by his subjects. The people were left with reason to dread lest the sovereign power which had professed to give the Charter as an act of grace might, by exercise of the same pretended prerogative and for specious reasons of a flimsy texture, take back its gift and still claim to hold

the people to their allegiance. It is piquant to recall, especially at the present time, that among those who strongly insisted upon the Charter was the Emperor Alexander, the autocrat of all the Russias !

Within the Charter there were reserved for Louis, governing with two Chambers, abundant opportunities for the beneficent exercise of power and influence. The difficulty and danger of his situation was that he could find whole-hearted supporters only among the professed and convinced Royalists, who were undoubtedly a minority of the nation, whose zeal was marred by manifold unwisdom and vindictiveness, and who were singularly destitute of leaders with intelligence, imagination, and commanding authority. There was an essential antagonism of feeling, as there was an essential conflict of interests, between many members of the Royalist party and those who had profited by the Revolution. Many of those who had lost everything by the Revolution found themselves face to face with those who had gained everything by it. All that the former class of persons saw in the Charter, with its provision confirming in their possessions the present owners of property which had been confiscated at the Revolution, was the formal and odious sanction of the violence of which they had been the victims ; and yet they honestly regarded themselves as the only Frenchmen who, during five-and-twenty years, had not wandered from the narrow way of honour. Naturally, they desired to find in the Restoration an opportunity of getting their own again, with the compound interest of revenge

added thereto. Their leaders ought to have taught them that the satisfaction of all their claims, reasonable as they might seem, was not practicable, still less safe, in the interests of the throne with which their fortunes were leagued. They ought to have perceived that the restoration of Louis to the throne of France was far indeed from being a parallel to the restoration of Charles II. to the throne of England; and even the Merry Monarch could not restore to opulence all the Cavalier gentry who had been ruined by the Civil War,—there was a severe limit to the number of argosies laden with golden grain that even he could float on the unprecedented floodtide of his popularity. Though, after the downfall of Napoleon, all minds that enjoyed a moment of leisure from panic or prejudice saw that the return of the Bourbons was inevitable, this was not to say that Louis had been recalled by the manifest desire of the nation. The Commission of Five upon whom the Chambers, after the abdication of the Emperor, had conferred all the powers of government was hostile to the Bourbons, and three of its members had actually been regicides. Indeed, the allied sovereigns themselves, surely the staunchest friends of legitimacy, had anxiously debated after the battle of Waterloo whether it was possible to make France accept the Bourbons, and it needed all the weight of authority possessed by the Emperor Alexander to carry the decision in favour of the ancient royal house. Only by disastrous defeat inflicted upon French arms had the return of Louis been made possible; and as regards the bulk of the people, the most that could be said was that they were

not unwilling to receive him—as a constitutional monarch. Louis himself was sagacious enough to recognise that he had not the right to expect much fervour in the loyalty of his people or in their devotion to his person. A significant saying of his was : “ He that is not against me is with me.” His main strength, therefore, was of a negative character ; it lay in the masses who were not against him. They wanted peace, and peace was not to be had without the Bourbons. Louis stood between the people and the calamity of a fresh invasion ; with his sceptre he waived aside the foreigners whom Napoleon had summoned with his sword.

The Royalists wished to ignore these cardinal facts, and seem to have possessed an inadequate consciousness of the truth that their violent faction was a minority of the nation. Their line of thought was : “ The Bourbons are again on the throne of France ; let us destroy, or where we cannot destroy let us pretend not to see, the works of the Revolution and the Empire ; let us go back to the old days when the throne, the aristocracy, and the priests possessed all the powers and immunities of the kingdom.” This policy was impossible ; it was a new France to which Louis had returned ; old France had passed away for ever. The principles of the Revolution must be recognised openly or implicitly—liberty and equality ; the sovereignty of the people ; representative institutions, with the power of the purse, making laws and controlling the executive ; the responsibility of all the servants of the crown ; freedom of religion, of the press, of trade, of industry ; unity of legislation and of the laws. In the early days of the

Revolution Louis had shown himself not unfriendly to its principles, and had in consequence incurred the suspicion of the party which supported the throne. He was not insensible to the logic of events, and was prepared to play the part of a constitutional monarch. But it came to pass that his wise intentions were sometimes shaken and sometimes frustrated by the exigencies of his too zealous and little prudent friends.

The difficulty of his task was increased by the intolerant temper of the clergy, who, as the passive spectators of tyranny, were obnoxious to great masses of the people. The Charter proclaimed Catholicism as the religion of the State, but that was not nearly enough for the clericals. Of what spirit they were may be inferred from the fact that during the first Restoration they had secured the passing of a law which made the observance of Sunday a legal obligation in France. Citizens were peremptorily enjoined, upon the passage of religious processions, to drape their houses with white cloth. The priests who had taken the oath of allegiance to the Empire were attacked with the utmost virulence; and as there were Royalists more royalist than the King, so there were clericals more clerical than the Pope; for His Holiness Pius VII. was vigorously denounced for having, in consenting to the Concordat of 1801, lent his support to Napoleon and encouraged the development of his power.

We would not have it supposed that the Royalists were the only party whose dispositions were blameworthy. The state of mind of the Liberals was not conducive to moderation and harmony.

The politicians and statesmen of France at this epoch seemed to have been more lacking even than is customary in the faculty of apprehending by sympathy and imagination the opinions and feelings of those opposed to them. If the Royalists did not understand the necessities of the present, the Liberals did not make allowance for the power of the past, of memory and tradition; they were deficient in historic imagination. They forgot that the history of France did not begin with the Revolution. While prepared to regard the return of the Bourbons as an accepted fact, they did not perceive that the country could not hold at one and the same time the ancient historic house and the pure, undiluted spirit of the Revolution. They were not quick enough to understand that concessions to the logic of events were necessary, and that, for the peace of the country, it was advisable to make these concessions gracefully. There seems to have been as little of the spirit of accommodation among the Liberals as among the Royalists; the usefulness of both parties was diminished, and their power for mischief increased, by the absence from their ranks of men possessing dominating force of character, of men whose leadership was accepted by large bodies of politicians, of men whose personality was powerfully impressed upon the people. The statesmen of France from the year of Waterloo to the Three Days of July 1830—Decazes, Villèle, Martignac, Polignac, and the rest—are all but forgotten; only faint echoes of their names remain. The statesmen of the Restoration have rushed down a particularly steep slope of the hills of time into the

sea of oblivion. Except for a moment, they did not tarry in the descent.

The Royalists, the Liberals, and the Bonapartists—the last weak in numbers and bankrupt of hope—were the three labelled parties of France at this epoch. But the great mass of the nation, while undoubtedly attached in a general way—as practical folk, not as ideologists—to the principles of the Revolution, and resolved to preserve the social and economic fruits of the great upheaval, were outside all parties. With them it was anything for a quiet life. France was exhausted. Trade was bad. The national exchequer was empty. Security, repose, peace, minds at leisure from distracting affairs of State, freedom for quiet energy—these were the needs of the country. Any system of government which would give France these, which would enable the ordinary vocations of life to be followed in a quiet, peaceful, unrestricted manner, would be acceptable to the bulk of Frenchmen.

This rapid review of the situation shows that the problem which Louis had to solve was indeed a complicated one. He had to work the institutions of parliamentary government and constitutional monarchy among a people to whom these institutions were new, and to whose traditions, perhaps also to whose temperament, they were alien. Every nation is worthy of being wisely and justly governed, but not every nation is fitted for representative institutions, and it remained to be discovered whether France was. Parliamentary institutions were not an unmixed success even in England, and the English nation had had an experience

extending over centuries. No other European nation had made an honest trial of them. Added to this uncertain element was the baffling complexity that the most fervid supporters of the throne hated popular freedom and free institutions, and were resolved to turn the last into instruments of aristocratic and clerical dominance; "the altar and the throne," that was their battle-cry. Moreover, Louis had to discover, mainly among men who were necessarily without training, experience, or manifest aptitude, those who were fit to administer the government of France under a new system, and would be loyal at once to himself and to the spirit of the new institutions.

Fortunately he was likely to enjoy, for the working out of this hazardous experiment, a period of freedom from foreign complications. The whole world desired peace. The situation of Louis with regard to foreign Powers was more favourable than at the first blush it might seem. If he could but hold securely the respect of his own people he was not called upon to submit to any treatment which might impair his personal dignity or wound the patriotic sensibilities of the French. He could afford to assume an attitude of reasonable independence towards the allied sovereigns; for though he owed to them—and the compliance of the French people—his throne, he stood as a barrier between these autocrats and Revolution—in France and elsewhere,—with the attendant dangers of that portent to their personal comfort and the stability of their thrones.

CHAPTER II

VEERING AND TACKLING

TALLEYRAND, with his heart of ice, and Fouché, Duc d'Otranto, with his forehead of brass, were the tools with which Louis was compelled to work at the beginning of his reign. Neither of them made any show of affection for the house of Bourbon; and indeed Fouché, the friend and accomplice of regicides, a knave without admixture of scruple or conscience, had a history which made him in the last degree hateful to every Royalist and forfeited the respect of every simple, honest man. The difficulty and uncertainty of the King's position was acutely signalled by the mere fact that he should have dreamt of retaining Fouché in his service for a single day. The presence of the old rascal, himself quite conscious of his rascality, must have rankled in the heart of Louis like a poisoned arrow. The circumstance also shows how little the affection of the people had warmed towards the restored house; otherwise it would not have contented them that a man who had compassed or justified the execution of Louis XVI. should be allowed to stand at the right hand of the restored brother of the Revolution's most illustrious victim.

The Government conceived it to be its first duty to punish the authors of the crime of the Hundred Days—those who had aided and abetted Napoleon from his arrival on the shores of France until his establishment in Paris. A wise Government would have perceived that practically the whole nation participated in this “crime,” and that an act of oblivion was the best means of meeting the situation. To Fouché, the Minister of Police, who had been too cunning to compromise himself prematurely with Napoleon, but had readily become his Minister, and possessed a traitor’s heart if ever man did—to him fell the duty of drawing up a list of the ringleaders in this crime. When the catalogue was ready Talleyrand remarked, that to do the Duc justice he had not forgotten to find a place for all his friends on the list! The number of names was at first over a hundred, but it was reduced, mainly at the instigation of the Royalist Decazes—paradox of the situation!—to half that figure.

The most distinguished victim of this proscription was Marshal Ney, who, having been sent to repel Napoleon, had joined him. On the field of Waterloo, when the tide of battle had turned against the Emperor, Ney, knowing himself to stand within the wrathful vengeance of the allied sovereigns and of the Bourbons, vainly and passionately sought for death as for hidden treasure. Undoubtedly he had committed a capital offence—mayhap he deserved death; but was it expedient that he should die? We think not. There was not the remotest probability that, had his life been spared, he would again be dangerous to the

peace of France. With Napoleon interned at St. Helena as in a tomb, Ney was harmless. The security of the Bourbons exacted that they should gain the confidence of the army of which Ney was the darling and the exemplar. The temper of the soldiery could be discerned from the conduct of the court-martial before whom Ney was in the first place arraigned. Almost all the members had served the Empire, and the gallant officer whose duty, by virtue of seniority, it was to preside, refused to perform his office. He was deprived of his command, and sentenced to three years' imprisonment. When finally constituted the court-martial declared itself incompetent to try a peer of France on a charge of high treason. This duty must fall on the Chamber of Peers. So alarmed were the Government at a prospect of an escape that, knowing the devotion of the soldiers to the "bravest of the brave," they refused to place him under the custody of the military, but had recourse to a select troop of the bodyguards. Desperately anxious that Ney should be convicted, they declared that France had been stupefied and affronted by the decision of the court-martial, and referred the trial to the Chamber of Peers. The most remarkable evidence was that given by Bourmont, whom the Marshal reproached for not having tried to keep him back! —an incident which shows how conscious poor Ney was of his own wildly impulsive temperament. With one dissentient the Peers declared that Ney was guilty. That dissentient was the Duc de Broglie, who expressed the opinion that the Government of the Hundred Days having been a regular

Government, it was impolitic to punish the anterior facts. Seventeen of the peers declared for deportation, but the majority were for death.

Ney met his fate in the manner that all the world expected of him. The nation took the matter quietly at the time, but many honest hearts must have swelled with sorrowful resentment, and when the affairs of the Bourbons began to be involved in shallows and miseries this sacrifice of a great French soldier was remembered against them, and contributed towards their undoing. *L'échafaud politique nuit toujours aux gouvernements*; and the question to be considered in cases of this sort is not whether the sentence of death is legally justifiable, but whether this extreme and irrevocable penalty will in the end make for public peace and public safety. Certain it is that the death of Ney did nothing to strengthen the Bourbon dynasty and not a little towards weakening it. It should in justice be added that the allied sovereigns had been exasperated beyond measure by the last adventure of Napoleon, and considered it indispensable for the peace of Europe that exemplary punishments should be inflicted upon his accomplices.

The out-and-out Royalists were in a vindictive mood, and there were outbreaks in the south marked by exhibitions of savagery all too characteristic of the French temperament in times of strong excitement. The mob at Avignon forced an entrance into the hotel where Marshal Brune was staying, shot him dead, and afterwards threw corpse and coffin into the Rhine. General Ramel, who had been sent by the King to dissolve the lawless bands of Royalist Volunteers, met a like

fate at Toulouse. The perpetrators of these and many other similar crimes upon less distinguished victims were either acquitted or subjected to ridiculously inadequate punishments. Two brothers, by name Faucher, one of whom had been Deputy and the other Mayor of La Réole, were shot at Bordeaux for having been slow to hoist the white flag, and for having allowed it to be insulted. Their real crime was that they were known enemies of the house of Bourbon. The vindictive spirit was abroad over all the land. Lavalette had been Postmaster-General before the first abdication, and a few hours prior to Napoleon's arrival in Paris from Elba he resumed his office. For this offence the Seine Assize Court sentenced him to death, but on the night before the day fixed for his doom his wife came to visit him and he calmly walked out of prison in her garments. The Royalists were furious at being balked of their prey, but he escaped clean out of their hands. So violent was their disposition that Richelieu, a faithful Royalist, but a man of temperate mind, who by this time had succeeded Talleyrand and Fouché at the head of affairs, declared that he was heartbroken. Among those banished from the country were Fouché,—whose absence no honest man deplored,—Marshal Soult and General Grouchy, brave soldiers whose sole offence was that they had been ready to serve in the armies of their country under whatever head of the State.

The selection of Richelieu as chief of the Cabinet supplies a striking illustration of the difficulties in the way of the new experiment in representative and parliamentary government. He was a noble,

an upright man of forty-eight, who had fought against the Republic and had, as Governor of the Crimea in the service of Russia, shown himself a capable administrator. But he had not set foot in France for twenty-five years, and he did not know his colleagues even by sight.

It would be tedious and not very profitable to go into the details of French politics during this period, and this book is not an attempt to tell the history of the Cabinets which have governed France in the past century. Among her politicians the spirit of patriotism has often been narrow; and although factiousness seems to be of the essence of politics, even as they are practised in England, it seldom reaches the pitch of persistency and unscrupulousness to which it often attains in France. It has been observed with humorous shrewdness that the architecture of the Chamber of Deputies, that of a Greek theatre, is favourable to the formation of parliamentary groups, inasmuch as there is no distinct and definite line of cleavage, as in the British House of Commons, between the Government side and the Opposition side. The problem of the Ministry, in the early days of the Restoration as at this hour, has been so to arrange its programme that for each item it may secure the support of such a combination of groups—it will not always be the same combination—as will give it a majority. In this one chapter, which is all that can be devoted to the reign of Louis XVIII., it is not possible to describe all the moves in this complicated and wearisome game. The endeavour of the writer will rather be to set forth tersely and clearly the resultant

of the various forces that were at work in the body politic of France during these nine years. We shall best succeed in our object if we gather together our notes under the four great heads of the franchise, the press, religion, and the army.

The cardinal fact of the situation with regard to the electoral laws was that, when the first ebullitions of royalist enthusiasm had subsided, the moderate franchise established at the beginning of the reign led to the gradual strengthening of the democratic and—as Royalists unwisely chose to consider them—the anti-dynastic forces of the Chamber. In the light of after days it does not seem an impossible undertaking that the King should have conciliated and won these forces, that thereby the roots of respect and affection for the throne might have struck deeper and stronger. To do Louis justice, he seems to have more than suspected that such a line of policy was the path of safety and prosperity for France and his house ; but he was overruled by the exigencies of his too zealous friends, strengthened as these importunities were by an occurrence so lamentably injurious to the cause of ordered liberty as the assassination of the Duc de Berri. In the course of nature the Duc would have come to the throne, and with him, if he had died childless, would have closed the direct line of the Bourbons. The avowed object of the murderer, who was a fanatic of the purest type and represented himself only, was to strike with sterility the old house of France. But his victim had recently been married, and a few months after his death his widow, who found favour in the sight of the people

by her spirit and fortitude, gave birth to a son, destined, as the Comte de Chambord, to a career of futility and disappointment. He never ascended the throne of France, and his race perished with him.

The Revolution had been an unrivalled, if very expensive, school of political education for the French people, and the means adopted by the ministers of Louis to subdue the growing democratic tendencies of the electorate were bound to be defeated by the intelligence of the country. It is possible to maintain a nation in prosperity and contentment under a Government which has been established by a *coup d'état*, but to put into operation a fairly liberal franchise and, when it does not produce an assembly agreeable to the ruling powers, to narrow that franchise, is an experiment the success of which must always be very doubtful.

At the beginning of Louis' reign the franchise was given to all citizens paying £12 or more in taxes. The first election produced a Chamber so violently royalist, so disposed to magnify its powers and to employ them, in spite of the King and the Government, for the restoration of the ancient régime, that it was dissolved after an existence of little more than a year. The proceedings of this assembly had obviously given deep offence to the nation no less than to the governing class, because in the new Chamber this wild faction mustered only a hundred out of a membership of 258. Under the existing law the Chamber was annually renewed by one-fifth, and at the elections of 1817, 1818, and 1819 the Government, which looked for its support chiefly among the moderate Royalists, but also among moderate men of inde-

terminate politics, lost so much ground to the Opposition parties that the next election seemed certain to make the Radicals masters of the Chamber. This outlook would not have seemed terrible to a Government which knew how to take occasion by the hand and to make the bounds of freedom wider, for the democratic party would become dangerous to the throne only if its strength were not recognised and if reasonable concession were not made to its demands. Nevertheless, the Government took fright and carried a revision of the franchise laws, which gave a second vote to electors who paid £40 or more in taxes. 258 members were allotted to the arrondissements, elected by all the voters on the £12 franchise; 172 members were allotted to the departments elected on the £40 franchise. It was as if, in England, highly rated electors had a vote not only for a local member but for a county member as well. The consequence of this double vote was the progressive weakening of the Radical party in the Chamber, until at the General Election of 1824 they obtained only nineteen seats. The Royalists, thanks to the electoral law and the prestige acquired by a successful war in Spain, becoming absolute masters of the Chambers, passed a law abolishing the annual renewal of the Lower House by one-fifth and fixing the duration of Parliament, subject to the King's prerogative of dissolution, at seven years. Yet the septennial act was not passed without misgiving on the part of many Royalists, who feared that it would strengthen the Chamber at the expense of the Crown. And that was the state of affairs at the death of Louis XVIII.

The alteration of the franchise law may be compared to tampering with a gas meter. A false statement is procured thereby; but the amount of gas consumed is not altered. The new law diminished the Radical strength in the Chamber, but in itself it could not diminish, but, on the contrary, tended to increase, its strength in the country, and to drive it for expression into revolutionary courses. To admit that the people have a right to an opinion and a vote, to allow them to exercise that right for a number of years, and then, because the result is not satisfactory to the Government, gravely to impair the value of that right, largely to stultify its exercise by playing tricks with the electoral law, is a sure method of nursing the forces of revolution. That is the disastrous and certainly fatal course which is being pursued at this hour in Russia. Duma after Duma is to be dissolved, electoral laws have to be trimmed and trimmed again, until an assembly is elected which is pleasing to the Czar and the vampires which suck the blood of the body politic in Russia. It is obvious that such an assembly, if, and when, it is constituted, will be utterly unable to avert the calamity the dread of which led to the original inception of the Duma. The very forces which it was most desirable to harness and set to useful work will be outside, wild untamed spirits of the whirlwind and the lightning.

The course adopted by the ministers of Louis was marred by the over-cleverness, the over-ingenuity which breeds only mischief in popular politics, and seldom if ever permanently profits the party in whose behalf it is exercised. A bold,

straight, and simple course is the most profitable for a Government working through representative institutions. Clever tactics may solve small temporary difficulties, but never great vital problems.

As for the yearly partial renewal of the Chamber, the arguments for and against its abolition had been long and deeply pondered. The original intention of the provision was, no doubt, to keep the representative assembly in living touch with the people who had elected it. But it was found in practice that the yearly agitation was injurious to the political health of the nation; it made a continuous policy difficult, and gravely weakened the moral force of the Government. Accordingly the weight of opinion was decidedly against it. But the object for which partial renewal of the assembly was devised is one of cardinal importance. A Government with a substantial majority in a Chamber elected for seven years may lose the confidence of the country long before the term of the Parliament, and may carry measures of fundamental importance which, judged by all the available indications, there is grave reason for suspecting are repugnant to the mass of the electors. Nay, the Government themselves, secretly sharing these apprehensions, may be consciously using their opportunity while yet there is time to safeguard the interests of their friends. Who shall take upon himself to say that such a betrayal of the spirit of representative institutions has not happened even in this happy England of ours? The only protection of the country against arbitrary conduct of this sort lies in one of these honourable understandings which have no legal basis, which

cannot be rigidly defined but are very really apprehended, and are so essential to the rightful working of the institutions of this country—the understanding, namely, that if the Government, taking a candid view of the situation, have reason to fear that the country is not with them, it is their duty to resign office. Apart from this understanding, there is nothing in the constitution of the country which would prevent a tyrannical Premier, controlling a subservient majority, from legislating with as little regard to the feelings and opinions of the country as though the House of Commons held its sittings in the planet Mars. A Prime Minister who desires to work representative institutions faithfully will give earnest heed to the manifestations of public opinion, and will carefully consider their bearing upon his moral authority. Shorter Parliaments, just in proportion to their shortness, will protect us from the danger indicated, but in the last resort it may be necessary to bring back into reality the royal prerogative of dissolution, and formally to set up the sovereign as the watchful guardian and ready vindicator of the rights of the people against a House of Commons which is abusing the authority derived from the nation.

Louis did not deem it inconsistent with his dignity and the spirit of parliamentary institutions openly to take a side in political controversy. On more than one occasion he issued a manifesto in favour of candidates who would promise to support the Government. And the Government, without disguise, and certainly without consciousness of corruption, exercised the utmost pressure upon

public functionaries of all grades. It was intimated that members of the civil service must turn themselves into election agents. It was the duty of an honourable functionary either to resign office or to serve with all his power and influence at election times the Government which employed him. Reciprocity was the essence of the matter. There is no reason to suspect that the Government were dishonest in taking this line. They considered that this simple view of the matter was justified in logic and in morality. The answer to this specious fallacy is obvious. Public functionaries are servants of the Government as representing the country, but the Government may not truly represent the country, and the very purpose of an election is to discover whether they do so or not. An election under free institutions may be compared to an action at law between the Government and the country, and it is not right that the Government should use the power of patronage conferred upon them by the people at a previous election in order to secure a dishonest or unjust verdict on the next occasion. The fallacy arises from the habit of considering the Government as an entity apart from the Chambers and the people, and in the absence of clear and consistent views on these matters it was perhaps pardonable. Unhappily, the practice, which ought now to be known and recognised as corrupt, persists in French politics to this day, in a country swarming with functionaries; but the evil of it is tempered by the fact that French Governments are made and unmade not so much by General Elections, as by the varying little-calculable and almost kaleidoscopic combinations of the numerous

groups and factions that make up the Chamber of Deputies.

There is nothing more deserving of careful examination by the student of the polity of any nation than the laws with regard to its public press. Without the liberty of the press there can be no real liberty; the press free, there can be no real tyranny. The Charter granted liberty to the press subject to the laws, not yet formulated when that document was drawn up, which were to repress the abuses of that liberty. After Waterloo, accordingly, the press was free, but it immediately proceeded to the use of such violent language that the Government considered themselves compelled to establish a preliminary authorisation for new journals and a censorship for all of them. In these circumstances the Ministry becomes the sole director of the organs of public opinion, and the Opposition, whether Conservative or Liberal, is in favour of the liberty of the press, because that means liberty to attack the Government. We are not surprised, then, to find that Villèle, the leader of the ultra-Royalists, and as such no favourer of democratic principles, is a vehement champion of liberty in this connection. In 1819 the bases of a wise and liberal press law were laid. The law defined the misdemeanours and crimes of which the press was capable, as provocations to crime, affronts towards the person of the King, outrages upon public and religious morality, slander and libel. With regard to the last, the defence of "true in fact and substance" was not to be admitted; on the contrary, the greater the truth the greater the libel. Publications could not be seized

before they were issued, though the Government were not obliged to stay their hand until a judgment was given in their favour. The more serious charges were to be tried by jury.

The essence of a good press law is that it should not be too lax, and that alleged infractions of it should be tried before a jury. These two conditions were fulfilled by the enactment of 1819. The press is capable of infinite mischief and there are publicists—friends of liberty and friends of the press—who believe that as regards international relations its influence is on the whole for evil, for strife and enmity rather than for amity and concord. The peace of the world is more endangered by the fierce wordy warfare of truculent journalists than by the rivalry of diplomatists. Nevertheless, democratic communities show a true instinct in regarding the freedom of the press as a vital interest. We say that the press law should not be too lax, because while there is great danger in laxness, there is little likelihood, when the adjudication of cases is in the hands of juries, that the law as administered will be more rigorous than the sense and sentiment of the community demand. There can be little question that at the present time the press laws of France, England, and the United States—and it may be of other countries—stand in need of strengthening in the public interest. False statements made by candidates or their responsible agents during a parliamentary election may be brought under the cognisance of the law, and very rightly so, but there seem to be no means of stigmatising and punishing deliberately mendacious statements by newspapers even when such

statements are obviously hostile to the interest of the commonwealth. We refrain from giving particulars, though we could easily do so, because we do not wish these remarks to wear a partisan aspect.

The French statesmen of the Restoration frequently fell lamentably short of their own ideas in the matter of the liberty of the press. The censorship was re-established in 1820, with the avowed object of stemming the rising tide of democracy. Legal measures were necessary—so it was said, in language which comes readily to lips of conservative politicians—to restrain democracy and to prevent the nation from becoming the dupe of agitators. The Government, as might have been expected, showed a profound distrust of the juries, because the rigour which the governing class wished to exercise went beyond the necessities of the time, as viewed by candid, impartial men not blinded by party spirit. There was no satisfaction, then, for the Government in the stiffening of the law, so long as the case came before the juries; therefore recourse might be had to the censorship, and judges, sitting without juries, were given the right of suspending and even of suppressing all periodical publications whose tendencies were hostile to the religion of the State and to the other religions recognised by the law, to the authority of the King, and to the stability of constitutional institutions. It was actually made an offence by the law of 1822 to expose the Government to hatred and scorn. If the Chamber considered itself insulted by any writer, it had the power to arraign him at its bar. The law recognised that

the King possessed various rights by virtue of his birth, and that it was in the exercise of these rights that he had given the Charter, a view of a great constitutional transaction which was not only not accepted by, but was profoundly repugnant to, a large section of the nation.

These oppressive regulations might have been little dangerous to the public tranquillity had there been reason to believe that the people were friendly and overwhelmingly conservative in their sentiments ; but on the contrary, there is good ground for supposing, from the election results previous to the tampering with the franchise, and from the Government's avowed want of confidence in the juries, that the bulk of the people were out of sympathy with the spirit of the Administration. The case against the new press law was well summed up in the remark that representative government was necessarily a conflict of two sets of opinions, and that the set which happened for the moment to be predominant should not be put in possession of the means of stifling the other. No party had the right of assuring to itself the monopoly of the press, and of so altering the law that it was easy to secure the punishment of writers who made themselves obnoxious to the said party. A curious concession to popular feeling was the proviso that in any circumstances the press must be freed from the censorship during the period of a General Election.

Catholicism as an institution, and to a great extent also as a rule of life and faith, was involved in the ruin which overwhelmed the monarchy and the aristocracy at the Revolution. The Church had aided and abetted, or at least connived at,

the tyranny of the Kings, and had become increased in goods as the reward of its compliance with the ways of the world and the caprices of arbitrary power. Its maxim of policy was that the ways of transgressors need not be hard when they were persons of quality. The Church had been the bulwark of privilege. It may have relieved the sufferings of the poor, but it did not contend for their rights; it may have taught men to be charitable, but not to be just. To subjects it had preached submission, but it had not preached righteousness to Kings. It had refused to listen to the cry of the oppressed. When at last the common people rose in revolt, priest and King alike were inundated by the torrent of fury which was poured out throughout the land.

After a long period of darkness and storm the sun began to shed his beams upon the house of Bourbon, and the Church also rejoiced and flourished in the rays. A great improvement in the status of Catholicism was bound to follow in the train of the Restoration. The true friends of religion, even those of them who have little love for the Bourbons, and perhaps less for Romanism, will not find it in their hearts to lament this inevitable result. They will reflect that the only revival of religion possible in France at this time was a revival of Catholicism, and that a corrupt religion is better than indifference, scepticism, and materialism. This admission by no means implies approval of the aggressive action of the Church in secular politics, or of the boundless claims which it sought to establish over the lives, hearts, and consciences of men. The object of

the extremists was to make religion more powerful than the law, a worthy and essential object of religion if it be taken to mean that the law of God in the heart of man should be a more potent influence for righteous living than the laws of the land ; but a most mischievous object if the intention is to secure by legislative compulsion universal outward observance of religious ordinances, or to elevate the commands of priests, stepping outside the spiritual domain, over the laws of the country. The Church may rightly order us not to break the seventh commandment in any circumstances, but the Pope may not command us to withdraw our allegiance from the State merely because of the passing of some enactment which in his view adversely affects the interests of the Church.

The Charter recognised Catholicism as the religion of the State, but guaranteed protection for all faiths and religious liberty for all. Soon, however, the Church began to utilise the strength of her new position. Her first concern was to get the education of the young into her own hands. In each canton a committee for primary education was set up, appointed by the prefect on the nomination of the rector, and presided over by the parish priest. It is quite a right and natural thing, on the part of those who believe in a national establishment of religion, to place the secular, no less than the spiritual, education of the young under the supervision of the parish clergyman. It is one of the worst evils of establishments that claims of domination, which to others appear arrogant, seem in the nature of things, and quite inevitable to the ministers of the privileged com-

munion. Pilgrimages became the fashion once again. It was at this time that the Congregation took its place at the head of the various associations which were formed for the purpose of bringing back the nation to Catholicism. Married priests in receipt of pensions were deprived of them, and were ordered to make restitution of the money that they had received. Ecclesiastical establishments were permitted to receive gifts of property. Divorce was abolished. £160,000 a year was granted to the Church in lieu of woods which had formerly belonged to her and had been sold as national property. In 1819 five hundred new chapels of ease were erected, and letters of obedience held by Christian teaching brothers were recognised as equivalent to university certificates,—that was at the same time to degrade education and favour the Church. Two years later thirty episcopal sees, in addition to the fifty already existing, were created and endowed with the money set free by the extinguished pensions. The salaries of the higher clergy were raised, and grants were made for the repair of religious edifices. At the formation of the ultra-royalist Ministry of Villèle in 1822 Vicomte de Montmorency, a prominent member of the Congregation, became Foreign Secretary, a promotion which caused some uneasiness to the King himself. Through Montmorency the Congregation began to exercise a palpable influence in the appointment of public officials. One of their agents, Franchet, was entrusted with the management of the police. Monsignor Frayssinous, Bishop of Hermopolis, was made President of the Council of Public Instruction

and Grand Master of the University, and later on a new post was created for him, that of Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs. Monsignor Frayssinous was a friend of the King, and held the same prudent and moderate opinions; but his cloth gave his appointment a significance which was not missed by the nation, and did not tend to conciliate for the Government the influential section which hated Catholicism and the more numerous section which was scornful or indifferent.

After Waterloo the army was compelled, by an arrangement insisted on by the allies, to withdraw beyond the Loire. Within a month the soldiers, at the suggestion of their commanders, had hauled down the tricolour and hoisted the white flag of old France. In the following year there was a general conflagration of the tricolours, the busts of Napoleon were smashed, the eagles and the other insignia of the imperial armies destroyed beyond sight and recognition. Pensions were voted to surviving officers of the royalist armies of La Vendée and to all Royalists who had taken part in any insurrection against the Republic or the Empire. These proceedings, which the logic of events may have justified and made inevitable, could not but be profoundly distasteful, depressing, and exasperating to the old soldiers of Napoleon; but the star of the Emperor had set for ever and the greater part of the veterans were too sick and faint at heart to show any active resentment.

Naturally Louis and his Ministers at once set themselves the task of reorganising the army. The dignity and safety of the King could not long be maintained by the armies of the foreigner. Nor, of

course, could he enjoy a feeling of self-respecting independence in his dealings with the allied sovereigns until his authority, resting upon the goodwill of the nation, was double-flanked by a disciplined and faithful army. He had the good sense to resist the importunities of the extreme Royalists, who considered that commissions in the army should be an appanage of the ancient nobility. On the contrary, the Government endeavoured, so far as the circumstances of the time permitted, to maintain a democratic element in the army. A non-commissioned officer of four years' standing was eligible for a commission; nay, more, a third of the sub-lieutenancies must be held by men who had been non-commissioned officers. Indeed, the officership of the French army for one hundred and twenty years, under many varieties of Government, has been recruited throughout a wide range of social position. It is in this respect essentially different from the officership of the British army, which, even until this hour and to the manifest diminution of its efficiency, bears boldly stamped upon it the character of the exclusive aristocratic caste from which, in the main, its members are drawn.

The intransigent Royalists maintained that these regulations with regard to promotions infringed the prerogative of the crown, and as this insolent and aggressive faction increased in influence there were occasional complaints that the avenues to advancement were only narrowly open to men from the ranks. But that the troops were not ill disposed to the Crown was proved by the grotesque failure of the few military insurrections that broke out, engineered for the most part by inveterate

and incurable plotters. That eminent politicians were privy to these revolts and would have been very ready to acclaim them had they been successful admits of no doubt. Generally, indeed, the punishment fell upon men who had been the tools of others more designing than themselves, who had diluted a small quantity of valour with a large dose of discretion. The explanation of these failures was simply that the people and the army alike were weary of conspiracies.

Any misgivings entertained by the Royalists concerning the temper of the army were removed by its conduct during the war with Spain in 1823. The object of this campaign, to impose upon the Spaniards a King whom they detested and who had been swept off his throne by the flood of liberalism, could not of itself excite enthusiasm in the nation which had produced the Revolution; but alas, the prospect of successful warfare is always welcome to unthinking masses, and a victorious campaign is always popular while it lasts. It is when the bill comes in that the nation begins to have anxious searchings of heart. The command of the French army was given to the Duc d'Angoulême, the heir at one remove to the throne, who enjoyed considerable personal popularity, professed moderate opinions, and persistently urged the infatuated Ferdinand VII. to grant a liberal constitution to his people. The Duc found that in Spain it is easy to win battles, but not easy to win wars. The country was a prey to its own fighting factions; within a few leagues of the French camp there were peace and order, but beyond nothing but fire and pillage and massacre. However, it was enough for

the men in the ranks that, wherever they appeared victory crowned their arms, they began to take a pride in the flag under which they were gathering fresh laurels, their blood was cleansed of the poison which had been poured into it by old and past humiliating endeavours of the Royalists to stain the pride of the glory which the army had won under the Republic and the Empire. The French Government were soon eager enough to rid themselves of the responsibilities which they had undertaken in Spain, but these results, on which the King and his Ministers had reckoned, remained.

Alas ! out of this good evil was wrought for the house of Bourbon by its foolish friends. The extreme Royalists, now that they felt sure of the army, believed themselves masters of France, and saw no danger in the full execution of their reactionary programme. They imagined that only a short and easy step separated them from the fulfilment of their desires. It was a delusion which was to prove fatal.

Louis XVIII. came to the throne of France an old man in feeble health. He ruled the country from his armchair, and in his armchair he died on the 16th September 1824. He has made but a weak impression on political memory, and posterity has done less than justice to his industry, sagacity, and pawkiness. He guided the destinies of his country with wise and delicate hand. His death left France involved in many internal difficulties, but in none which might not have been solved in the peaceful evolution of history. There can be little doubt that, had his friends been as wise as himself, the Bourbons would have established themselves securely on

the throne of France, and a Bourbon might have been reigning there to-day. Not that Louis ever quite realised the changed conditions. At one moment it seemed that he had fully grasped and accepted the conceptions of parliamentary government, at another he appeared to miss and ignore the meaning of it. He understood the English system, but fancied that, as worked in France, it could be modified in the interests of the monarchy. A Government which should be the instrument of the Chamber's will was not a pleasing thought to him. The conception which prevailed with him, whether consciously or not, was that of the Government as an entity apart which must serve the King who made it, and at the same time contrive to keep in at least fairly sympathetic relations with the Chambers. He had a sincere desire to serve his country in its highest interests; he was not egotistically or fanatically devoted to any "high-falutin" notions of his own authority, and in times of excited feeling he was generally the last man to lose his head. Various anecdotes have come down to us which give penetrating glances into the shrewd humorous intelligence which was among his most useful characteristics. When the Prussians after Waterloo threatened to blow up the Pont d'Iéna, because the name had humiliating associations to them, the King is said to have declared that he would place himself in his armchair on the bridge and see if Blücher would execute his menace. He compared himself in the hands of the too zealous Royalists to the poor cavalier who, being too stiff to mount his horse, prayed to St. George with so much fervour that the saint gave him more

agility than he needed, and he landed on the other side of the animal ! A few weeks before his death, struggling against what he knew to be his last illness, he remarked that a king is permitted to die, but he must never be ill. He was keenly aware of how little his successor understood the dangers which confronted him, and how little fitted he was by disposition to cope with and overcome them. Calling his little grandnephew, the Duc de Bordeaux, to his side, he said : " Let Charles x. take care of (ménager) the throne of this child." It was a solemn warning from dying lips of which Charles x. took little heed.

CHAPTER III

DANCING GAILY TO PERDITION

IT was known of the people that Charles x. had accepted with unconcealed hostility the constitutional régime under which Louis was content to govern; that he had been the soul of the party which had been ever engaged in machinations against the moderate policy of his brother; and that he was resolved, while honouring the Charter with a mechanical observance, to elude, if he might, the spirit of its provisions, and restore as far as possible the days of the ancient monarchy. He contemned as servitude the conditions under which the Kings of England exercised their sovereignty. The Liberals were therefore from the beginning suspicious of him, and interpreted his assurances in the light of his avowed desires.

His first act was to send into retirement a large number of the highest officers in the army, including many Generals who had attained their positions in the wars of the Empire. Such an outcry arose against this measure that the King went back upon his decision and made many exceptions to the ordinance; but when this unfortunate step was followed by a measure for indemnifying the émigrés the suspicion of the people deepened into certainty.

Nevertheless it was a natural and reasonable feeling that, the Bourbons being restored to the throne and to prosperity, the other victims of the Revolution, the people who had suffered for their association with the royal cause, should be placed in something like their former positions. It was calculated that the revenue from the property confiscated yielded £1,200,000 in the year 1790, and an addition was made to the national debt of a sum sufficient at the current price of stocks to yield that sum. The opponents of the measure retorted that no favour should be shown to people who had left their country of their own accord and had fought in the armies of the foreigner against the Republic. The trouble and mischief of the discussion was that it irritated and opened wounds which were beginning to heal, and made a vital question of the controversy between the Revolution and the ancient régime, a controversy which was in course of settling down to a matter of mere historical interest. The extreme Royalists even went so far as to propose, in defiance of express stipulations in the Charter, that the property which had been forsaken by the émigrés and sold as national possessions should be handed back to their original owners; but this over-boldness was repelled by the Government. A sequel to this law of indemnity was the granting of pensions to surviving members of the brave Swiss Guard who, on the 10th August 1792, had defended the Tuileries against the wrath and patriotic fury of the Paris mob, incensed by the insolent manifesto of the Duke of Brunswick threatening the French capital with destruction.

A free press and a tyranny cannot exist side by

side, and naturally a Government whose object, as revealed by their actions if not by their declarations, was anti-revolutionary, considered themselves entitled and obliged to suppress or paralyse the public prints which exposed and condemned their policy. Of what spirit the extreme Royalists were, and how little understanding they had of the new times, may be inferred from the fact that one of their arguments in favour of a severe press law was that Napoleon had governed without the liberty of the press! As if France, with a recognised constitution which expressly guaranteed liberty of the press, were not living under conditions vitally different from those which prevailed when Napoleon was exercising a power which had been created and was sustained by the strength of his own personality! It may be that the Government honestly considered that they had just cause of complaint against the excesses of the Opposition press,—but what Government is not in the same position? The existing franchise law was so contrived that it prevented the Liberals, who were recruited mainly from the middle classes, from having the strength in the Chamber to which their position in the country entitled them. A natural consequence of this was that they made up by the violence of their journals for their weakness in the legislature. Public opinion runs in two channels, press and Parliament; if the current is diverted from one of these the other will overflow, and a devastating flood may be expected. The offences imputed to the newspapers will be well understood by our readers if we say that they seem to have combined the excesses of *Reynolds'*

Newspaper and the yellow press, very irritating to their respective opponents, but irritation of the sort which men in public life may be expected to endure patiently. There were attacks on the Church, on foreign policy, on the two branches of the Legislature,¹ even on the King himself; attempts were made to sow dissension between members of the Cabinet, to stir up discontent in the country, to incite the people against the yoke of the law. Very serious no doubt, but the inevitable drawbacks of a constitutional, almost democratic régime, not calling for exceptional methods of repression.

The Government proposals to beat back the swelling tide of press denunciation were not wanting in rigour. Periodical literature was to be afflicted with a heavy stamp duty, the scale of fines and imprisonment was to be raised, and the printers, no less than the proprietors, were to be held accountable to law. Other publications were to carry a very high stamp duty, and before being issued to the world were to be deposited for a certain number of days with a public authority.

The newspapers and the men of letters flew to arms against these proposals. Three members of the Academy, who had persuaded that eminently reputable institution to prepare a petition to the King against the Government's project, were punished by being deprived of the public offices which they held. The Government failed to perceive that they were really striving to acquire an authority independent of public opinion, and that their policy, if they were allowed to persist in it, was bound to end in the dissolution of the con-

stitutional monarchy, in tyranny or in revolution. Their proposals passed the Chamber of Deputies by a considerable majority, but the peers, more truly interpreting the sentiments of the nation, showed a solid determination to subject the Bill to a thorough transformation, and rather than submit to this the Government withdrew their measure.

Great was the joy of the whole country. Paris illuminated and treated itself to a display of fireworks. Crowds gathered in the streets, and it might have been thought that a victory over a foreign foe was being celebrated. The only shred of credit that remained to Ministers in this matter was that they had persuaded both Chambers to agree to a proposal for raising the price of carrying newspapers through the post.

Charles x. was a devoted partisan of the clerical party, and the people, with much bitterness of heart, saw their King, in the wake of the priests, taking part in religious processions. When Charles stepped upon the throne the hopes of the clericals rose to their highest pitch. Louis had not been ill-disposed towards them, but his zeal was strongly tempered with prudence, and it was not an easy thing to rush him into a position from which his calm sagacity was holding him back. No such obstacles were anticipated in dealing with Charles, although he was quick to resent the slightest affront, or seeming affront, to his royal authority even when it proceeded from them.

The Jesuits, though the order was not recognised by the law, had returned to France, and had immediately become the centre and mainspring of

aggressive Catholicism. The question of giving legal sanction to their establishments was already mooted. In England at the present time the right of the members of any religious order to incorporate themselves, to hold property, and to devote themselves to propagandist activity would be acknowledged without the faintest challenge. But the ideas of liberty in France have never been, nor are they now, so wide and generous as those which prevail in England. Besides, the circumstances of France are widely different. The attitude of the French Government towards religious associations frequently reminds one of that which was assumed by the British Government toward the trade unions in the early days of that movement.

The first step in the religious reaction under Charles x. was to take away from the legislature the power of authorising the establishment of monasteries and convents by the existing recognised orders, and to allocate it to the King. The Chambers were still left to deal with the recognition of new orders. A barbarous law of sacrilege followed. The theft of vessels which had been consecrated for the holding of the elements in the Mass was made punishable by death and the mutilation of the offending hand. The majority, taking a strictly theological view of this crime, insisted that the true light in which to regard it was decide. The opponents of the measure contended that it was not within the competency of a secular authority to pronounce upon the dogma of the Real Presence, and that, the principle of the measure being admitted, it would

become the duty of the State to prosecute cases of blasphemy and heresy. The clerical party not only admitted but insisted upon this logical inference. This savage law was never put into execution, and the passing of it turned to the disadvantage of the clericals, because it put a weapon into the hands of their enemies which they were not slow to use with effect.

Two of the Liberal newspapers which were daily denouncing the Jesuits were at the instigation, or at any rate with the approval, of the King, prosecuted by the Government. The sentence of the Court was awaited with great eagerness throughout the kingdom. The judges refused to take the view that the conduct of the offending newspapers was worthy of being punished by suspension, and contented themselves with merely warning them to be more circumspect in the future. At the same time the judges reprobated the conduct and teaching of a section of the clerical party as a menace to the independence of the monarchy, the sovereignty of the King, and public liberty. Charles x. considered himself as personally wounded by this decree, and the whole proceedings certainly shook his popularity. The decision darkened the outlook for the reactionaries; considering that the juries regarded the delinquencies of the press with too lenient an eye, they had removed such cases from their cognisance, and they now discovered that the judges, sharing in the national sentiment, were not disposed to be more rigorous than the juries.

The ideal of Lamennais, who led the extreme clerical party, was that Christendom should become a theocracy, with the Pope as the supreme agent of

God, Kings and Emperors ruling under him, and he deciding sovereignly in case of disputes between monarchs and their subjects. To the eyes of Lamennais, anarchy and atheism were rampant in the world, and all as the result of that pernicious principle, liberty of conscience. The Catholic Church, in short, did not believe in tolerance, and does not at this moment so believe. Heresy is to be more fiercely combated than the most deadly plague, for it sinks in unending perdition the immortal souls of men. No terms can be made with the contamination. Extermination is the only policy. These boundless claims excited the sharp antagonism even of many faithful Royalists. Montlosier, an old cavalier, a zealous champion of the monarchy, and at one time also of the clergy, published a pamphlet in which he demanded, according to existing laws, the expulsion of the Jesuits and the suppression of ultramontane doctrine. Lamennais was prosecuted on the ground that his teaching constituted an attack on the authority of the King, and defended himself by pleading that a civil tribunal was not competent to deal with spiritual matters. This was in effect a demand that he should be free to proclaim ecclesiastical principles which struck at the very root of all civil authority. He was fined thirty francs!

Montlosier, on the other hand, was rewarded for his zeal by the loss of his pension. The disparity in the punishments was much remarked, and the resultant of the Government's activity, meant to put out the fire, was to stir it up. The disquietude of the nation was intensified at this time by the appointment of a member of the Congregation and a violent

supporter of the Jesuits as governor and tutor respectively of the Duc de Bordeaux, the grandson of the King and the heir at one remove to the throne.

Frayssinous, the Minister of Public Worship, did not manifest any sympathy with the extreme clericals, but as a Bishop he was suspect, and his utterances were marked by a naïve ingenuousness or want of tact, whichever it may be considered, that did not soothe, but rather increased, the almost morbid suspiciousness of the anti-clericals. He sought to palliate the excesses of the young clergy by describing them as the reaction against Napoleon's arbitrary treatment of the Church. He argued that though the Jesuits as a body were unauthorised they might be tolerated as individuals, and it was as individuals, under the control of the Bishops, that they directed seven seminaries.

These representations, which seemed to justify the alarm of the country, only made matters worse. The nation was penetrated with the idea that the priests were the hidden mainspring of the Government's activity in all its branches. Such a suspicion—whether well or ill founded really matters little—implies blameworthy action on the part of the Government, because it must at least have been guilty of indiscretions which gave birth and colour to the suspicions. Governments, no less than individuals, must seek to avoid all appearance of evil. And the clericals themselves are in the end always injured by being suspected of having stepped outside their domain to secure possession of weapons which should be wielded by other hands.

It is not in itself a bad sign that religion should stir up strife, so long as the battle of the faith is being fought by the sword of the Spirit. "I came not to bring peace, but a sword." A society which lives in a continual whirl of theological polemics is not necessarily in an unwholesome condition. That there are matters of controversy in religion about which men get excited and even angry is not a condition of things to be bewailed. When violent antagonism to religion dies away the Churches have little reason to congratulate themselves. The halls of science which were numerous in England at the height of the Bradlaugh propaganda have largely disappeared, and indeed it is said that some of them have become mission halls; yet there are Christian men, not a few, who are convinced that there was in those days more true, earnest, religious faith in the country than there is now. The enemies of the Church in France were in great part, no doubt, the enemies of all religion, and for them as such, we cannot profess to have sympathy. It is not a reproach to the Catholic Church that she caused great strife in France, but that she made unreasonable and arrogant demands, and that she sought to enforce them by methods which were repugnant to good sense, justice, charity, and the stability of the State.

An attempt to return towards the principle of primogeniture stirred up and confirmed the deepest suspicions of the people. This result was achieved none the less effectually that the endeavour was hesitating and weak, suggesting that the Government were both aware of and frightened by the enormity of their proceeding. According to the

existing law, a father was bound to set aside a fixed part of his estate for division at his death, in certain proportions, among his family. Only a limited quantity of his property could he allocate by will as he chose. The proposal of the new law was that if the father left no will that part of his estate which under the existing law he was free to dispose of at his pleasure was to go to the eldest son, who would also receive the portion that fell to him among the brothers, taken by preference, the new law said, out of real estate.

What were the arguments by which the Government supported their proposal? Only persons paying at least £40 a year in direct taxation could be elected to the Chamber of Deputies. The maintainers of the new project declared that by the repeated division of inheritances the number of eligibles was being seriously reduced. That is to say, and they would readily have admitted it, that they were in favour of keeping up the high property qualification for membership in the Chamber. What was a matter of even greater concern to the reactionary party was the reduction in the number of persons entitled to exercise the double vote. As we have stated on page 26, a contribution of £40 a year in direct taxation entitled the payer to a vote for the arrondissement member and a vote for the department member. This provision, which from its first enacting was the subject of a bitter and unceasingly active discontent, gave to mere wealth an addition of weight in the election of deputies to which in the eyes of persons professing liberal and democratic principles it was by no means entitled. Men of substance in all circumstances,

and particularly in a State where the forces that made for unsettlement seem peculiarly active, are much more inclined to aristocratic than to popular opinions. They are likely to be more zealous for the order and settled government which secure them in the possession and enjoyment of their goods than for liberty. A diminution in the number of such men must in any case have been injurious to a Conservative Ministry working with a King who was disposed to hark back to the days before the Revolution ; but with the double vote in operation the shrinking of the class entitled to exercise it was, from their point of view, doubly serious.

Among the landed class, far more than among the commercial aristocracy of the towns, was the division of successions likely to result in the loss of the double vote. If the portion of land that falls to the inheritance of a son who has a close hereditary connection with the soil is adequate to support him, he is in general content, he is not inclined to embark on exciting and hazardous enterprises in the hope of securing the means with which to extend his patrimony. It is otherwise to a son who has inherited a modest fortune from a father who has made his wealth in commerce. If his share is in money his inclination is to follow in his father's footsteps, and use his humble hundreds as the foundation of handsome thousands. If his portion is a business or a share thereof he feels obliged to put his energies into the maintenance and extension of the concern. These inevitable tendencies, operating in conjunction with the existing law concerning successions, were bound to cause alarm

to a reactionary government ; for the aristocracy of land is more conservative than the aristocracy of commerce, and the diminution of the double-vote qualification among the descendants and successors of the old seigneurs was more alarming to the Ministry of Charles x. than would have been the loss of the same among the new rich people of the towns. Indeed, the growing strength of the wealthy bourgeoisie, with its habits of business, the close scrutiny which it was more and more inclined to exercise upon the conduct of Government, and its assertion of its own weight, was causing considerable uneasiness among the friends of arbitrary power. It was openly avowed that the safety of the monarchy demanded the building up of a great landed interest to balance the industrial aristocracy. The case of England with a Conservative party deriving a great part of its strength from a land system scarcely freed from the shackles of feudalism was called in aid by the supporters of the Government project.

Although the actual measure of the Cabinet was feeble, with very limited provisions indeed, the nation awoke at once to the perilous tendency of them. It is doubtful whether any single act of government did more to sap the foundations of Charles x.'s throne than this unfortunate proposal. It was regarded as a challenge to the nation. The newspapers cried out that the Bill was the work of the Jesuits, that its design was to re-establish the ancient régime, that it was hostile to the ideas of the age, and an outrage on natural affections. The most ingenious argument in favour of the measure was that of Montalembert, who urged that it would

serve to keep in existence a class of men with means and leisure enough to concern themselves about public affairs, and that such men, presenting impassable barriers to Republicanism on the one hand and Absolutism on the other, were necessary to the maintenance of the free institutions which gathered round a constitutional monarchy. The peers, to whom the Bill was first presented, whittled away its provisions until there was little left of it, and that little innocuous; and in this form it was adopted by the deputies. Paris, after its manner, celebrated this check to the Government by illuminations. A victory over a foreign foe could scarcely have given greater satisfaction to the citizens of the capital.

The Government were not without other unmistakable signs and warnings that their reactionary proceedings and their even more manifest reactionary spirit stirred up deep animosity among a considerable portion of the nation. Towards the close of 1825 the obsequies of General Foy, who had won great popularity as a deputy by his eloquent denunciations of the ancient régime, were made the occasion of a political demonstration. A hundred thousand persons followed the coffin, and along the whole line of the boulevards the shops were closed in token of public mourning. With the countenance of the Duc d'Orléans a subscription was opened for the children of the General.

A more striking and sinister manifestation of public feeling was that which took place less than seventeen months later when the King reviewed the National Guard of Paris in the Champ de Mars. Villèle and his Ministry had just been compelled

to withdraw their Press Bill; they were suffering the extremity of public disfavour, and toppling over into the abyss of obloquy and denunciation. Though the personal popularity of the King was not seriously impaired, there was grave reason to fear the scandal of an open demonstration against his Ministers in his own presence. And so it happened. Surrounded by the princes of the royal house and by his staff, the King, mounted on horseback, was acclaimed with shouts of "Vive le roi!" presently mingled, however, with even more earnest and noisy cries of "Vive la liberté de la presse! Vive la Charte! A bas les ministres! A bas les Jésuits! A bas Villèle!" One of the National Guard actually stepped outside the rank in order that his shouts might be the better heard and distinguished. The King, backing his horse against the man in order to put him into his place again, answered: "I have come here to receive your homage, not to be taught by you." As the King left the field the shouts pursued him; and the princesses, whose carriages were surrounded by the people, were compelled to listen to the ejaculations which had affronted the King.

Charles was inclined to make light of the matter, and to proceed no further than the punishment of individual offenders, but over-persuaded by Villèle, who represented the demonstration as a most audacious attempt at revolution, he gave his consent that same evening to an ordinance which dissolved the National Guard of Paris, comprising twenty thousand men. This was a grave error; for the National Guard was little troubled by revolutionary sentiment, it was a bourgeois

force regarded even by many Royalists as a buttress of the monarchy. A wise King would have seen in this unfortunate demonstration a sounding of the depth of discontent among the moderate middle classes, and would have reflected how serious the situation was when those whose inclinations and interests were all for peace and settled government adopted such unwonted means of expressing themselves. An ordinance of dissolution was useless and harmful; if the reasonable demands of moderate men are not granted, and an attempt is made to bar the avenue of hope against them, they are apt to cease being moderate; and one effect of the dissolution must have been a considerable accession of strength to the forces which were hostile to the King and his ideas.

Since the death of Louis xviii. Liberalism had been gaining ground, and now, in 1827, there was little doubt that its adherents comprised the majority of the nation. The Government, made cruel and desperate by fear of an overwhelming calamity, reinforced the severity of the existing press laws by the re-establishment of the censorship. The consequence was a shower of pamphlets watering and fertilising the seeds of political doctrine which had been blown all over the country. The Ministry gained nothing by the censorship, and suffered the diminution of credit which follows the balking of an extreme measure.

The Government obviously could not go on, and Villèle was resolved not to resign. He found himself bound by knotted cords which might be cut by the sword of a *coup d'état* or unravelled

by the chances of a General Election. The latter was the resource to which he at last made up his mind to commit himself. Seventy-six new peers—thirty-five of them from among the deputies—were created partly to strengthen on the side of the Government the Upper House which had mitigated the worse excesses of reaction, and partly to remove from the Lower House some members who had proved inconveniently exacting. The Liberals of Paris were so sure of success that they began to rejoice before the results were known, smashing the windows of citizens who had omitted to illuminate. A few barricades were erected, more out of sheer excess of excitement than with serious intent of revolution, and they were easily cleared by the troops. The revolution-mongers who follow the Liberal army as camp-followers were ready, but they did not believe that their opportunity had arrived.

The result of the election was the return of 170 Ministerialists out of a total of 420 deputies; the Liberals, with 180 members, had doubled their numbers and were the strongest party in the new Chamber, and undoubtedly much stronger in the country than in Parliament; the anti-ministerial Royalists counted 70. Villèle still clung desperately to his position. He advised the King, in the very certain event of the Chamber demanding the dismissal of the Ministry, to refuse this request promptly; that once finally settled, he proposed to meet the situation by introducing measures in harmony with the sentiments which the nation had just expressed. The King, after hesitating for a fortnight, decided against the Ministry. It was

only with much difficulty and after many proposed combinations had miscarried that a new Cabinet under Martignac was formed. Villèle, overwhelmed by unpopularity, had fallen by making concessions against his better judgment to the extreme Royalists. The new Ministry, instructed by the mistakes of its predecessors and warned by the disaster which had overtaken it, understood the direction in which the nation would have it go ; but would it secure the concurrence of the King ?

The new Ministry immediately set itself to reverse the ecclesiastical policy of its predecessor. Various functionaries were deprived of their positions, because of their slavish devotion to the interests of the Congregation. The King gave his consent to these measures very reluctantly. Fraysinous, the Minister of Worship and of Public Instruction in the Villèle Cabinet, was at first retained by Martignac, but presently he was shorn of some of his functions and very soon after compelled to retire. The King, however, refused to allow his Ministers a voice in the selection of the guardian to the Duc de Bordeaux. He persisted in the appointment of the Duc de Damas, a devoted adherent of the Congregation. The position of the secondary schools, conducted by the clergy, was regulated by two ordinances. One of these enacted that the managers and teachers must not belong to any unauthorised order. This provision was directed against the Jesuits, whose growing influence in the education of the young was dreaded, and who were not recognised by the law of France. However, to disarm the hostility of all but the most extreme clericals the Government made a

special grant of £48,000 to these schools, the number of whose pupils was fixed at 20,000.

Nevertheless, the Church raised the cry of persecution,—a characteristic proceeding of the Roman Catholic communion when any attempt is made to restrict its pretensions within the limits of the civil law. The King was called upon to save France. The Bishops declared that their consciences would not permit them to submit the nomination of the superiors and directors of these schools to the approval of the civil power, nor to subscribe to the article which enacted that the directors should not belong to an unauthorised order! This last statement was a plain defiance of the law of the land in a matter in which conscience was not directly or obviously involved. The Bishops further objected to the limitation of the number of pupils and to the prohibition against receiving day-scholars. Charles loved the Church, but he loved his own authority more, and the Bishops had overstepped the mark of discretion. The King was very angry, and declared that the dignity of the crown and the well-being of religion demanded the execution of the ordinances. When the Bishops still proved refractory he brought pressure to bear on the Pope, who disavowed the claim of the Bishops to impose the unauthorised orders on France. The Bishops gave in, out of deference to the royal dignity which seemed to be involved in the matter, comforting themselves with the secret confidence that the ordinances were the work of the Ministers, that the King was really on their side, and that their hour would soon come.

A liberal spirit was at once manifested in relation

to the press. Preliminary authorisation and the censorship were abolished. Newspapers were no longer liable to be indicted for the tendency of a series of articles ; a specific offence must be alleged. However, the amount of the pecuniary security for good behaviour was increased, and the managers were rendered amenable to severe penalties, especially in case of a repeated offence. The policy of the Government was to stretch out the bounds of press liberty as widely as possible, and at the same time maintain the rigour of the punishments for excesses. "The influence of the newspapers," said Martignac, "is necessary, but it is dangerous, for their interest, in opposition to that of the nation, lies in excitement, which is the only means of maintaining public curiosity. Order and peace are deadly enemies to the newspapers !" The trial of press offences was still withheld from the juries, but the continuance of this enactment encountered only mild opposition even among the Liberals, because the judges had shown themselves susceptible to the atmosphere of the time.

The Martignac Ministry sought to act in such a spirit as to prove that Royalism could be liberal and Liberalism monarchical. / That it did in a great measure succeed hardly admits of doubt. But the opportunity of final triumph was never within its reach, for it was well understood that the King did not sympathise with its principles of life and was only searching for an occasion to get rid of it. Charles, an inveterate plotter, could not resist the temptation to conspire against his own Government when that happened to be inharmonious with his personal opinions. The blow from which the Government

never recovered was the rejection of its proposals for the reform of the municipal institutions of the country in a liberal spirit. One of the most notable speeches against the measure was made by Labourdonnaye, to whom the King expressed his satisfaction with the oration !

By all the outward and visible signs the Ministry was well pleasing to the nation, and indeed a certain historian, not wanting in sympathy with the royalist cause, admits that it was the only Ministry of the Restoration the memory of which was recalled with affection by the masses. The King undertook journeys to various parts of his dominions, and was everywhere received with enthusiasm. Some of the most Liberal of the deputies took part in these demonstrations, and were eager for the honour of being received by his Majesty. Unfortunately, all that the King gathered from these tokens of popularity, compounded, as it was, of admiration for his personal qualities and satisfaction with the conduct of the Government, was the hope of being able in due time to presume with impunity upon the good-nature of the French people, and to tamper with their rights and liberties.

The Liberals must bear a heavy share of responsibility for the disabling blow which was dealt to the Martignac Ministry by the loss of the Bills for the reform of municipal institutions. The proposals, though they made a great stride in the direction of which the Liberals approved, did not go far enough for them ; and out of mere factiousness, the dire consequences of which were realised at the moment when it achieved its fatal result, they united with the opposition at the other

pole which considered the measures wildly revolutionary.

The King saw that his hour had come. He sent for Polignac, a devoted personal friend. That he was notoriously incompetent was to Charles an irrelevant consideration; he would not even hold account of the fact that Polignac's position in the Chambers was hopeless; the important point was that he was uncompromising in the championship of the most reactionary and most illiberal views. The new Ministers were appointed even before their predecessors knew that they were going to be dismissed. On this occasion Charles, in his contact with some of the Martignac Ministers, was lacking in the gracious politeness which, as a rule, formed part of the charm of his personality.

Before his accession to office Polignac, though professing to accept representative institutions, had publicly lamented that they were being perverted to the weakening of the Crown and of religion. He had hesitated long before taking the oath of allegiance to the Charter, he had been deeply involved in the ultra-royalist intrigues against the Ministers of Louis XVIII., he had warmly supported the Bill for the revival of primogeniture, one of the most unpopular and damaging proposals of the Restoration, and he was willing, it was believed, to become the slavish tool of the King and the priests. What added to the hatred and fear with which he was regarded was the spectacle of calm religious repose which he presented. A tyrant who acts in the heat of temper is not so formidable a personality as one who is always calm

and unruffled, who perpetrates his cruelties, not with a savage glare in his eyes, but with a bow and a smile. It was something like this with Polignac. While a fierce tornado was blowing around him, involving friends and foes in its sweep, he sat, in perfect confidence and serenity, in the eye of the storm. What irritated and infuriated his foes, and ultimately his friends also, was the manifest absence in him of even a remotest suspicion that he might be wrong in his ideas or that his plans might miscarry.

The new Ministry began its career with the prepossessions of the country against it. At this time Lafayette, the brave and chivalrous Republican, was making a triumphal progress through some of the towns in the south, making speeches on liberty by the way. He congratulated France on possessing the calm and disdainful firmness of a great people which knew its rights, felt its strength, and would be faithful to its duty. How serious were the fears of the country may be gauged from the circumstance that it was anticipated that the Government would attempt to raise taxes without the consent of the Chambers; and associations, openly encouraged by the newspapers, began to be formed to refuse payment in such an eventuality. The new Ministry was naturally hostile to the press. The editor of the *Journal des Débats*, who, though a Royalist, was a Liberal, was tried for insulting the King. At first condemned to six months' imprisonment and a fine, he was, on appeal, acquitted. When the judges presented themselves at the first royal reception after this decision the King spoke to them in a severe tone, and was so

singularly ill-advised as openly to show his displeasure with their conduct.

Though Polignac was called to power in August 1829, he did not come face to face with the Chamber until the following March. The deputies threw down the gage of battle in the address which they voted in reply to the King's speech. They represented to his Majesty that the views of the Government and of the people were not in harmony, that the Government distrusted the people, and that the people believed their liberties to be threatened. A first and necessary condition of the strength of the throne and the grandeur of France was that the Government should possess the confidence of the nation. The King declared that the Chamber had overstepped its rights, that his resolution was unshakable,—in short, that he meant to keep his Ministers.

Polignac went on his way in blind confidence. He could effect nothing with the deputies, but he was convinced that the country was not really much concerned, that the agitation was only on the surface, and that it was all the fault of the liberty of the press. It was resolved to try the chances of a General Election. At the time a successful campaign was being waged in Algeria, and the Government were holding the cup of military glory, too often a cup of sorcery, to the lips of the people. But they declined to drink of it. They refused to render themselves unfit for the sober discharge of the most important business they had on hand. In the new Chamber of 428 members the Opposition were in a majority of 112. Among the candidates who had been de-

feated were the Admiral and the Navy Minister who had contributed so largely to the triumph in Algeria.

A supreme crisis was evidently at hand. The King would not hear of concessions. Concessions, he said, had destroyed Louis XVI. It was a question of riding on horseback as a sovereign or riding in a cart to the guillotine. At the same time, he disclaimed any intention of resorting to a *coup d'état*. The provision on which he secretly relied to save himself from the imputation of illegality was Article 14 of the Charter, which gave the King the right to make ordinances for the safety of the State. It did not come within the compass of his narrow intelligence to perceive that no such situation as that in which he found himself was contemplated by this Article, and that it was possible to be faithful to the letter of it while betraying the whole spirit of the Charter. The abettors of the King in his madness poured into his ears the most nonsensical topsy-turvy ideas—"that the press and the political associations had destroyed the spirit of representative government, and that every Government had the power, a power pre-existent to the laws, to provide for its own safety"; that, in short, a King governing with representative institutions has the right radically to alter these institutions when the people exercise them with a result which is not well-pleasing to his Majesty. In the whole history of revolutions, and revolutions have produced some strange freaks of polity, there is no document more puerile than that in which the advisers of Charles X. sought to justify their proposals at this momentous epoch.

However, the die was cast. On the 26th July 1830 four ordinances were published in the *Moniteur*. They abolished the liberty of the press, dissolved the recently elected Chamber of Deputies even before it had met, appointed a new election to be held in September, and announced a new electoral law which greatly restricted the franchise, limited the number of deputies to 258, and reintroduced the annual renewal by one-fifth. Further, the Chamber in considering a measure was restricted to the adoption of such emendations as had been proposed or consented to by the King. One of the Ministers, before signing this fateful document, cast his eyes all round the room. "What are you looking for?" asked Polignac. "The portrait of Strafford," was the reply.

CHAPTER IV

THREE RED DAYS

POLIGNAC'S calculation was that the nation would be so surprised and dumbfounded by the ordinances as to be rendered helpless. Never did statesman make a graver mistake. It was the King and his Ministers upon whom the surprise was to be inflicted. Ever since the accession of Charles x. the people had lived in expectation of a *coup d'état*, and the extreme Royalists had cherished, without any elaborate attempts at concealment, a desire of the same. In 1827, while the Villèle Ministry was obviously tottering to its fall, and speculation was rife as to the subsequent course of events, rumour ascribed to the King the intention of using the army to override the Chamber and of governing by means of proscription lists. At the close of a review of the troops in the Camp at Saint-Omer that year Charles said to General de Mortemart: "What could we not do with troops animated by such a good spirit?" "Yes, sire," replied the sagacious soldier, "we could do almost anything with them on the day of the enterprise; but what of the day after?" No doubt indiscreet observations of this sort were noised abroad, losing nothing in their way to the public ear, and giving rise to

disquieting apprehensions. "Surely Princes had need, in tender matters and ticklish times, to beware what they say; especially in these short speeches, which fly abroad like darts and are thought to be shot out of their secret intentions."

The King did not from his heart accept the representative institutions which in governing he was bound to take into consideration. He intended to realise his own views: if the Chambers co-operated, good and well; if they refused their co-operation, they must be circumvented or suppressed. His lip-service to representative institutions was analogous to that which is paid to the same principle by the English House of Peers. That assembly has no faith in democracy—though most of its members are at some pains to conceal or disguise their distrust—and is fully resolved, except when democracy is of the same mind as itself—let the truth be fully told—to delay, pervert, or defy the will of the nation so long as it can do so without imperilling its own existence as a branch of the legislature, or the social distinction which membership of the House confers upon those who sit there as upon those who share their blood.

The result of such a policy as that pursued by Charles x., if persisted in, was a foregone conclusion. It must end in a successful *coup d'état* or a successful revolution. Yet there was nothing of the political gambler about Charles x.; it never seems to have dawned upon him that he was engaged upon a desperate enterprise in which his own crown was the stake. He seems to have considered that his personal popularity, backed by the fidelity of the army, of which after the campaign in Spain the

Royalists did not entertain a doubt, was adequate to so tremendous an undertaking. Most even of those who urged upon him extreme courses had some conception of the risks involved. But never a doubt seems to have entered the mind of Charles. He went a-hunting on the day which was to seal the fate of his dynasty.

The ordinances were published in the *Moniteur* of July 26, and before night fell the popular commotion began to show itself. The King was at Saint-Cloud, a few miles from Paris. If he had been in his capital one of two things would have happened: he would have suffered personal indignity, perhaps injury; or, surrounded by his household troops, he would have speedily suppressed the incipient revolt. His absence from the scene of tumult had undoubtedly a vital bearing on the issue.

Having expected nothing worse than a riot, the Government had neglected to take the most ordinary precautions. The franchise did not descend below the middle classes; in the bourgeoisie, according to the view of the Government, lay the root of discontent, and the bourgeoisie, though it may be at times violently vocal, is not revolutionary; it does not wish to risk its money and property. The Government seem to have argued that, because the masses had no vote they had no interest, or nothing but a superficial interest, in politics. That they would rise in resistless fury was not thought of. It is worth noting, in the first place, then, that the Revolution of July, a revolution under a constitutional and parliamentary régime, was effected by men without votes.

There were 8000 troops with eight pieces of artillery in Paris. The loyalty of three of the regiments was known to be doubtful, and within two days 2500 soldiers had deserted or were missing. The General in command, Marmont, Duc de Raguse, had stood idly by for several hours at the commencement of the disturbances, while the crowds ransacked the shops of the gunsmiths, and while the old National Guard of Paris, incompletely disarmed, was furbishing the 30,000 muskets which had been left in its hands. On the 28th the soldiers realised that they were unable to cope with the situation; not one of the positions which they had attempted to occupy in the city had been held; Charles, remaining at Saint-Cloud, refused to believe the bad news, and still maintained a stiff-necked attitude. His chance of salvation was lost.

It is sometimes easy, in the light of after days, to mark the point of time at which concessions would probably have saved a Ministry or a throne. But we shall do well to remember that the statesmen who have to act before the event cannot have that fulness of knowledge respecting the dispositions of men which may belong to quite ordinary intelligences as they look back upon the scene. The task of a statesman who has to face the possibility of a revolution is never so simple as it may be made to appear in words.

True, Charles had been repeatedly warned by politicians who opposed his conduct, and of whom, therefore, he took no account, that the end would be the destruction of his dynasty. But he was obsessed by the idea of the Duchesse d'Angoulême, his daughter-in-law and the daughter of Louis XVI.,

that for a King to make a concession is to take a step down from his throne. The same fatal phantasy had pursued James II. of England to the day of his death. Yet the truth is obvious and simple. A wise King, if he is driven to the conclusion that there is palpable danger of a revolution, desiring to stave it off, will make concessions graciously and promptly. Time is of the very essence of the matter. As long as it remains plausible for the Crown and the Court party to represent their concessions as free-will gifts there is a chance of saving the monarchy. Once the people are penetrated by the conviction that what is given is given under compulsion they cease, of course, to show gratitude; they are exasperated by the opposition offered to their demands, and presently, inflated by their victory and conscious of their strength, they are inclined to act on the principle that the best solution of the situation is to make its recurrence impossible by removing at the same time the King and the necessity of compulsion.

The condemnation that falls upon Charles X. is that he refused to accept, from those who had the best means of measuring the crisis, the counsels of conciliation which they offered to him, and at the time they were first given. In other respects, as concerns dignity and character, his conduct in the presence of a supreme disaster was admirable. But in political wisdom he was conspicuously lacking. Not until the royal troops had been compelled to evacuate Paris on the 29th did he sign the withdrawal of the ordinances. A tyro in statecraft could not have acted with less sagacity. One of the Ministers who had strongly disapproved

the issue of the ordinances was as strongly opposed to their withdrawal, declaring that that meant the downfall of the throne. There was true insight in this counsel; having deferred concession until concession was useless, until it could no longer bear the aspect of a gracious gift, the King had only one chance remaining, a desperate and uncompromising opposition of force to force.

At eight o'clock in the evening the envoys of the King arrived at the Hotel de Ville of Paris with the intimation that the ordinances had been withdrawn, and that a new Ministry was to be formed under Mortemart. Lafayette, who was in command of the forces of the Revolution, received them with cold politeness, and referred them to the deputies from whom he had received his commission. The answer of the latter was plain and plump: concessions were now useless, only a new dynasty could govern France. Next morning a notice was posted all over the capital: "Charles x. can never again enter Paris. He has shed the blood of the people."

In the meantime what was the attitude of the professed politicians in the face of the popular commotions? Their first step was to declare that the King had transgressed the law, and that they themselves desired, in any proceedings of protest that they might take, to keep within it. The Opposition journals, considering the ordinances illegal, regarded themselves as absolved from giving heed to them; notwithstanding, therefore, the reinstatement of the preliminary authorisation and the censorship, two of them made their appearance on the morning of the 27th without having

sought the former or submitted to the latter. It was an attempt to prevent the circulation of these papers that gave to the sullen crowds which had thronged the streets from the early morning their first impetus to violence.

Anxious and cautious, the handful of deputies who happened to be in Paris waited upon events. Urged by some of the Paris electors to place themselves at the head of the insurrection, they evaded the importunities of their friends, whether out of regard for their personal safety, being as yet uncertain of the issue, or, what is more probable, fearing to make themselves responsible for a repetition of the horrors of the first revolution. But on the third day of the street fighting, when the royal troops had withdrawn from the capital and the cause of the King, in Paris at least, was lost, the deputies resolved to bank the flood of feeling and violence and restore order. Lafayette, who, though now seventy-three years of age, retained much of the physical vigour and all the republican fervour of his early manhood, eagerly accepted an invitation from the deputies to take command of the forces of Paris, and installed himself at the Hotel de Ville. Lafayette, however, held more advanced views than his more sober-minded confederates thought it wise, in the interests of France, to act upon. The humiliations of 1815, when the allied troops encamped within the walls of Paris, when a crushing fine was imposed upon the nation and its corporate entity mutilated, had cut deep, burning like acid, into the quivering heart and memory of France. To proclaim a Republic might mean the necessity of facing Europe in

arms,—that was the fear which made the more deliberate of the deputies pale and tremble. The time was gone when France, as in 1792, feeling like a mighty young giant awakening from sweet refreshing sleep, could hurl scorn and defiance at the pigmies which mowed and gibbered around her. Sharp disappointments and devastating reverses had abated her high spirit, and she no longer felt able to meet the revived and intensified anger of an affronted Europe.

Further, there was no need, as in 1789, of a violent rupture with the immediate past. A simple revision and strengthening of the Charter would give the nation all the securities and all the opportunities of reform and progress that it needed. The French Revolution of 1830, like the English Revolution of 1688, was in the main not a creative but a preservative transaction, and the French politicians of the period were impressed, instructed, and practically helped by the analogy between their position, in its constitutional aspects, and that of the Whig statesmen of England more than one hundred and forty years before. Fortunate was it for France at this juncture that there was at hand in the Duc d'Orléans—directly descended in the male line from the younger brother of Louis XIV., and the head of the junior branch of the Bourbon family—a personage who was ready to play a rôle similar to that in which William of Orange had so distinguished himself. Disowning in his conduct the anti-national sentiments of the émigrés, the patriotic Duc had fought in the armies of the Republic; and since the Restoration he had withheld his sympathies from the extreme

Royalists. His history and his character pointed him out to the deputies as the destined deliverer of France. The crown to be offered to him would clearly be the gift of the French nation, and the acceptance of it would imply a full recognition, on the part of the King, of the supremacy of the national will.

This solution of the crisis could not be reached all at once. The first step of the deputies was to inform the Duc, who was at Raincy, that their hopes rested in him, and that for him the alternative would shortly be either to leave the country or accept the crown. He was invited to repair to Paris at once in order to assume the duties of Lieutenant-General of the kingdom. When he arrived in the capital, in the persuasion, evidently, that the affairs of his kinsman were not so desperate as they seemed to almost everybody else, he sent for Mortemart and inquired of him whether the King would recognise him in the event of his accepting the office offered to him by the deputies. Mortemart replied that he saw no other way of putting a bridle on anarchy, and undertook to advise the King in this sense. The situation of the Duc was not without personal danger, for the presence of a Bourbon was of itself a cause of irritation and suspicion to the extreme, and therefore noisy and energetic, section of Liberals, whose desire was the establishment of a Republic. Lafayette was slow to abandon this hope, and only finally relinquished it when he was told that if he proclaimed the Republic he would himself have to take the Presidency of it. However, the popular feeling was won over to the side of the Duc when,

Lafayette by his side, he appeared to the crowd at a window of the Hotel de Ville with the tricolour in his hand.

Hurried preparations were now made for the meeting of the Chambers. Before they assembled Charles and his son, the Duc d'Angoulême, had abdicated in favour of the five-year-old Duc de Bordeaux, who was to be proclaimed as Henry v. This was an expedient of despair. Henry v. lived to be an elderly man, but he never sat for one day on the throne of France. The answer of the Duc d'Orléans to the abdication was to send to Charles x. a number of commissioners charged with the duty of seeing him safely out of the country. In the rear of these commissioners was let loose a great confused swarm of armed men, soldiers and civilians, imperfectly disciplined, excited and incensed. The greatest care was taken that this mob should not come into actual touch with the small body of troops which surrounded the fallen monarch. The object of the movement, which was suggested by the shrewd Odilon Barrot, was merely to frighten the King and to persuade him how hopeless would be any endeavour to re-enter Paris and resume his authority.

At the opening of the Chambers on August 3, in the presence of 240 deputies and 60 peers, the Duc, standing beside the vacant throne, declared that he held his power from the Chambers, and protested his desire to secure from all possibility of infringement the rights of the nation as expressed in the Charter. Following the precedent of the English Revolution of 1688, the Chambers declared the throne vacant, and then--with the

same safe and august example in mind—proceeded, by revising the Charter, to settle the conditions on which the crown should be offered to the Duc d'Orléans. Clause 14, authorising the King to make provision for the safety of the State, was essentially modified; its vagueness, leaving a loophole for the exercise of arbitrary power, had enabled Charles x. to cloak his tyranny with a specious legality. The most noteworthy of the other alterations was that Catholicism was no longer declared to be the religion of the State, but only of the majority of the French people. But the most vital change of all, that which comprehended and guaranteed all the others, consisted in the declaration that the Charter must no longer be regarded as having been granted by the King; it was the result of a mutual contract. The King at his accession must swear, in presence of the Chambers, to respect the rights of the nation and observe faithfully the constitutional laws.

It is highly to the credit of the Chambers, and significant of the noble temper of the French nation at this time, that, while the political proceedings of Charles x. were reprobated, only one deputy made an insulting personal reference—and that was immediately resented—to the unhappy monarch who was now on his way to a sorrowful exile. Throughout these sad proceedings the character and dignity of the old King inspired respect. He was fond of power, and fonder still of extravagant theories respecting his own rights and position, but there was nothing dark or mean or cruel in his nature. The commissioners who accompanied and guarded him during his long,



CHARLES X, KING OF FRANCE

From the painting by François (baron) Gérard

slow, mournful journey to Cherbourg found themselves strangely drawn and warmed to his personality, and saw him sail away from the shores of France with feelings in their hearts which were scarcely to be distinguished from personal sorrow.

There was great joy throughout the nation, and greater among the middle, than among the lowest classes, when the revision of the Charter was completed and the throne was definitely offered to the Duc d'Orléans. On the 9th of August he took the oath, and accepted the insignia of sovereignty from the hands of four Marshals of France. The Duc de Fitzjames, a descendant of James II. of England, was amongst the first, constrained as he was by a sorrowful necessity, to express his allegiance to the new monarch; while regretting the downfall of a King whom he had loved, as the result of proceedings which he described as more foolish than perfidious. The Powers were not slow to recognise the new Government, and the reign of Louis-Philippe I. commenced under auspices in which doubt and hope were blended, but in which hope seemed the more conspicuous ingredient.

CHAPTER V

THE MONARCHY OF THE UPPER MIDDLE CLASSES

VERY early in the reign of Louis-Philippe the difficulties with which it was to writhe until its unhappy close began to manifest themselves. The root of the trouble lay in fundamental differences as to the interpretation of the Revolution of July. Now that the Charter had been revised and its spirit safeguarded against abuse by the letter thereof, the King and his friends considered that the work of the revolution was done, that the last attainable degree of perfection in the civil constitution of France had been reached. Henceforward the government of the country was to proceed as under the Restoration. "The misfortune of this country," said Casimir Périer to Odilon Barrot, "is that there are many men who believe that there has been a revolution in France. There has been no revolution, only a change in the person of the chief of the State." "The Revolution," said Guizot, in language which seems an echo of that held by Burke regarding the English Revolution of 1688, "has changed a dynasty, but in confining this change within the narrowest limits it has sought for a substitute as near to the former

dynasty as possible. The instinct of the country has driven it to make the change as little marked as possible."

The other interpretation, and as the course of history abundantly proved, the right one, held by a large section of publicists friendly to the person and dynasty of Louis-Philippe, was that the Revolution of 1830 was rather a reversion to the Revolution of 1789, the principles of which were now to be gradually, but not slowly, worked out towards the establishment, under a constitutional and strictly limited monarchy, of a true democracy. "Our Revolution," said Odilon Barrot, "does not date from the three great days; it ascends much higher, it began when the element of aristocratic privilege was destroyed in France." Though the attack on the spirit of the Charter gave its cue to the Revolution of 1830, the forces of revolt were strengthened and made triumphant by the accession of elements which were in essential conflict with the Restoration on broader and more general grounds, and were availing themselves of an opportunity to vindicate a more sweeping and comprehensive cause; naturally, all the radical discontent in the country attached itself to the Revolution, and would have attached itself thereto no matter what the cause, serious or insignificant, of the revolt, so long as it contained a promise of success. Louis-Philippe, however, speedily threw away the ladder of revolutionary sentiment and principle by which he had been hoisted to the throne of France. He was violently opposed to the dictum of Thiers that the King should reign and not govern, and set himself resolutely to the business of establishing

his personal authority. His Ministers were to be his instruments, he would not allow himself to be hidden behind their responsibility ; his should be the policy that it would be their duty to impose upon the Chambers. This determination, and fear of the Revolution, were the mainsprings of his policy.

Never perhaps was the reign of any monarch so continuously troubled as that of Louis-Philippe. The advanced Liberals soon perceived that their hopes of a Republic under a hereditary Presidency, held for life, were lost like streams in the desert, and the younger and more ardent among them immediately began to show their spirit and to be turbulent. Towards the end of 1830 it was decreed that a cross should be presented to those who had distinguished themselves during the Three Days. It was to bear the legend, " Given by the King of the French," and the recipients were to take the oath of allegiance to Louis-Philippe. A majority of the persons whom it was proposed thus to honour, viewing the decoration as a national recognition of acts which had been performed before Louis-Philippe was King, indignantly rejected the conditions of the compliment.

In the following year it was projected to renew the annual celebration of the taking of the Bastille. The King could not be expected to view with gladness of heart the commemoration of events which had culminated so tragically for his kinsmen, and the Government might reasonably have adopted an attitude of neutrality towards the celebration. But it went the length of resolving to prevent all gatherings and demonstrations in the streets.

Accordingly, bands of young men, without arms, came into conflict with the police and the soldiery, and many among them were wounded. A mob of hired ruffians, marshalled and led by the police and armed with clubs, were let loose upon crowds not intending, and being without weapons not capable of, any mischief. Two newspapers which denounced these proceedings were prosecuted by the Minister of the Interior and the Prefect of Police, but they justified their statements and were acquitted. It came out that neither the Minister nor the Prefect knew anything about the hiring of the ruffians, and this iniquity was generally attributed to the aide-de-camp of the King who commanded the private police of the palace. Such incidents were symptomatic of the feeling of the country. They occur and occur again, and, together with the numerous attempts upon the life of the King, make up a large part of the story of the reign.

With the early days of Louis-Philippe comes the first serious emergence of the labour question as we now understand the term, and we quite distinctly feel that we have passed into the light of the day in which we are now living. This is a point, as we shall see, of the utmost importance. The question of electoral reform, which is increasingly clamant as the reign progresses, until it becomes the one sound that is heard under the political sky, is not understood unless it is realised that its most passionate utterance came from men who were suffering substantial grievances and demanded the franchise in the determination of using it as an instrument of mending their misery.

The city of Lyons, with its great silk industry,

was the scene of grave conflicts. Trade had of late years declined owing to foreign competition, and wages had been reduced. Though the law forbade all combinations for dealing with questions of wages, the workers, in order to resist further diminutions, formed themselves into a union representing 80,000 men and women; the manufacturers, in order to combat demands which they might consider unreasonable, also united their forces. Towards the end of 1831 an outwardly amicable conference, representative of both sides, fixed the rate of wages for the time being. But a number of the manufacturers, declaring that the distress of the workpeople was a trumped-up story, refused to accept this award. The Government gave its approval to these recalcitrants, and censured the Prefect who had summoned the conference,—clear indications, surely, of the extent to which the Government was dominated by bourgeois sentiment, and of how little its spirit was in harmony with that which prevailed in 1789. France is already far away from the Three Days of July. The Lyons workers replied to the Government and the masters by leaving their looms idle; and arming themselves, most with cudgels, a few with rifles, they paraded the streets, carrying a black flag on which were inscribed the words—“To live working or to die fighting.” An insurrection, marked by many cruel scenes, followed. In the end the workers triumphed, and the soldiers were forced to abandon the town.

For eight days the leaders of the silk weavers ruled Lyons in peace; but their appeal that the Government should intervene to settle prices and

wages was refused. Marshal Soult marched against the town with 46,000 men. The King very unwisely permitted his eldest son, the young Duc d'Orléans, to accompany this force. Whatever the merits of the dispute at Lyons, it was surely in the highest degree impolitic personally to associate members of the Royal Family with an enterprise, not endangering the monarchy, which might involve the shooting down of thousands of workpeople. The conduct of Louis-Philippe was prolific in such blunders. As it happened, no opposition was made to the soldiers; but the Prefect, whose offence was to have promoted the cause of conciliation, was recalled, the award of the conference fixing the rate of wages was set aside, and all the matters in dispute were referred to a council in which masters and men were equally represented.

The result of this first conflict of labour with the Government of July was a distinct accession of strength to the Republicans. It was not, of course, that theoretical opinions concerning the best form of government entered into the matter at all; it was simply this—that if the hand of Louis-Philippe was to be against the workers, then the hands of the workers would be against him, and when his evil hour should come would strike with victorious power.

The conflict between masters and men at Lyons was renewed early in 1834 by a reduction of wages. 20,000 looms ceased their throbbing. Though the Prefect, remembering the punishment of his predecessor, refused to intervene, counsels of moderation, promoted by the Republicans, pre-

vailed, and after a week's idleness work was resumed. The Government's method of meeting the rising flood of industrial democracy was to pass a law abolishing all freedom of association, forbidding every kind of public meeting, and referring breaches of this ordinance not to trial by jury, but by the Chamber of Peers. Further, the Government, having made their preparations for a conflict and poured 10,000 soldiers with sixty pieces of artillery into Lyons, put on trial several workmen for using threats and committing trifling acts of violence during the recent strikes. Their exasperated comrades erected barricades in the streets, and fierce fighting, with rifle and bayonet and conflagration as the weapons, and with old men, women, and children among the victims, went on in the streets during five days. The workers fought bravely and emerged from the conflict, conquered, indeed, but free from the imputations of brutality which were justly attached to the soldiers. For the moment, at any rate, these sacrifices of blood went for nothing; the right to strike is the palladium of the workers' liberty; but the industrial problem is not to be solved by violence and outrage, inflicted or endured.

The powerful significance of these events at Lyons is not to be missed. The cause of freedom was identifying itself more and more prominently with the cause of the workers. It had not always been so. The springs of the opposition to Charles x. had lain in the middle classes, who were zealous in the defence not only of their material interests, but also of their due influence in the direction of government. This section of society, consisting

to a great extent of business men, considering their interests menaced by the growing articulate-ness of the workers, drew away from the cause of progressive liberty and threw their weight on the side of the Conservatives, who resisted all efforts to broaden the basis of the national will, and considered that no one was worthy to have the humblest share in the government of the country unless he paid at least £8 a year in taxes.

This policy might have succeeded if just and tolerable conditions of life had been secured to those whose humbleness of station relieved them from making this contribution to the expenditure of the nation. Working men who have food enough to eat, the wherewithal to be clothed, and a decent roof over their heads, and are treated, in general, with justice, will not, in large numbers at least, risk their lives in a bloody struggle for a vote. Why should they, when they must find it so difficult to strike a balance between what they already possess and all that they can hope to obtain by the exercise of the ballot? "The rebellions of the belly are the worst," says Bacon, and a Government which possesses masses of very poor and hungry people and turns a deaf ear to their cry is in eminent danger. An essential condition of success, therefore, of the Conservative policy was that all active concern in politics should be deadened among those who paid less than £8 a year in taxes. That result might have been achieved, certainly all danger to the existing dynasty would have been removed, if these poorer subjects of the Crown, composing it must be remembered the overwhelming majority of the population, had

been contented with the conditions of their material existence.

But in any case there must be at least a deposit of genuine public spirit among these immense masses; and if people have intelligence enough and patriotism enough to interest themselves in politics they will demand the franchise,—they will consider the denial of it as a personal affront; and whether they receive it or not, they will be reckoned with by every wise Government. The danger is that even these meek, calm souls, if they are refused an instrument of influence which they believe they have sense enough to make a right use of, may conceive an idea of impressing themselves upon the Government in other and more violent ways.

The reign of Louis-Philippe seems to divide itself naturally into three sections: the first ending in March 1839 with his decisive defeat, as it seemed, in the struggle for personal government; the second period, lasting less than twenty months, in which by a series of skilful but pernicious manœuvres he checkmated the coalition which imagined that it had finally laid his extravagant pretensions; and the last period, opening in October 1840 with the Guizot Ministry, which ruled France for more than seven years and brought down Louis-Philippe and his dynasty into irretrievable ruin. In this chapter the first period will be dealt with.

On the good side of the balance must be set down the excellent provisions with regard to elementary education, for which the credit belongs to Guizot, who as Minister of Public Instruction conducted the measures through the Chambers. The Revolution,

its energies absorbed in the struggle for existence, had no leisure to pursue the realisation of its ideals in education, as in some other matters; Napoleon, whose ambitions would have clashed with the aspirations of an increasingly intelligent proletariat, did nothing for the instruction of the people; and the Restoration, with its annual grant of £2000, could not claim to have improved much upon the Emperor. Under Guizot's Bill every commune was obliged to maintain a public school, at which instruction should be given in return for payment to children whose parents or guardians could afford the fees, and freely in the case of poorer children. The minimum salary of the teachers, for whom quarters must be found by the commune, was £8 a year, in addition to a sum proportioned to the number of his pupils. Poor communes had a right to pecuniary help from the departments, and poor departments from the national exchequer. The appointment of the teachers was vested in local authorities, from whose composition it was sought by an amendment of the Bill—unsuccessful, however—to exclude the clergy. In the principal centres of population higher grade elementary schools, in which the curriculum included instruction in history, geography, and science, were established; in a few years, however, many of the elementary schools were levelled up to the height of the higher grade schools. A Radical deputy proposed that citizenship, its rights and duties, should be one of the subjects; but this suggestion, probably regarded by the Court party as an insidious endeavour to sap the foundation of the monarchy,

was rejected. Training colleges for teachers were established.

This law of 1833 is almost the sole title of Guizot to grateful remembrance as a politician. A curious speculation it would be to inquire to what extent history, in ironical mood, used these enactments to prepare the downfall of Guizot and the triumph, complete if not long-enduring, of the principles against which his political career was one long warfare. In 1848 the first generation of those who had enjoyed the advantages of the law of 1833 had just arrived at manhood, and no doubt contributed largely to the fierce energy and unquenchable enthusiasm which gave to the deep discontents of the time their victorious propulsion. An instructed and unenfranchised populace is more likely to embarrass a Government than an ignorant mob, for it adds the power of knowledge to the strength of numbers. It is surprising that a consideration so elementary should have escaped a mind so laborious as that of Guizot.

Thiers was the most progressive of the statesmen who secured a share in the executive government of the country. As Minister of Commerce and Public Works he obtained, in 1833, a vote of £4,000,000, for the construction of roads, canals, and lighthouses. At the same time the question of railways began to occupy the attention of the commercial classes and the Government. At the end of 1837 the Ministry submitted a project for the construction of nine great lines by the State. As the making of railways is not an industry that can be thrown open to free competition, the Government felt that these enterprises, partaking

of the nature of monopoly, should be in the hands of the State and not of private companies. Their view was vigorously combated by two sets of opinion widely discordant in cogency and respectability. The capitalist members of the Chamber from whom the Government derived a considerable portion of their strength were not content to see themselves and their friends shut out from what seemed a dazzling new prospect of boundless opulence. On the other hand, members of the Opposition, having regard to the pressure which the Government notoriously exercised at election times by its power of giving or withholding a large number of desirable public appointments, and considering that already a large proportion of deputies consisted of functionaries in the pay, and therefore at the disposal, of the Government, were resolutely opposed to a wide extension of the field in which this influence, so greatly impairing the integrity of representative institutions, might be exercised. The only friends of the ministerial project were the members of Socialist tendencies, natural supporters of the measure, but strange allies for the Government of Louis-Philippe; and the Chamber by a very decisive majority declared itself in favour of private enterprise.

The attitude of a Government towards the public press is always a sound and safe criterion of its disposition towards the principles of liberty. And in especial if the Ministry desires to remove press offences from the cognisance of the juries we may conclude with certainty that the Administration is not based upon the confidence and affection of the people. There is no conclusion that can be

reached in political science that more nearly approaches absolute sureness than this. In a panic caused by an attempt on the King's life, in 1835, a crime which had inflicted death on several innocent people and had served to sustain an affectionate interest in the person of the King, various reactionary laws were passed in the scope of whose operations the press, though not specially aimed at, was included. It was made a crime to discuss his Majesty's right to the throne and the first beginning of his Government. So early had Louis-Philippe and his friends become ashamed of the Revolution of 1830! No man might call himself a Republican without rendering himself liable to prosecution; to stir up hatred and scorn of the person of the King or of his constitutional authority was a high crime and misdemeanour which might be visited upon the offender by a trial before the Peers. The penalties in fines and imprisonments were heavily increased. The Opposition journalists had developed a pretty talent for pictorial caricatures, and as nowhere so much as in France does ridicule kill, they were making effective use of this powerful political weapon. The Government resolved to break this instrument by submitting all drawings of the newspapers to a preliminary authorisation. The cartoon that passed the censor was not likely to give much delight to friends or do much damage to opponents.

A journalistic quarrel, which had a fatal issue for one of the disputants, may be noted here on the ground more particularly of the curious interest of its cause. M. Emile de Girardin, a young man who was regarded as a bold inventive spirit, con-

ceived the idea of making newspapers cheaper and thereby receiving a wider publicity by printing advertisements on one of the pages. All the other newspapers raised a loud outcry; they pointed out that the advertisements would often be lying and that the public would be deceived; they considered that the suggestion was an affront to the dignity of journalism. The dispute came to a climax when M. de Girardin announced that he was going to publish biographies of contemporary journalists. Armand Carrel, another editor, replied that he would not tolerate this, and, an attempt at reconciliation having failed, a duel by pistol was fought, and Carrel received a wound from which within two days he died. It was a great loss to the Republican party; for Carrel was not only their most powerful champion in the press, he was the recognised first man in his profession, his influence and the respect due to his character were recognised by many who differed widely from his opinions. He has been made the subject of a fine tribute by Henri Martin: "Carrel," he says, "was a great writer without thinking of it; his thought—exact, brilliant, profound—found at the first effort an expression equal to itself. Every thought was a deed, and one might have said that he wrote not with a pen but with a sword." These words exactly describe the qualifications of every truly great and influential political journalist.

The troubles of the Government with the members of political associations holding advanced opinions began early. On the morrow of the Revolution there was formed an organisation, under the title of the Friends of the People, whose immediate and

ostensible object was so to stir up the spirit of the nation that it should be prepared to meet with confidence the feared hostility of united Europe. When the emergency for which the association was formed did not arise the Friends of the People, under the influence of Government discountenance, found themselves involved in an active propaganda on behalf of extreme views. They demanded universal suffrage, open competition for all appointments in the Civil Service, the abolition of capital punishment, and the regulation of wages by mixed committees of masters and men. The Government, regarding these views as subversive of constituted authority, prosecuted the president of the society, but could not secure his condemnation.

An organisation much more extreme, and more closely knit with the working classes, sprang from the loins of the Friends of the People. It was the Society of the Rights of Man, which took Robespierre for its hero and his doctrines for its gospel. The more responsible men of the Republican party, headed by Lafayette, viewed with disfavour, amounting almost to abhorrence, this harking back to episodes in the Revolution which clouded its glory and warped its meaning, and which they would gladly have blotted out. The tyranny of revolutionary tribunals was more cruel than that of Kings, and they dreaded the propagation of ideals which suggested a return to the days of a universal bondage of terror. The principle of personal liberty was considerably less impaired under Louis-Philippe than it would be under a new Robespierre.

However, the strength of the Society of the Rights of Man was not drawn from the teaching and



LOUIS PHILIPPE I, KING OF THE FRENCH

(From the painting in the Musée de Versailles by Winterhalter)

the memory of the Jacobins, but from its championship of living workmen, whose wages were so small that they could not put by anything for times of slackness, and whose hours were so long that they had not rest enough to keep body and mind in health. The society made it plain that it did not consider itself precluded from the employment of force for the attainment of its purposes. It promoted disturbances, with much useless shedding of blood, at Paris, Lyons, and elsewhere.

This movement for the abolition or mitigation of acute social distress by means, in the first place, of vast constitutional changes was contemporaneous with the Chartist agitation in England. But the leaders of the latter propaganda were guided by a truer political instinct than that which was vouchsafed even to men so well instructed and so experienced as Lafayette. Among the Chartists there were many Republicans, but they were too sagacious to place the overthrow of the monarchy in the forefront of their programme. To have done so would have been to divide the nation sharply into two camps, to have created a strong resistance to the permeation of Chartist ideas outside their own organisation, and to have stopped the ears of all persons attached to the monarchy to that large element in Chartism, born as it was of real suffering, which appealed to all honest, feeling hearts. The success of any movement in England depends on winning over to the organisation, if even only for a very brief period, a large accession of those people who, in general, keep outside all movements ; Chartism yoked to Republicanism could never have reached this point, and the triumph of its

substantive principles which has been achieved would have been indefinitely deferred. France has not had since the great Revolution a form of Government which so clearly promised to give stability and prosperity to the country as the monarchy of July. Lafayette and his friends rendered a signal disservice to their country when, after a very brief experience, they abandoned all hope of radical reform from the constitutional monarchy. A republic is not necessarily more favourable to personal liberty and civil equality than a monarchy; there have been aristocratic republics and there are democratic monarchies.

In the light of ordinary reason, and in the yet more abundant and glowing light of history, we can say with confidence that the formation of a Republican party was a grave error, inflicting a cruel wound on the hopes and promises for the fulfilment of which forms of government, of whatever complexion they be, alone have any value. The one item Republicanism on the programme was a challenge to the enemy with the sharp end of the lance to mortal combat. It overshadowed and compromised, shackled and fettered all other projects of reform, however moderate and reasonable they might be. It hardened the hearts of opponents, and seemed to make inevitable a conflict in which success, if achieved at all, must be purchased by sacrifices too fearful to contemplate. It is true that the Government could have spiked the guns of the Republican party if they had known how to take occasion by the hand and made a moderate, so long as it was a timely, grant of reform; but for the catastrophes which closed and soon followed

the reign of Louis-Philippe the tribunal of history will divide the responsibility between those who wanted everything and those who would grant nothing.

Ignorance and misery and the savage suspiciousness which ignorance and misery produced reigned among the people. A terrible epidemic of cholera broke out in the spring of 1832. A rumour that the true cause of the sickness and death was wholesale poisoning, the work of a gang of conspirators, ran speedily abroad, finding ready entrance into the hearts of people maddened with fear and privation; and frenzied crowds fell with fatal fury upon persons suspected of this infamy. The Prefect of Police thought to assure the people by declaring that some wretches, in order to fasten guilt upon the public authority, had thrown poison into the fountains, into the publicans' pot, and upon the butchers' meat.

The people had a more reasonable ground of suspicion in the project for the construction of a line of fortifications around Paris. The Government was unhappy in the moment that it selected for the announcement of its plans. A serious insurrection (June 1833) in Paris had just been quelled, and it was not an unnatural fear that the forts were to be created not to repel an invasion, of which the danger was remote, but to cow into submission the inhabitants of Paris exasperated in the near future by some act of arbitrary power which at the moment might conceivably be preparing. The maintainers of the project declared that they were actuated by a sincere desire to prevent a repetition of the humiliations of 1814 and

1815, when the armies of the allies encamped within the capital. The Chamber insisted on the necessity of a special law of authorisation, and refused to vote the money until such an enactment had been examined and passed. In spite of this plainly declared opposition the Government persisted for a time with the preliminary work, but the storm of indignation that blew from all parts of France was so violent that they bent to it rather than be broken.

In 1840, during a period subsequent to that with which we are now dealing, when suspicion, though still wideawake, was not so vocal, and when France was really in difficulties concerning her foreign relations, the project was renewed and carried to completion at a cost of £5,600,000. The enemies of France in England and Prussia professed to see in the erection of these fortifications the preparations for a war which had been resolved on. In a confidential letter—the publication of which in 1841 created a prodigious scandal—evidently sketching the line of apology that was to be taken in private towards foreign Courts, Louis-Philippe protested that the forts were intended not to repel a foreign invasion but to subdue, if need should arise, the turbulent population of Paris. The declaration is of no value as an indication of the King's real thoughts. It only means that on this occasion, as throughout his whole reign, the attitude of Louis-Philippe towards foreign sovereigns was something less than spirited.

Various points of dynastic and constitutional interest fall to be noted in this summarised review of the first period in Louis-Philippe's reign. At

the outset we are confronted with this fact, so strikingly illustrative of the political conditions, that, when the General Election of 1831, the first after the Revolution, was concluded, the country still remained in ignorance as to whether the majority belonged to the Ministry or to the Opposition! It is seldom, even in our own day, that General Elections in France have that decisive significance which they bear in other countries. The fate of Ministries is more often determined by the kaleidoscopic changes in the arrangement of the various groups that form the Chamber than by the declarations of the polls.

The conditions of membership in the Chamber of Peers was among the earliest constitutional questions posed for solution. Hereditary succession was abolished; the nomination of membership for life was ceded as a prerogative of the King, and no limit whatever was placed to the number of Peers. Of all possible solutions this was surely the worst. A hereditary House of Peers may be a very useful branch of the legislature, if it honestly recognises, whatever the scope of its theoretical powers, that, in association with a popularly elected Chamber, a severe limitation is imposed on the exercise of these powers by the very origin of its authority. An electoral Upper House may also have its justification if it can be so constituted that it is neither a replica of the Lower House nor an entire inversion of it, and if the authority naturally correspondent to its mode of election does not rise above the right to ensure a prudent delay, or revise, without impairing, the essential spirit of the proceedings of the Lower House. As

for a nominated Upper House with a statutory number of members, that has been found to give good results in many parts of the British Empire. But an assembly of Peers which is neither hereditary nor elected nor limited in numbers, and is at the absolute disposal of the Crown, is not calculated to be a useful or even a safe branch of a free constitution.

Various classes of personages from whom the King might make his choice for the House of Peers were designated. In these were included the heads of manufacturing, commercial, and banking houses, provided that to this qualification was added the further one of paying at least £200 a year in direct taxation. In days when conflicts between capital and labour were becoming a feature of the times, and when labour questions, that touched society at the quick, were assuming an increasing prominence, the presence of capitalists, chosen as such, in a non-elective house, possessing powers co-ordinate with those of the Chamber of Deputies, was little likely to commend the new régime to the favour of the workers.

To ensure a majority among the Peers for the reconstitution of their house, an accession of thirty-six new members was made to their number. This process was repeated as often as a new Ministry should think it necessary. The result, of course, was to destroy the moral authority of the Upper House, and, while leaving its powers intact, emptied it of all value for the nation.

Louis-Philippe made no secret of his intention to be a personal ruler, if also a constitutional sovereign. It might have appeared that he was acting on the

maxim that a King who would not feel his crown too heavy for him must wear it every day. There was nothing of the despot in him ; he was not possessed by far-reaching schemes of social or political regeneration such as sometimes make the lust of power a respectable or even praiseworthy characteristic ; it was simply that he was infected by the spirit of meddling, that he would have a finger in every pie. When it was respectfully suggested to him, after a threatened insurrection in Paris, that the policy of his Ministers should be brought into greater harmony with the aspirations of the people, he exclaimed : “ The policy of my Ministers ! I do not know what you mean ; there is only one policy, and that is mine. Persuade me that it is wrong and I shall change it, but until that, though one should bray me in a mortar, I shall not depart from it.” Doubtless he forgot for the moment that it was the fool of whom the wise man said, that though he were pounded in a mortar his folly would not depart from him.

The circumstances of the hour imposed upon Louis-Philippe at various times Ministers who were personally obnoxious to him. He could not bear the Duc de Broglie, because of the rigidity of his temperament, and because he looked to the Nation and the Chamber rather than to the King for his inspiration and authority. Thiers was not much more of a favourite. With an instinct which failed him when it would have been most useful, the King dreaded Guizot, because of the unpopularity which from the very morrow of the Revolution of 1830 fastened itself like glue upon his name. When, therefore, in the autumn of 1832, Louis-

Philippe was face to face with a Cabinet dominated by de Broglie, Thiers, and Guizot, great was his dismay, and unceasing were his endeavours to sow dissension among the members of this triumvirate. *Divide et impera* was the ruling principle of his policy.

In 1834, as the result of a hostile vote concerning a matter of subsidiary importance, in which "the King's friends" acted against the Government, de Broglie resigned the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and was replaced by a worthy man of no political standing upon whom the King could easily impose his will.

In the same year Thiers and Guizot, the former desiring an amnesty for political offences, and the latter having been induced to support that request in return for the support of the former in securing the restoration of de Broglie to the Cabinet, came into conflict with the King, who refused the amnesty because he knew the granting of it would mean the acceptance of the Duc. Thiers and Guizot accordingly resigned, but within three days they were recalled by the King, who for the moment, however, had his way about de Broglie. In the spring of 1835 the triumvirate was formed again in the Cabinet, much to the annoyance of Louis-Philippe. Within less than a year, however, it was finally broken up.

For less than seven months Thiers was head of the Cabinet, but the King wanted a chief clerk, not a Prime Minister; and as Thiers was not a candidate for the humbler office, there was the inevitable rupture. M. Molé, whose recommendation was that he was ready to be the tool of Louis-Philippe, succeeded Thiers, and to save the new

Ministry from the ridicule of France, M. Guizot, who insisted upon places being found for several of his friends, was persuaded to enter the Cabinet, leaving de Broglie outside. It was all to the good, in the eyes of the King, that Molé and Guizot had nothing in common either in character or principles; each could be used to nullify the other, and leave ample room for the exercise in the Government of the King's personal authority.

This Ministry, too, had its brief day. When it was defeated Molé and Guizot separated. Molé tried to secure the co-operation of Thiers in the formation of a new Cabinet, and failed. Guizot tried to secure the co-operation of Thiers in the formation of a new Cabinet, and failed. The King again sent for Molé, who accepted office, with a policy of doing as little as possible, humouring the Chamber, and leaving everything that mattered in the government of the country and in the regulation of its foreign relations to the King.

Guizot and Thiers, though their fundamental differences were developing more prominently day by day, formed a coalition which included Legitimists, Republicans, and the constitutional opposition, for the overthrow of personal government; and this was the clear issue at the election of 1839. In spite of wholesale dismissals, meant to intimidate hesitating functionaries, the running of placemen as Government candidates, lavish promises to individual persons and localities, and insulting polemics in official journals, the result was disastrous to the Ministry. The country pronounced decisively and, as it seemed, finally against the ambitions of the King.

During this period of the reign of Louis-Philippe two attempts by representatives of the fallen Bourbon and Bonaparte dynasties to overthrow the July Monarchy only reached that degree of ridiculous failure which is more injurious to the cause that sustains it than tragic disaster. Charles x. quietly and speedily resigned himself to exile and obscurity, no longer thinking of stretching out his weary hands for a crown; but the Duchesse de Berri, who had won some measure of affectionate interest among the people by the pathetic circumstances attending the death of her husband and the birth of the Duc de Bordeaux, and by the spirited character of her general conduct, resolved upon an armed assertion of her son's rights to the throne. From her asylum in Italy, where she was surrounded by many gay young sparks of the royalist party, she plotted an attack on the Tuileries during the progress of a ball there on the night of 1st February to 2nd February 1832. Though this romantic project was countermanded, the police had got on the scent of it, and arrested some of the subordinate conspirators in a Paris café.

The Duchesse did not lose courage. Towards the end of April she landed at Marseilles, and a few enthusiasts gathered around the white flag, but the Government forces moved at once to the attack and the Legitimists dispersed without striking a blow. The intrepid adventuress nevertheless pushed her way undetected through Toulouse into La Vendée, a former stronghold of royalist sentiment. Disguised as a peasant, she traversed the district and found concealment from her

enemies in a farmhouse. Thither the Legitimists who were in the plot resorted to her, and concerted plans for an insurrection on the 24th of May. But the date was altered to the 3rd of June; a number of the enrolled men were left in ignorance of this vital rearrangement; and though there was spirited fighting, marked by deeds of fruitless heroism in some corners, the enterprise completely miscarried. For five months, baffling the efforts of the police, the Duchesse lay hidden at Nantes. Betrayed at last, she was sent as a prisoner to the castle of Blaye on the Gironde.

To the indignation of the Legitimists, rumour speedily began to take liberties with the good name of the distinguished prisoner. The imputations were denounced as lying and scandalous. Overwhelming was the confusion in the ranks of the partisans of fallen royalty when it was announced that the Duchesse was with child. It appeared that she had been secretly married, while in Italy, to a Sicilian nobleman. A daughter was born on the 10th of May 1833, in the following month the captive was granted her liberty, and the hopes of the Legitimists were indefinitely suspended.

The son of Napoleon died at Vienna on the 22nd July 1832, at the age of twenty-one, and the partisans of the Orléans dynasty believed themselves and France finally delivered from the fear of the Bonapartes. At that moment there was perhaps not a score of men of whatever party in the country into whose minds there had entered even the conception of a second Empire. The headship of the Bonapartes passed to Louis Napoleon, a young man of twenty-four, whose

name in days to come was to give a sombre significance to the most tragic scenes in the moving drama of French history. He was doubly linked with the great conqueror. His father, the King of Holland, was the Emperor's brother, while his mother, the Queen Hortense, was the daughter of the Empress Josephine by her first husband. Inspired by his mother, Louis Napoleon, like his uncle, was possessed by an invincible faith in his destiny. Whether success were at hand or far distant he perceived, as he confessed when many years later he had waded through slaughter to a throne, that his immediate policy was to keep himself in evidence. To show that he was a politician he wrote, or caused to be written in his name, a volume of *Rêveries Politiques* in which were expressed the most democratic opinions. That the world in general, and France in particular, might know that he was a soldier he published a manual on the artillery. While residing in Switzerland he cultivated relations of an indefinite sort with members of the opposition, and was treated with respectful deference by distinguished soldiers to whom the name and fame of the great Emperor counted for much.

Towards the end of October 1836 he appeared in Strasburg, and sought to rally the people round the imperial eagle as the symbol of liberty no less than of glory! Presenting himself to the 4th regiment of artillery, whose commander was a confederate, he harangued them out of their loyalty to Louis-Philippe; but when the gunners encountered the infantrymen of the 46th regiment, led by a resolute colonel, their enthusiasm melted

away like the mist of the morning. The feeble flame flickered out. Not a drop of blood was shed. The Government treated Louis Napoleon as they had treated the Duchesse de Berri, with contemptuous levity, and hurriedly shipped him to America. His career as a dangerous personage was believed to have ended.

CHAPTER VI

THE RISING TIDE OF POPULAR FEELING

HOSTILITY to personal government was the sole principle of cohesion in the coalition which had inflicted an apparently final defeat on the extravagant pretensions of Louis-Philippe. But no sooner was the victory achieved than the radical differences subsisting between the conquerors began to show themselves. Currents of opinion whose courses were set in widely diverging directions had intersected for a moment, and in the whirlpool thus created the ship of arbitrary monarchy had been drawn down into the boiling depths. But as it soon appeared, those on board had escaped with their lives. In less than two years the King had by skilful manœuvring divided up and beaten separately the forces which had seemed overwhelmingly powerful. He found himself at last, after ten years' ceaseless strategy, face to face with a Cabinet which found it an easy and sympathetic task to carry out his behests, and with a Prime Minister who was as deeply resolved as the King himself not to make any concessions to popular feeling. But before that ardently longed for consummation had been reached the King and his Ministers had received ample warnings of

the formidable nature of the task which awaited them, and were without excuse if they did not carefully consider within themselves whether they were strong enough to resist and overcome the elemental forces which were to be let loose against them.

The measures for the abolition of the right of association and for the suppression of the republican societies had entirely failed in their main intention. The demand for such enactments can be justified only when those who favour them can honestly proclaim their certainty that these associations and societies draw their life altogether from publicity, that, withdrawn from the air and light, they will die. If these prognostications are not fulfilled the laws are by that very fact condemned. For widely ramified secret societies, with the closely knit discipline which secrecy encourages, are likely to be more dangerous to the State than public organisations even of a blatant character. In the latter case the Government are able to take the measure of the strength which they must sap by timely concession or destroy by force. The societies which the Ministry had endeavoured to suppress shed their old names and masses of their more moderate members,—the very sections which, had the associations been recognised by the law, would have mitigated their extravagance,—and betook themselves, with the savage and resolute remnant, to increasing underground activity. They so undermined the fabric of the monarchy that any well-directed external blow was likely to bring it in a heap to the ground. When the hour came in which these secret workers might

show themselves in the light they moved about among the heaving, swaying masses giving direction, purpose, fire, and fresh strength to their movements.

Wild aspirations and wild language are like explosive gases. If they have free access to the spaces of the sky they may be mingled and lost and rendered innocuous in the upper air. But if they are pent up in a narrow space under considerable pressure they may rend the earth and darken the sky in a devastating disaster. The secret Society of Families which took the place of the public Society of the Rights of Man demanded the destruction of the government of the rich which had reduced the common people to the level of slaves or negroes! When the police got on the track of this ambitious organisation it simply dissolved itself and reappeared more violent than ever as the Society of the Seasons. It was now frankly Socialist. The establishment of the Republic, declared the Society of the Seasons, would be but a means to an end, and the end was that the property of people who did not work and possessed everything should pass to those who worked and possessed nothing. Regicide, atheism, communism — these were other items on the programme of the more advanced unofficial members. But the cause received a dignity and an accession of strength from the presence among its leaders of men of education and easy circumstances, who personally had nothing to gain by the triumph of the cause for which in their estimation no toil, no sacrifice was too much, who were sincerely moved by the sorrows and sufferings of the poor, and envisaged the whole

question through a golden haze of Christian sentiment.

An insurrection promoted by this Society of the Seasons broke out in Paris in the spring of 1839; it cost a few lives, and was suppressed without having inspired any serious alarms in the bosom of authority. Armand Barbès, one of the leaders, a man of position, means, and exalted character, was condemned to death. Of his legal guilt there was no doubt, and when a man heads an armed insurrection against an established Government he knows that he is staking his life, and his private sanctity cannot be pleaded as a protection against the extreme penalty; but Barbès denied that he had actually taken life, his words and demeanour at his trial and his character had gripped the sympathetic interest of the country, and it was felt that neither the integrity of justice nor the safety of the State would be impaired by the sparing of his life. The students pleaded for the abolition of the death penalty, a band of workmen marched in procession to the Chamber of Deputies carrying a flag on which the same sentiment was expressed. The sister of the condemned man penetrated to the royal closet and pleaded for the life of her brother in passionate entreaties to which the Duchesse d'Orléans, the wife of the heir-apparent, added her own earnest petition. Officialdom was adamant; but the heart of the King was melted. "The right of pardon," he said, "is one of my prerogatives; allow me to avail myself of it."

The country had been for over two months without a settled Government, so profound were the dissensions among the coalition; the King was

able to represent to hesitating and factious politicians that on the morrow of fighting in the streets, and of the danger thus portended, no patriotic man should think of withholding his co-operation from his sovereign; and a Ministry was formed with Marshal Soult, under the thumb of the King, at its head.

Seldom does either revolutionary excitement or courtly complaisance sweep away the French middle classes from the extreme carefulness in money matters which is one of their dominant and most valuable characteristics. Louis-Philippe in the days of his exile had been straitened in his circumstances; at one time, when "to be King stood not within the prospect of belief," he had even been compelled to earn his living by teaching. An experience of this sort, if it does not make a man greedy when affluence seems to be within his reach, has as a rule the effect of rendering him hard and close. When he accepted the crown Louis-Philippe made over his private property to his children, and requested from the Chamber a civil list of £720,000. Though the halo that surrounded his head as the deliverer of his country from tyranny and anarchy was still in full radiance, the demand for the means of sustaining the royal dignity produced so unfortunate an impression that it had to be withdrawn. The settling of the figure was left, much to the chagrin of the King, to the Chamber, which reduced it to £480,000. A yearly revenue of £40,000 was granted to the heir-apparent, and the law declared that the King had no claims upon the national exchequer for the provision of settlements for his other children. All this was

in the first flush of enthusiasm for the monarchy of July. If they do these things in a green tree, what will be done in the dry? Eight years later, in the period of which we are now writing, Louis-Philippe presented a request for an annual allowance of £20,000 for his second son, the Duc de Nemours. The Chamber, representing the bourgeois sentiment, which wished to see in the Orléans dynasty merely a hereditary presidency content with modest state, refused the grant, and the Ministry resigned.

Thiers reluctantly consented to become head of a new Ministry, and made a bargain with Guizot by which the latter retained the position of Ambassador at London, and undertook to persuade his friends to support the Ministry, provided that the laws forbidding all discussion of the first beginning of the King's Government and the assumption of the name of Republican were maintained, and that no electoral reform were granted.

The questions of parliamentary reform and the extension of the franchise were rapidly approaching the stage of urgency. The Chamber swarmed with functionaries dependent on the Government; this circumstance, and the exclusion from the vote of the workers and peasants, together making the Chamber a very imperfect representation of the country, could not be borne in peace and content under a King who owed his throne to a great popular uprising, and, unlike Napoleon, for example, did not possess any exceptional intrinsic qualities such as might have enabled him to overbear the limitations which necessarily sprang from his history. They constituted a state of things inevitably perilous

to the stability of the existing institutions. It will ever remain a puzzle that so sure and simple a view of the matter did not present itself to the mind of the King and the unfortunate Minister who worked with him for the ruin of the Orléans dynasty. Various views were current as to the extent to which the franchise should be enlarged; but extension, whether narrow or wide, found support in many quarters and for differing reasons. The Legitimists, who believed—wrongly as the future showed—that their cause was strong among the peasant proprietors, demanded universal suffrage, exercised indirectly; the moderate Republicans, who described themselves by the English term Radical, would have been content with the enfranchisement of the *petite bourgeoisie*, the lower middle class or the upper working class, according as one cares to phrase it, including farmers and artisans who were working on their own account and not for a master. What was known as “the dynastic Opposition,” the party that contended against the Government without being hostile to the constitutional monarchy, favoured the sort of reform which nearly thirty years afterwards was known in England as “the fancy franchises.” They would give the vote to barristers, doctors, retired officers of the army and navy, members of municipal bodies, and the like. The adoption of the Radical plan would have meant an electorate of from 1,200,000 to 1,500,000 persons; the fancy franchises stopped short at less than half that figure.

Thiers, according to the terms of his contract with Guizot, was compelled to do violence for a time to

his sympathies and principles, and found an excuse for domestic inactivity in the foreign preoccupations which at the time engaged the attention of the nation. A noteworthy incident of his Ministry was the return of the corpse of the Emperor Napoleon to receive a final resting-place, as he had desired, in the midst of the people whom he had loved. The Prince de Joinville, the sailor son of Louis-Philippe, brought the body of the great conqueror in a man-of-war from St. Helena to Havre, thence it was conveyed up the Seine to Paris. The King awaited the solemn arrival at the Chapel of the Invalides. "Sire," said the Prince, "I present to you the body of the Emperor Napoleon." "I receive it," answered Louis-Philippe, "in the name of France." An English statesman, remarking on these ceremonies of an unwonted majesty, happily expressed the wish that the people of England and of France might bury their historic enmity in the grave of Napoleon. Cynics were justified in commenting upon the irony of these elaborate honours to the dead body of the Emperor at a time when all living persons who drew their blood from the same source were forbidden to set foot upon the soil of the country whose glory Napoleon had so highly exalted.

Louis Bonaparte thought fit to anticipate these touching solemnities by a demonstration on behalf of his claim to the French throne. General Bertrand, the most worthy of the Emperor's companions in his exile, had placed in the hands of Louis-Philippe the sword that the conqueror had worn at Austerlitz. The Pretender bitterly complained of this act, saying that the representatives of the

Emperor's blood had been deprived of the only heritage that fate had left to them, and held out threats, explicit enough in substance, though wrapped up in vague language. But little heed was paid to these writhings of angry impotency, as they seemed. The King was absent from Paris, taking holiday, when news reached him that Louis Napoleon had disembarked at Boulogne on the 6th of August 1840. The enterprise of the Pretender, though it had been better prepared than that at Strasburg, was just as ineffectual. Louis Napoleon and his friends landed at Wimereux, a few miles to the north of Boulogne, and made their way to Boulogne, where they were hailed with acclamation by the first portion of the garrison to whom they presented themselves. But immediately the recall was sounded, other troops marched against the conspirators, who, thoroughly daunted, retired to the foot of the column that the Emperor had erected in honour of the Grand Army encamped there for the invasion of England. But the shadow of this noble monument, and the powerful memories, strengthened by recent events, which it inspired, could not protect them. They made in hot haste for the sea, threw themselves into the water, and sought to swim to the ship's boat, which would take them to their vessel. The pursuers opened fire upon the fugitives, one of them was shot dead; the boat capsized, and another of the conspirators was drowned; Louis Napoleon fell into the hands of his enemies.

The Pretender was brought before the House of Peers and sentenced to imprisonment for life. All the prepared details of the enterprise were brought

to light, including the flamboyant proclamations in which he promised glory, honour, and fortune to the soldiers, order and liberty and a reduction in taxation to the citizens. "Soldiers," said he in these declarations, "the great shade of Napoleon speaks to you by my voice. Traitors, get thee hence!—the Napoleonic spirit, which concerns itself only with the welfare of the people, marches forward to bring you to confusion." Louis Napoleon was confined in the fortress of Ham, from which, if we may anticipate here, he escaped a few years later. Again, all classes of the community who had intelligence enough to read the papers and understand what they read, deluded themselves with the idea that, covered with ridicule as he was, and shut up in a fortress, Louis Napoleon might confidently be discarded as a factor in the future history of the country.

Louis-Philippe in the meantime was involved in misunderstandings with foreign Powers. This was to him naturally a very disappointing result of his unceasing efforts to commend himself to their favour. In his foreign policy he had broken with the tradition of the first Revolution in which were implied a spirited attitude to the rulers of other countries, and a sympathetic line towards oppressed nationalities. Louis-Philippe, on the other hand, championed the temporal power of the Pope, though the Papal States were admitted by everybody, except the Pope, his immediate retinue, and a handful of fanatics, to be the worst governed in Europe; he looked with disfavour on the movement for the liberation and unification of Italy from the Alps to the sea; he had given Austria,

Prussia, and Russia good reason to understand that he would offer no effective opposition to their designs on unhappy Poland, and in his controversies with England regarding various questions (now without living interest) concerning Spain, Portugal, Turkey, and Egypt, he had allowed himself to be outplayed or intimidated by British diplomacy. His strength in France was gravely impaired by this weakness in his foreign relations; indeed, M. Hanotaux, the historian of contemporary France, who has distinguished himself as Minister of Foreign Affairs under the Third Republic, attributes the downfall of the monarchy of July to this cause. But this seems to the present writer, who confesses to being guilty of great presumption in lifting up his pen against Hanotaux, to be an exaggerated view of the matter; the cause is inadequate to the effect, the Revolution of 1848. If the people rise in armed revolt against their sovereign, it is because they have been touched more closely to the quick than would be the case by the mere refusal of the King to play the knight-errant of Europe.

However that may be, the conduct of Louis-Philippe in foreign affairs was not involuntary weakness, but calculated policy. He considered that the legitimist sovereigns of Europe must consider his reign as an usurpation, and he sought to purchase pardon for this offence, as an Italian professor has put it almost too forcibly, by offering them the liberty of the nations which had fondly put their trust in the noble French people. One chief objective of Louis-Philippe was to obtain for himself and France a place and a due proportion

of influence in the concert of Europe. The four chief Powers, Russia, Austria, Prussia, and England, fully understanding the King's line of policy, and divining his fixed resolve not in any circumstances to proceed to extremities, a resolve which, of course, reduced him to nonentity, seemed to take a malicious delight in riding roughshod over his royal susceptibilities, and his sense of the importance of the rôle that the extent, wealth, population, and power of France entitled her to play. A crisis came when, in 1840, the four Powers excluded France from participation in the drawing up of a treaty regulating a prolonged feud between the Viceroy of Egypt and the Sultan of Turkey, in which France had by manifest tokens declared herself to be immediately concerned. The King was beside himself with vexation. "What," he cried, "for ten years I have shielded them at the expense of my popularity, and at the peril of my life; they owe to me the peace of Europe and the security of their thrones. Is this how they reward my services? Do they want me to put on the red cap of revolution again?" These words reveal as by a flashlight the motives of Louis-Philippe's foreign policy. It gave France peace during eighteen years, but it sullied the national dignity, and, as we have indicated, it contributed not inconsiderably to the pulling down of the throne.

The people were as resolved to remember as the King was to forget the days of July. In 1840 the tenth anniversary of the Revolution was celebrated by the erection upon the site of the Bastille of a bronze column in honour of the citizens who

had fought for public liberty on the three days of July. The remains of those who had died in the struggle were gathered together from their resting-places in various parts of Paris, to the Church of Saint-Germain l'Auxerrois, whence, after an impressive service, they were carried in solemn procession to the Place de la Bastille, and deposited in the vaults prepared for them beneath the column. The King so far conceded to the prevailing sentiment as from the top of the colonnade of the Louvre to salute the coffins as they passed on their way. During ten years he had exhibited but a poor simulacrum of respect towards the principles for which those who rested within the coffins had laid down their lives, and he had contrived effectually to disguise his gratitude for the sacrifices upon which his throne had been erected.

At this time a continuous tremor of political excitement was set in motion by the banquets, a word fated to have a sinister significance for the Orléans dynasty. Crowds of enthusiasts met together in Paris, Lyons, and the other great towns to eat and to drink, to make and to hear speeches in favour of electoral reform. The spirit of their activity communicated itself to every part of the country. "Every one that was in distress, and every one that was discontented," gathered under the banner of reform, not necessarily because they saw in the extension of the franchise the attainment of their specific desires, but because reform represented the anti-governmental policy. The oppressive conditions of life among many sections of the labouring population gained numerous adherents to the reform movement. The workers not posses-

sing the franchise were inclined to consider, in the bitterness of their spirits, that society as then constituted was organised to facilitate the oppression of the proletariat by the merchants and manufacturers, and to hold immoderate notions concerning the extent of the benefits that they could secure for themselves by parliamentary action. Louis Blanc was preaching with sincerity and passion the gospel of Socialism. He maintained that it was the duty of the State to find tools and work and a uniform wage for every claimant. Fancying that the declaration of his doctrine could effect a revolution in the nature of man, he proposed to substitute the spirit of honour for the love of material gain as the grand motive of industry. The workers themselves began to demand the abolition of the "middlemen," shorter hours, larger wages, and no piece-work. When these demands were rejected in Paris and in several other towns they went on strike; there were collisions with "blacklegs," the police, and the military, and the usual incidents of this sort of industrial warfare. The only progress made by the cause of labour as the result of these conflicts seemed to be simply that the masters and the Government were somewhat alarmed, and began to entertain serious apprehensions concerning the future. A Communist floor-polisher, to whom the King presented the aspect of "the greatest tyrant of ancient and modern times," fired a carbine at the carriage of the sovereign as it rolled along the quay of the Tuileries. Nobody was injured, and the crazy fellow, who stoutly maintained that he had no accomplices, was executed.

Thiers found himself in very imperfect sympathy with the King in matters of foreign policy. The critical occasion was a misunderstanding with England concerning the regulation of the affairs of Egypt and Turkey. The young blood in France was roused, the partisans of advanced opinions assumed a bellicose attitude, and the commercial classes were swayed first to one side and then to the other, according as their sentiments of patriotism or of material interest predominated. Guizot, who was the French Ambassador in London, and whose fear of revolutionary principles drove him into lively sympathy with the King's ideas of foreign policy, worked his hardest for peace; but that the peril was very real may be judged from the fact that within three months French Government stock went down from 119 to 104. As the sober sense of the nation reasserted itself it was perceived that the settlement of the question whether Syria should be ruled by the Sultan or by a rebellious Viceroy of his would involve an altogether disproportionate expense if it meant for France a war with a coalition of the great Powers. In the reaction of opinions one was inclined to blame the Government bitterly for throwing the country into a quarrel which was not at all worth a war, and yet from which France could not withdraw without loss of dignity and prestige. Thiers, in drawing up a King's speech, put into the first paragraph words to the effect that France must prepare to put herself on a war footing. Louis-Philippe would not accept this language. Thiers, glad to be relieved from a situation of oppressive responsibilities without honour and without

satisfaction, offered his resignation with alacrity; Guizot was recalled from London, and placed at the Foreign Office. And with this we enter upon another chapter in the story of the July Monarchy.

CHAPTER VII

THE MINISTRY OF GUIZOT

WE shall not attempt to draw a complete character of the statesman who for ten years waged ineffectual war with the elements, ever increasing in strength, and was finally struck to the ground by a thunderbolt. But some personal notes must be devoted to a man remarkable in this, if in nothing else, that he dominated the course of political history in France for a longer period than fell to the lot of any other of her statesmen in the nineteenth century. From October 1840 to February 1848 the Government of France was Guizot. This also is noteworthy, that on no political career, judged by its main purpose, has history pronounced her adverse verdict with greater decision. The motive power of Guizot's policy, during the most signal and the final term of his career, was the dread of revolution. Yet he provoked a revolution, and as a politician perished in it.

Born in 1787, Guizot lost his father in the first Revolution. This memory seems to have deeply stained his thoughts and sentiments while life lasted. He began to take an active part in politics at the Restoration of the Bourbons after Waterloo. He knew history too well, and he possessed an

intelligence too wide and philosophical to permit him to become a partisan of the old régime. Accordingly we generally find him working with the constitutional Opposition, and filling a rôle towards the men of that section who were conspicuously in the public eye similar to that which Burke played for the great Whig leaders,—inspiring their counsels, finding reasons for their prepossessions, supplying a basis of philosophy for their crude intuitions, writing their protests and even their speeches. He always maintained that he was equally hostile to absolutism and anarchy. By the former he meant a return to the days of Louis XIV., and the latter he considered an inevitable result of a widely extended suffrage. The form of government which would have most closely fitted with his temperament would have been a paternal aristocratic republic. He would have presented a gracious and majestic figure among the city fathers of Republican Rome, or, in more modern days, of Florence or Venice. A Protestant by religion, hard, dry, austere in his personal and intellectual habits, he was fitted to rule at once with inflexibility and kindness in the grey, cold iron days before the warm blood of liberty had coursed in the veins of the people and the Revolution had unbarred a vista of golden radiant hopes. As it happened, he was out of joint with the times in which his lot was cast.

Guizot honestly believed that in the department of politics wisdom and virtue did not condescend to dwell with men of low estate, that the chosen habitation of these qualities was among the prosperous and the richly endowed in this world's goods.

He would be entitled to the credit of having consistently maintained this opinion, were it not that unalterable devotion to an error is not admirable. Lamartine passionately protested that for a policy of this sort there was no need of a statesman ; a boundary stone would do just as well. This scornful description pierced the Conservative majority like the nail which Jael drove into the head of Sisera. The qualification for the franchise was the payment of £8 in direct taxes, and Guizot from the beginning, and always, simply refused to listen to any proposal for the reduction of this figure. When it was pointed out to him that persistency in so obdurate an attitude must lead to civil commotions, he replied that he had no fear, that all the trouble was caused by agitators who mistook the echoes of their own voices for public opinion, that the mass of the people, about whose claims and whose wrongs these orators were so strident, were quite indifferent. It is a secular error of arbitrary-minded governors to attribute to agitators the discontent which has created those agitators and given them their influence. There are, of course, persons who take a delight in stirring up strife and in turning an unreasonable discontent, so produced, to their own profit and power, yet it is a generally safe axiom in politics that when a mighty conflagration bursts out, the part which the presence of large quantities of combustible material has taken in the production of the disaster should be carefully examined.

Guizot, not believing in the existence of any real deep-seated discontent, was not drawn to any programme of social reforms the carrying out of



GUIZOT, THE MOST PROMINENT STATESMAN OF THE JULY MONARCHY

which would have removed the root of misery from which the agitation for electoral reform derived most of its nourishment. If such a conception had entered his mind he would have been compelled to abandon it or lose the support of the high bourgeoisie who were the pillars of his strength, for what these dreaded in the demand for reform was not so much the threatened diminution of their own political influence as the implicit menace to their material interests. Unfortunately Guizot never perceived himself to be within sight of the necessity of making this choice. His cherished convictions, that the country was contented, that the people did not want the vote, and that to give them the vote would mean ruin and revolution, do not seem to have been for a moment disturbed until within a few days of his downfall and the overthrow of the dynasty. The Charter as originally granted by Louis XVIII., as revised at the Revolution of 1830 and made into a real mutually binding compact between the nation and the sovereign, was in his view the last word of human wisdom. It was the final and perfect blossoming on the tree of political progress. The confutation of all these views and the summary conviction and condemnation of Guizot lie in one word—the Revolution of 1848.

That Guizot was readily granted the support of the majority of the electorate was due to the decline in the political integrity of the upper middle classes. With the rise into urgent importance of industrial questions, the insistent demand of the workers to have a greater share in the wealth which they claimed to have created, and their obstinate con-

viction that the adjustment of these inequalities could be effected by acts of the legislature, the possession of the franchise came to have a distinctly material, pecuniary value to the traders and manufacturers and to the professional classes whose success so largely depends upon the prosperity of the commercial classes. The ideals of right and liberty which had been upheld so staunchly by those sections of the community in the days before the Revolution of 1830 provoked only a sceptical sniff and a sneering curl of the lip. Their interest in legislation and government was limited to proposals and acts of administration which increased or threatened to diminish the balance at the bankers. De Tocqueville proclaimed the consequences which must inevitably flow from the exercise of the franchise in a spirit of material selfishness. The passions of the people who are denied electoral rights are not political, they are social. "Opinions and ideas are spreading among them which are going to overturn not this or that Ministry, not this or that Government, but society itself. We are sleeping on a volcano." The cares of this world and the deceitfulness of riches had choked the good seeds of truth and justice and freedom which had been sown in their hearts. The fear of socialism and revolution, like a mighty, rushing wind, had driven them away from their anchorage in the sound and noble doctrines which they had formerly adorned. They failed to perceive that the antidote to socialism was not a policy of do-nothing or repression, but an honest attempt to mitigate the very real misery of which the prevalence of socialistic principles was a symptom.

On several occasions the Government showed a conspicuous complacency or timidity towards the commercial classes, even when the latter were vindicating claims which in the opinion of the Ministry were hostile to the general interests of the country. A case in point was the proposed Customs Union with Belgium in 1842. If this had been consummated the special industries of Paris and the produce of the wine-growing districts would have benefited by free admission into the northern kingdom, while in return the manufactures of Belgium would have had a valuable and much-needed new market opened to them. But the capitalist classes of France, the iron-masters, the oil producers, the great manufacturers, and the Chambers of Commerce, took alarm at this proposal, and, in Congress assembled, called upon the Ministry to give it up. The Government immediately bent its head in submission. One has only to recall how differently associations of workmen, acting in defence of elementary rights, had been treated, how scanty had been the measure of consideration and sympathy meted out to them, to realise the distance which separated the existing régime from the region of democratic sentiment and principle.

The workers did not allow themselves to be discouraged by the cold, sombre, harsh demeanour of the Government towards them. Their cause was powerfully championed by such writers as Louis Blanc and Proudhon, animated by a sincere desire to serve the working-classes, whose toil and suffering they had shared. If there was an abundant admixture of extravagance and mischief in their

propaganda, it is not the partisans of an unsympathetic and neglectful Government that shall dare to blame them. The workers were also for the first time making trial for themselves of the weapon of journalism, and one of their papers exhibited the salutary but at that time—and for intelligible and not blameworthy reasons—very unusual combination of Christian faith and republican principles.

The prospects of the dynasty in the tumultuous events that still lay in the womb of the future were darkened by the tragic death in 1842 of the heir to the throne, the Duc d'Orléans, as the result of a carriage accident. This ardent young prince was much more in sympathy with the temper of the nation, both as regarded foreign and domestic policy, than his father. He had on several occasions shown that he was keenly inflamed at what he considered the pusillanimity of the King, and he perceived that the effect of his father's weakness and timidity was to shake the stability of the throne. If it came to a choice he would rather meet death leading the soldiers of France against a foreign foe than find her ingloriously in the streets of Paris. The terms of his instructions for the rearing of his son, the Comte de Paris, contained in his will, indicate that his domestic policy would have drawn its inspiration from the Revolution, that he would have paid more than lip-service to the principles which his father had been called to the throne to promote. His ambition was that his son, whether as King or as an obscure individual, should be a passionate champion of the Revolution. All this fair promise perished miserably a few

years later in the strong infatuation which led Louis-Philippe with horrible convulsions to tug and shake, till down they came, the pillars of the monarchy, overwhelming himself in the ruins and working sad destruction to the peace and prosperity of France.

But this is to anticipate. An unmistakable badge of arbitrary government is an illiberal attitude towards the press, and we find only what we expect when we note a vigorous revival of prosecutions against the newspapers, the majority of whom, naturally enough as representing the predominant temper of the nation, belonged to the Opposition. *La France* was arraigned for an offence against the person of the King in publishing certain letters, alleged to be written by his Majesty, in which Louis-Philippe, among other expressions deeply injurious to the national sensibilities, defended the construction of the fortifications of Paris as banking the torrent of popular turbulence, and described Poland as the focus of unceasing rebellions. The prosecution not only denied the authenticity of the letters, but declared that if the King had written them he would have been an odious tyrant. Nevertheless, the jury acquitted the journal. Another instance, in which a jury three times brought in a verdict favourable to a newspaper, in obvious defiance of the statute governing the case, indicated more clearly to what extent the moral authority of the Government and of the laws which they administered was sapped and mined. The *National* was charged with making a direct attack upon the King, and though such a line of political criticism was clearly for-

bidden by the odious enactments of September 1835, the jury refused to convict.

The Government, in spite of warnings so significant of the national temper, persisted in a course of action which was setting in array against them all the forces of liberty and progress in the kingdom. The editor of the *Journal du Peuple* was accused of complicity in an attempt made by Quénisset upon three of the King's sons, because he had published a letter in which a certain person, arrested as a fellow-conspirator with Quénisset, begged the journal to take up their defence. The editor, having not the slightest personal acquaintance with his correspondent, had published the letter merely as an interesting contribution to his paper. The case came before the House of Peers. Quénisset was condemned to death, the natural reward of his crime; and the editor, for his "moral complicity" in stirring up the people to hate the King and the dynasty, to five years' imprisonment. A more cruel, a more monstrous travesty of justice had not been perpetrated since the Restoration. Indignation was general. The principal organ among the ministerial journals was silent, while the greater number of the newspapers in Paris and throughout the country drew up a united protest and resolved that henceforth they would not report the proceedings of the Upper House. The Government retaliated by numerous press prosecutions, but having juries to deal with and not an Upper House, which, departing from worthy traditions, had cast off its austere devotion to lofty principles, and was even more infected by the poisonous atmosphere of arbitrary power

than the Lower House, they were in every case balked of their revenge.

The lesson of such incidents would not have been lost upon any Government which was not an incarnation of conceit and folly. When juries hold views concerning alleged misdemeanours of the press which are fundamentally at variance with those that the Government wish to enforce, the Ministers ought at once to conclude that the existing press laws, having lost that community with general feeling to which the laws owe all their legitimate authority, must either be adapted to the prevailing sentiment or allowed to lapse. The acceptance of this axiom is the touchstone of elementary political wisdom. An absolute monarchy, no less than a Government working with or under representative institutions, can secure its success and stability only by conforming to the universal truth that "nations are governed by a knowledge of their temper, and by a judicious management of it." When the Government press for the application of certain laws and juries treat these laws as if they were obsolete, the former have received the clearest possible intimation that they have misunderstood the temper of the people, and that the course of wisdom and safety is graciously to recede from their exigencies. No Government, not even the most powerful Oriental despotism, can dragoon a whole nation. Scarcely any mode of governing men is more remote from the principles of ideal liberty than the discipline of an army, yet the War Office rightly submits to punishment and disgrace a captain who allows his company to get into a state of mutiny, whatever be the rights and wrongs of the

discords which have sprung up between the officer and his men. Guizot and the King had not grasped the commonplaces of political philosophy, for, as affording to their enemies a crowning proof of their desperate situation, they began to pack the juries, and in this way secure the convictions which were refused to them by men honestly chosen. It is needless to remark how little such contemptible victories added to their strength.

Other signs of the weakening of the central government and of the incongruity of the laws with public feeling had not been wanting. In 1841, the financial position of the nation being critical, a law was passed providing for a general census, for the purpose of rating of buildings, doors, and windows, and of letting values. The municipalities protested against the interposition of the agents of the national exchequer in the taking of this assessment. The tax collector is never a popular figure, and when he comes as the harbinger of new imposts his welcome is somewhat less than cordial. The Guizot Government, although it might with safety and dignity have complied with the request of the municipalities to entrust the census to local agents, preferred to make the weight of its hand felt.

The consequence was that there was serious trouble in many towns. At Toulouse the mayor resigned, the Town Council refused to lend its aid to the Treasury officials, and the citizens closed their doors. A Prefect who had shown signs of hesitation was succeeded by one who might be depended upon for vigorous measures. The people mobbed and hooted and jeered at him. Barricades—a word that occurs so frequently in the modern

history of France, and can never be mentioned without a shudder and a blanching of the cheeks—barricades were erected in the streets and blood was shed ; but the National Guard shared the general discontent, the troops fraternised with the National Guard, victory was to the people ; the Prefect and the Public Prosecutor were compelled to leave the town. It is often the penalty of feeble violence that its failure involves the Government in extreme measures which can only aggravate the mischief that has been done, which may create a situation of real danger, but which nevertheless, if the central authority is not to be dissolved, are absolutely necessary. Accordingly troops were poured into Toulouse in such numbers as to make resistance hopeless and useless ; and the assessment was carried out, like the collection of a poll-tax among a conquered population, under the protection of bayonets and artillery. The total result of these proceedings, in Toulouse as in other large centres of population, was to accentuate the hostility of the democracy to the Government and—what was of new and sinister significance—to alienate the sympathy and support of the lower bourgeoisie, which had been of great value to the Government in its earlier struggles with republican insurrection.

We have not disguised our rooted opinion that the formation of a republican opposition to the government of Louis-Philippe was a capital error, a cruel blow to the peace of France, an almost insurmountable barrier to the accomplishment of the substantive items in the party's programme. A monarchy cannot be expected to make terms with opponents who announce that they will be content

with nothing short of its destruction. But the most stupid of all possible ways of combating this *intransigentism* was to make the assumption of the name of Republican an offence against the law. It ill became Louis-Philippe, who owed his acceptance by the populace of Paris, and consequently his throne, to the sponsorship of an avowed holder of republican principles, Lafayette, to give his consent to such an enactment. The rising spirit of the country refused to take heed of this proscription, and at last reached to such a pitch of boldness that Ledru-Rollin, when in 1841 he stood as a candidate for La Sarthe, declared himself, without circumlocution, a Republican. The distinguished young barrister was put on his trial for this offence, and the jury, not daring on this occasion to give legality a bold smack on the face, yet not willing fully to gratify the Government, found him guilty, not of declaring himself a Republican, but of publishing his electoral address containing that declaration in a newspaper. However, there was a flaw in the trial, the conviction was quashed, and a new trial before another jury resulted in an acquittal. It is surely a sign of serious disease in the body politic when the laws are contemned of the very people upon whom is laid the duty of vindicating their potency.

Since the great Revolution the clerical party has always been a reed to pierce the hand of any Government which leans upon it. The national fear and horror of a favoured and increasingly aggressive clericalism had been a powerful factor in the ruin of Charles x. The Ministers of Louis-Philippe would have done well to allow the clergy

to continue in their traditional attachment to the elder branch of the Bourbons. The tendency of such a policy would have been to depress the cause of Legitimacy and to maintain the gulf of severance between it and the nation. The Government, however, pursued a different line of conduct. They attempted by a conciliatory attitude towards the clergy to detach it from the elder branch and win its support for the Orléans dynasty. The result was that offence was given to large sections of the nation without any such compensating increase of strength to Louis-Philippe as would bestead him in a day of adversity; for against a popular uprising the support of the clericals was worth less than nothing, was indeed an impetus to the fury of the mob, while in balancing the Orléans dynasty against the elder branch the clericals knew that what the former might give to them in tenfold would be received from the latter in thirtyfold, yea, in hundredfold.

However, the clericals were not slow to take advantage of the concessions with which the Government of Louis-Philippe sought to win their favour. A cardinal point of clerical policy in all countries has been to secure the control of education. A campaign led by the Comte de Montalembert, and supported by all the clergy, was inaugurated against the secular basis on which the University with its affiliated schools and colleges throughout the country was organised. Education, as directed by the State, was destroying faith and corrupting morals—so it was passionately proclaimed; it was infected with scepticism and pantheism; it was an outrage on the rights of family life, lording it

over the domestic sentiments, and perverting the souls of children. The Jesuits, who had lain low after the Revolution of 1830, but had never left the country, had in 1841 double the number of secondary schools that they had maintained under Charles x. Though they belonged to an unauthorised and illegal society, they were the glowing centre of heat whence radiated all the aggressive Catholic activity. Skilful and successful efforts were made to secure for the Church the future mothers of the nation by the establishment of convent schools for the education of young girls. To the rigorous denunciation of the Jesuits which this activity provoked, the Bishop of Châlons boldly replied: "Why, we are all Jesuits!" The word was true in the sense that the spirit of the Jesuits dominated the Church.

The philosopher and poet Quinet, and the historian Michelet, the former as grave in style as the latter was vivacious, entering the lists against the clericals in 1843, found themselves immediately proclaimed as the leaders of the campaign against the limitless pretensions of Ultramontanism. Michelet denounced sacerdotalism, in its institution of the confessional, as hostile to the peace and integrity of family life. Quinet insisted upon the sovereignty of the individual conscience, in matters of opinion no less than in matters of conduct, and proclaimed its indefeasible freedom from all external authority. He maintained the identity of the essential principles of Christianity with those of the French Revolution. Lamartine suggested that a solution of the religious question, in its political aspects, would be found in the disendowment

of the Church and its formal separation from the State. In 1845 the Government, driven by the force of a public opinion which had subdued even the reactionary Chamber of Deputies, came to an understanding with the Pope—whose support they had secured by manifest tokens of goodwill, and perhaps also by conditional promises of future advantage—that the Jesuits should anticipate the operation of the law and of their own accord close their houses. The Fathers bent for the time beneath the gale of popular passion, in the hope and intention of rearing their heads again in the near future. Adopting their familiar tactics, they changed their name and place of abode, and waited. Quinet, however, was rewarded for his zeal by being driven to resign his professor's chair at the Collège de France.

Tyranny and corruption are bed-fellows. An arbitrary administration which was also pure has never been known. A tyrannical Government means a centralised Government which can seldom adequately supervise the operations of its agents at the extremities. The Guizot administration showed a praiseworthy activity in the promotion of works of public utility, but the poison of corruption found a propitious field for action in this department of State effort. It was complained that the favours of the Government were confined to the constituencies which returned deputies acceptable to those in authority. Guizot's answer to this charge was more damaging to the integrity of the Government than a frank admission would have been. "Because," said he to his constituents,—"because I have helped you sometimes to repair

your churches, to build your presbyteries and your schools, to assure a career to your children, have you ceased to vote according to your conscience? Do you feel yourself corrupted?" The weakness of this defence is hardly worthy of comment. It somehow reminds us irresistibly of the reply alleged to have been made by a certain British Prime Minister when accused of giving too large a share of ministerial appointments to his relations: "Why," he asked, "should men of ability lose the reward due to their talents simply because they are my sons and sons-in-law and nephews?" Why should the churches and presbyteries and schools of worthy people fall into disgraceful dilapidation simply because they are my constituents? Why should electors who have received favours at my hands not give honest votes? Why should votes given for me in such circumstances not be honest votes? Echo answers, why? The questions exhibit a bland ingenuousness quite worthy of the heathen Chinese.

Out of 457 deputies, 184, or roughly two-fifths, held appointments which rendered them dependent on the Ministry. Time and time again attempts were unsuccessfully made to remove this glaring scandal. Guizot opposed himself to all reform like a buttress of concrete. Thiers rightly described such a state of things as a caricature of representative government. Naturally, the example of the Government in maintaining its power by a corrupt influence among the deputies gave the tone to the whole of the public service. Bribery and cheating were rife. Conflagrations broke out in the arsenals at Toulon and Cherbourg, involving a

loss of thousands of pounds, and designed, it was believed, to cover up the traces of thefts on a large scale by highly placed personages. A malefactor in the Government employment at the port of Rochefort committed suicide rather than face in Court the charges of peculation that were directed against him.

Even members of the Cabinet were involved in the scandals of corruption. The Government at the time (1847) had in their pay a paper called the *Époque*, which stigmatised itself by attacks on the private lives of members of the Opposition. The Minister of the Interior was accused of exacting, in return for a theatrical licence, a donation of £4000 to the funds of the *Époque*. Further, the editor of the *Époque* was accused of having secured a large sum from postmasters by giving an undertaking, on behalf of the Minister of the Interior, that a certain measure advancing their interests would be promoted in the Chambers. It was also alleged that a seat in the House of Peers had been sold for £3200. The author of the last-mentioned accusation was summoned before the Peers, at his own instigation, for affronting the honour of the House; but the Government could not rebut his charge, and he was acquitted. The other serious allegations were passed over by the Ministers without any attempt to meet them, and for obvious reasons. Just at this time General Cubières, a former Minister of War, was punished by the loss of all civil rights for offering a bribe of £4000 to M. Teste, a former Minister of Public Works, and M. Teste was sent to prison for three years for receiving the same. The nation was greatly dis-

quieted by the corruption which it had knowledge of, and by the still greater corruption which it only suspected. The unenfranchised masses could not be content to be held down by an administration whose integrity had been so deeply stained by the foul breath of unresisted scandal.

Famine itself came to help the enemies of the Government. In 1845 potato disease aggravated the distress caused by a poor harvest, and in the following year the produce of the fields was even scantier. A demand went up from the hungry people that foreign corn should, for a time at least, be admitted free of duty. The Government, slow at first to realise the urgency of the situation, eventually granted the request. But, as often happens, unlucky occasion conspired with procrastination to shear the remedy of large part of its efficacy. Owing to the prevalence of extensive floods it was found difficult to distribute over the country the cargoes of corn which were landed at Marseilles from Odessa. There had been over-speculation in railways; money was scarce; and in spite of free imports the price of corn reached a figure which did not wear a comforting aspect to the mass of the poor. Charity, private and municipal, readily opened its stores of bounty; but the need was even greater than the liberality. Crowds of desperate people, maddened by starvation, violently forced their way into the receptacles of corn, and compelled the owners to accept the price that was offered to them. Bands of beggars overran the country, and intimidated the farmers to supply them with food. Gaunt assassination stalked the land and found some victims. Bloody

riots were frequent, and whole regions of the country were in anarchy. The vigour that had not been prompt in the work of relief was manifest enough in the work of repression. Flying columns of troops scoured the country. The prisons were crowded. It is only fair to say that the general feeling of the community towards the insurrection of empty stomachs harmonised with the attitude of the Government; for when the poor wretches were brought up for trial the juries forgot their miseries and remembered only their crime. Several of the rioters were condemned to death and many to penal servitude. Louis-Philippe, a tender-hearted man and eager as a rule to find grounds of leniency, had no bowels of compassion for this occasion.

“ If he may
Find mercy in the law, 'tis his; if none,
Let him not seek't of us.”

That was his antiphonic response to the petition of the country for examples. The severities of authority inspired sullen resentment rather than fear, and implanted a strong root of passionate longing for revenge. It is a safe conjecture that the suppression of the starvation riots of this terrible winter yielded a harvest of Revolutionists, of men, without fear as without hope, who impatiently waited the opportunity for the bloodiest adventures, who needed no other inspiration to reckless bravery than the sting of bitter misery and the memory of the sharp remedies that had been applied for the healing of their woes.

A trite saying it is that whom the gods wish to

destroy they first drive mad. History supplies few more striking illustrations of this old saw than the infatuation of Louis-Philippe and Guizot in the presence of events whose meaning was, as it seemed, written large across the heavens. A few months before the catastrophe which sunk the monarchy in hideous ruin the orators of the Government taunted the Opposition with preaching in the desert, in the midst of a dumb and indifferent country. The King in his speech at the opening of the Chamber, in the last days of 1847, described the reform agitation as the stirring up of blind and hostile passions, and declared his conviction of his ability to surmount all obstacles. "Let no one believe," cried the Minister of the Interior, in the very month of the Revolution, "that the Government will give way to demonstrations of whatever sort; no, they will not yield." Guizot, inflexible as ever, repelled every overture of compromise or conciliation. Some progressive members of the Conservative party presented a very moderate petition to the King in favour of reform; as soon as their backs were turned his Majesty, in an access of senile fury, trampled the document beneath his feet. The leading journal on the Government side hurled defiance at the Opposition, and exhorted the Ministry in this wise: "March against the phantom; it will vanish!"

It is indeed one of the securities of freedom that tyranny, at the acme of its malevolence, so often goes blind and mad. Louis-Philippe was full of security just as the moment of his greatest peril was almost upon him. "I shall not be taken by surprise," he exclaimed, in the gabbling vanity of

an impotent old man. "I shall not commit the faults of Charles x. ; I shall know what steps to take, and how to defend myself." Even when the shouts and songs of the students and the workmen reached the King's apartments at the Tuileries his Majesty remained entirely undismayed. "I will drive that away like the dust before the wind." Forty-eight hours later King Louis-Philippe, the first and the last reigning member of his dynasty, was hurrying out of France, shorn of all the trappings of a King and disguised as an Englishman of the middle class. It was rather a mean way of sneaking out of difficulties into which he had proudly strutted. His enemies did not even do him the reverence of pursuing him, either with a view of seizing his person or hastening his departure. France had simply ceased to take account of him. The following chapter will give a brief account of the sombre and thrilling scene upon which the curtain was rung down at the end of the strange eventful drama of Louis-Philippe, King of the French.

CHAPTER VIII

THE REVOLUTION OF 1848

AROUND a table loaded with choice viands and rare wines a gathering of politicians, like-minded before they entered the banqueting hall, are likely to find their agreements accentuated and their zeal warmed as the evening proceeds. Private banquets for the promotion of public objects are an immemorial institution, but public feasts designed for the advancement of political causes, to which admission is obtained by the payment of a sum of money, are a method of propaganda which did not attain a noteworthy development until our own time. The succession of such banquets which precluded the downfall of Louis-Philippe is likely to remain for ever memorable.

These banquets had not in all cases a definite anti-dynastic purpose. As often as not the toast of "The King" was included in the programme, and indeed many reformers who looked with little favour on the republican movement had borne a prominent part in these gatherings. Ledru-Rollin, the most conspicuous of the republican leaders, had at first kept himself aloof from this method of political agitation, probably holding a mean opinion of its efficacy. Not by food and

drink, but by blood and iron—thus may have run his thoughts—was arbitrary power to be overthrown. At length, however, he resolved to be present at an important banquet at Lille. Odilon Barrot, who had agreed to take part in the same, when he heard that the redoubtable Republican was going to be a fellow-diner, stipulated that the toast of the King should be honoured. This guarantee not being forthcoming, he withdrew, leaving the field to Ledru-Rollin, who, while demanding universal suffrage, distinguished himself in other respects by his moderation. In the course of 1847 no fewer than fifty towns had signalled themselves by the holding of similar banquets, some of them of an exclusively republican character.

The pivot of the insurrection which led to the Revolution of 1848 turns upon one special, projected feast which will not be forgotten as long as the history of France excites interest. It was announced that a great banquet would be held in Paris on the 19th of February 1848, in support of the reform movement. The Minister of the Interior claimed that the Government had the right to prohibit any gathering to which people were admitted for money, and the police forbade the holding of this banquet. "You wish to put the hand of the police upon the mouth of the country," exclaimed Lamartine,—“remember the *Jeu de Paume*. The *Jeu de Paume* was a place of meeting closed by authority and re-opened by the nation.” The Opposition declared that the prohibition was illegal and a breach of the constitution, and continued their preparations, in association with a

committee representing the electors of Paris, for the banquet. Excitement was intense. All business was suspended. The promoters of the movement sought to deprive the Government of all excuse for violence. Instead of holding the banquet on a Sunday or on a Monday, as had been intended, when masses of the Parisian populace are free to move about in the streets, they fixed on a Tuesday—22nd February, and for a place of meeting chose an almost deserted street in the end of Paris farthest removed from the most populous quarters, namely, near the Arc de Triomphe.

On the morning of the 21st the Opposition papers published the programme of the great reform demonstration for the following day. The Place de la Madeleine was to be the starting-point. Those members of the National Guard who had arranged to take part were enjoined to present themselves in uniform and to line the procession in order that all chance of collision between the demonstration and the authorities might be prevented. The Government party felt that this injunction was an unwarrantable assumption of executive authority. Nothing affrighted them more than the prospect of 100,000 disciplined men, even if on the occasion without their weapons, assembling and separating in good order at the word of the Opposition. It would seem that the disposal of great part of the armed strength of the Crown had silently passed away from it. The Government intimated that it would permit the deputies and their fellow-guests to betake themselves individually to the banqueting-hall, but that it would not tolerate the procession through the streets. Accord-

ingly it was decided, much to the disgust of many fiery spirits, to give up the banquet. "I told you so," said the King, when he heard of it,— "I told you so," said he, raining a shower of mockery upon his opponents. And then the Government committed an act of madness which destroyed it: It issued an order calling together the National Guard for the following day. "There's our great demonstration," shouted the quick-witted Reformers,— "we shall have it under the best form." The Ministry, in their eagerness to vindicate their authority upon the National Guard, had not perceived in their precipitancy that they were delivering themselves into the hand of their enemies. They saw their mistake immediately they had made it, but it was too late to undo the mischief they had done to their own cause.

The fateful 22nd of February dawned. In the morning the students gathered in the Place de la Panthéon. Soon they were joined by masses of workmen. Then commenced the parade through the streets of Paris, to the shouts of "Long live Reform! Down with Guizot!" As they proceeded the numbers and the excitement grew. Many slight conflicts with the guardians of the peace ensued. The mob threw stones and the Municipal Guard charged them, not without violence but without as yet opening fire. The Chamber met, but was immediately adjourned, without one word being said of what was in the minds of all. Every man held his peace, because, with the noise of the strife outside in their ears, every man was full of hopes and fears and no man knew in his heart what would come of these things,

though that they were big with fate no one doubted. Meanwhile the crowds had begun to tear up the pavements and commenced the erection of barricades.

What were the forces at the disposal of the Government to cope with the insurrection? They were certainly not deficient in numerical strength. More than 30,000 troops, well supported by artillery, occupied all the strategic positions. Opportunities for reinforcement from the neighbouring garrisons were easy and plentiful. There were besides the forts sprinkled round Paris as part of the great scheme of fortifications which had been carried out some years previously. But there was dissension among the military commanders, resulting inevitably in want of cohesion, energy, and resolution. As for the National Guard, which had been the great buttress of the throne in the early days of the monarchy, it refused to lend its strength to the suppression of an insurrection inspired by motives which were regarded with respect and sympathy by the greater part of its members. Accordingly only a very small number responded to the appeal of the Government to come to the help of the regular soldiers. Yet when darkness fell upon the day of the 22nd February, the King and his Ministers believed that they were masters of the situation. Louis-Philippe refused to consider the indications of weakness and hesitancy among the troops of the line. The dawn, however, showed no diminution in the confident vigour of the insurrection. The troops set to work again upon the destruction of the barricades, but as soon as they destroyed one set and drew off to another quarter the razed barricades were rebuilt.

There was neither hope nor finality in this department of the repressive activity.

Another summons was addressed to the National Guard. The response was much heartier than on the former occasion, but in this circumstance there was no comfort for the Government. The men who answered the appeal belonged to the party of reform, while those who favoured the Government cause remained for the most part deaf to the call. A battalion of the National Guard, encountering some troops of the line, saluted them with the cry of "Long live Reform!" to which the regulars replied by "Long live the National Guard!" This same battalion joined with the people in the singing of the "Marseillaise." Soon the National Guard came out more strongly on the side of the insurrection, openly protecting the people from the vengeance of the Municipal Guard and the Government cavalry. The insurrectionists won over the soldiers of the line by avoiding bloody encounters with them, and by refusing to be provoked out of an attitude of friendliness to them.

These events, which many persons had foreseen as contingencies which ought at least to be reckoned with, fell upon the King with the force and surprise of a thunderbolt. At last his eyes were opened, but no instinct of practical sagacity came to rescue him from his peril. Guizot was dismissed, very reluctantly, but in his place was put M. Molé, a man without native force of character and obnoxious to a great part of the nation as an instrument of the King in a previous abortive attempt to establish personal government. The news of

the change of Ministry was spread abroad among the people. The downfall of Guizot gave great satisfaction, and there were some cries of "Long live the King!" but when Molé, whose history was vividly remembered, was mentioned as Guizot's successor, and no definite promise of serious reform was made, the masses felt that Louis-Philippe was trying to dupe them, and lost faith in the sincerity or value of his concession. The poor, weak, foolish King flattered himself that he had shown great cleverness in avoiding all public promises! It is amazing that he should not have perceived that there was no choice between a fight to the death and the fullest, the frankest, most specific acceptance of the demands of the men who had so deeply involved themselves in the agitation and the insurrection.

Molé had the good sense to decline the King's invitation to form a Ministry, and advised him to send for Thiers and Odilon Barrot. The King flew into a temper at the mention of the name of Thiers, but at length so far gave way as to consent to a Ministry with Molé and Thiers as joint chiefs. Precious hours, during which, if the King had but known it, the life-blood of his dynasty was ebbing away, were lost in the search for Thiers; and when he was found he refused, very reasonably, to serve as a co-ordinate of Molé. But he clearly indicated that he and his friends would not withhold their support from the Government in the hour of its agony, if reform was granted and a General Election held. The King would not hear of a dissolution, and thus the second day of the insurrection drew to a close. In the evening Paris

presented an appearance of a very striking character. The streets, the squares, and the boulevards were crowded ; the city, including even the Government buildings, was so profusely illuminated that the air was almost as clear as in broad daylight. The people lavished supplies of food and wine upon the soldiers, faint and famished as they were, for the commissariat arrangements had completely broken down. Long, densely thronged processions, carrying flags, torches, and lanterns, threaded the city in all directions.

The final and most bloody phase of the insurrection was inaugurated by a collision, in great part unintended and accidental, between one of these processions and a party of troops guarding the Foreign Office. The bodies of those who had been slain in this encounter were placed on a cart which was driven through the streets, accompanied by a great concourse of people to shouts of "Vengeance!" The dread tocsin was sounded in the churches all over Paris from eleven o'clock until midnight. All the gunsmiths' shops were emptied ; barricades, more than 1500 in all, sprang up on every side, and the 24th of February dawned upon a populace full of fury, resolved to perish or to glut their passion of vengeance upon the butchers of their fellow-citizens.

The first news that fell upon the city was that Marshal Bugeaud, noted for his reactionary opinions and for his ruthless methods of dealing with popular disturbances, had been placed in supreme command of the troops. In the meanwhile Thiers and Barrot, in spite of the obduracy of the King regarding a dissolution, were jointly engaged in the

formation of a Ministry. Their hopes of averting a revolution were not high, but they felt that patriotic duty demanded of them the attempt. Columns of troops were despatched to occupy the Hotel de Ville and the Panthéon; they made their way without much difficulty to these places, but immediately on their arrival they were forced to recognise that, surrounded as they were with barricades, and cut off from all communication with the rest of Paris, their position was that of the garrison of a closely besieged town.

Another column, setting out for the Place de la Bastille, was confronted by an enormous barricade, and the commander was given to understand that any offensive act on the part of the troops would lead to a useless massacre. He agreed to stay his hand until the news of the formation of the Thiers-Barrot Ministry should have penetrated to the people. The fond hope was still entertained that the downfall of Guizot and the succession of a Cabinet in sympathy with the reform movement would dissolve the insurrection like the heat of the sun upon the morning mists. At that hour it would have been almost as reasonable to expect that a serpent-charmer could lay a storm, or calm a volcano, or still an earthquake.

The barracks of the Municipal Guard, one after the other, surrendered to the insurrection, and the National Guard was now frankly and actively on the side of the people. At ten o'clock the King permitted his new Ministers to announce that a General Election would be held; but there were no means at hand of printing the proclamation, and before it could appear in the newspapers

its pertinency to the situation was altogether lost. Barrot had undertaken the hazardous office of going about among the people in the streets and in the barricades announcing the change of Ministry, but his essays of peace were met with shouts of "Down with Louis-Philippe! To the Tuileries!" He returned to his own house, hopeless, broken with fatigue and anguish.

Paris was in the hands of the insurrection, and the masses began to converge from all quarters upon the palace of the King. Guizot, in peril of his life, had hied him away, disguised as a woman. Thiers, who remained at the Tuileries, proposed that the Court should withdraw to Saint-Cloud, there gather together an army and re-enter Paris. The King could not make up his mind to any definite course of action. The fusillade in the Place de la Concorde, adjoining the palace on the west, had made the inmates of the Tuileries realise how great and how imminent their danger was. On the Place de la Carrousel, on the east of the palace, were stationed 4000 troops, a few detachments of the National Guard, with sixteen pieces of artillery. The King, mounted on horseback, went forth to review them, and to assure, if it were yet possible, their fidelity. It was a pitiful scene. The few timid, halting cries of "Long live the King!" were drowned in passionate exclamations of "Long live the Reform!" "You have it!" shouted the King, though the words had difficulty in getting out of his throat. But there was no leap of answering enthusiasm from the troops; some were hostile, the rest were mournful and depressed. "It is all over," said the King,

turning his bridle and addressing himself to Thiers,—"it is all over. I can see that well." Returning to the Tuileries, he sunk into an armchair, a crushed and broken man.

The Duc de Nemours, the second son of the King, and the guardian of his elder brother's child, the heir to the throne, suggested to Louis-Philippe in an oblique and hesitating way that he should abdicate in favour of the Duchesse d'Orléans as Regent. Inspired by his wife, a heroic and exalted spirit, he replied that he would prefer death. His last act of conciliation was to transfer the Presidency of the Council from Thiers to Barrot, for the insurrection had plainly shown that it had not forgotten earlier episodes in the career of Thiers, in which, as a Minister of Louis-Philippe, he had compromised for a time at least with reactionary policy. The spirit of the revolutionaries, growing more exasperated with the resistance offered to it, and in all cases overcoming the resistance, gave ground for serious apprehensions among the inmates of the Tuileries. An hour later approaches were again made to the King with a view to his abdication. At length, after a silence, the words fell from his lips—they could hardly be said to be spoken: "I have always been a peace-loving Prince. I abdicate." The Queen and her daughters protested, overwhelming the unhappy monarch with sobs and tears and tokens of affection, and the King was slow to give his signature to the document which made his spoken words valid.

Almost immediately thereafter word came that the people were about to attack the palace. The soldiers, deputies, courtiers, and functionaries had

already taken themselves off, leaving the Royal Family to the protection of the soldiers drawn up in the courtyard. Louis-Philippe, the Queen, and the members of their family departed by a postern gate, leaving behind the Duchesse d'Orléans, her children, and their guardian uncle, the Duc de Nemours. The rickety carriages which contained the royal fugitives set out at a gallop in the direction of Saint-Cloud, and with them disappeared Louis-Philippe from the pages of French history. Louis XVI. had finished his career in a tragedy which impressed all the world; Charles X. had maintained a noble dignity in his slow progress from Rambouillet into exile; Louis-Philippe, who was certainly not inferior to either of them in personal courage, made a much less dignified exit from the stage. The Duchesse d'Orléans and her sons soon followed the King, but they did not leave Paris. The high-spirited lady felt that there was still a rôle for her to play, and that she must not lightly sacrifice the throne of her son.

Presently the insurrectionists arrived and shook the gates of the palace, which were opened to them by the Governor. The revolutionists showed a remarkable and very commendable restraint. One of them set himself upon the throne, and, amid shouts of laughter, gravely bowed to the crowd. Then that characteristic article of royal furniture was carried off in a cart and burnt on the Place de la Bastille, at the foot of the column which commemorated the three days of July 1830. It was fitting enough that the throne should be made a sacrifice to the principles which Louis-Philippe had been summoned to maintain, but

upon which he had turned his back. All the trumpery insignia of royalty that could be found in the palace and many articles of furniture or decoration directly associated with the object of their animosity, the crowd destroyed. In La Salle du Trône they transacted a parody of the royal receptions. All this was harmless enough, and he must be niggard indeed who will deny to the victors these modest satisfactions. They showed in other respects a noble generosity and a high-minded sensibility. Three hundred of the Municipal Guard who quite expected to be massacred were spared; they were merely stripped of their uniforms and told to take themselves away. The crown diamonds were put under protection and carefully guarded, as was also the oratory of the Queen; and a large crucifix found in her room was carried respectfully to the Church of Saint-Roch. The same tenderness was shown to the apartments of the Duchesse d'Orléans.

Her Royal Highness presented herself at the Chamber of Deputies to ask its protection for her son, the Comte de Paris, in the absence of Louis-Philippe the head of the Orléans dynasty. She was received with acclamation by the great majority of the deputies, but the extreme Radicals demanded a provisional Government, and the people who were pouring, as a wild flood, into the Chamber uttered the same cry. It was not to be expected that the insurrection would allow such an assembly to stand in the way of its wishes—a Chamber largely comprised of functionaries, elected on a very restricted upper-middle-class franchise, the ally and accomplice of the Minister and the King whose stiff-necked attitude had provoked the

Revolution. The protection of a Chamber of Deputies unable to protect itself was worth nothing to the Duchesse d'Orléans. The President of the Chamber declared the sitting suspended until the Duchesse and the Comte de Paris had withdrawn. But the Duchesse kept her ground, so did the crowd, and the hall resounded with shouts demanding that the downfall of the dynasty should be proclaimed. Ledru-Rollin declared that the fighting in the streets would continue if the majority of the Chamber claimed to maintain a new usurpation against the rights of the people. He demanded a Provisional Government and the immediate convocation of a National Convention. The patience of the insurrection was in the meantime being rapidly exhausted. Presently a band of armed men rushed in violently upon the assembly, shouting, "Down with the Chamber!" The Duchesse, feeling that everything was lost, hurried away with her children.

The debating chamber emptied itself of all but the Radical deputies and the clamorous crowd. A Provisional Government was then and there appointed; a move was made for the Hotel de Ville, where the Republicans, overwhelming in their strength and in their exigency, insisted upon the association of several of their number with the new Ministers; and the Second Republic was proclaimed. Universal manhood suffrage was instituted, and arrangements were hurried on for consulting the will of the sovereign people.

CHAPTER IX

HOW LOUIS NAPOLEON BECAME EMPEROR

IF anyone had predicted on the 1st of January 1848 that before the close of the year Louis Napoleon would be President of the French Republic he would have been laughed to scorn as a madman. He would have been set down at once as a person whose opinions on political matters were of no account whatever. It will be our business in this chapter to explain, in as clear and unencumbered a manner as is possible to us, how this seeming impossibility came to pass. In our view it is a story full of interest, and not empty of instruction. We shall endeavour throughout to keep to the one main point.

The Provisional Government, formed after the Revolution of February 1848, with Lamartine as the most conspicuous figure and dominating spirit, was urged by the menaces of extremists to make a definite proclamation of a Republic, but it contented itself with expressing its preference for that form of government, while leaving the final decision to the people, who were to be consulted as early as possible. An extension of the franchise had been the object of the agitation, which had culminated in the complete overthrow of its oppon-

ents, and it was a foregone conclusion that the electorate which was to determine the constitution of the country must be erected on the basis of universal manhood suffrage.

The feeling in favour of a Republic was not to be measured, as far as the rural districts were concerned, by the happenings in Paris. Many of the peasants had come to the conclusion, applying the process of exhaustion, that they were inclined to favour Bonapartism. They did not like the dynasty which had just been overthrown, because they thought that the Orleanists were greedy and exacting; they detested Legitimacy, because it was associated in their minds and in their experience with harsh treatment at the hands of the seigneurs; they dreaded and hated the Republicans, because they believed the extreme members of that party desired nothing so much as to despoil the peasants of their laboriously garnered savings, and perhaps drive them off their fields. Yet France must have a Government, and what remained but the Bonapartes?

The artisans were in a state of mind which would have called for wise and tender treatment at any time, and was especially dangerous to institutions which were to be reared on a basis of universal suffrage. They were miserable and ignorant, and when a great part of the power in a State falls into the hands of ill-instructed people who are wretched and poor and naked, the community is in frightful peril. During the closing years of Louis-Philippe's reign trade had been much depressed; the Revolution had for the moment completely disorganised society, and many workers were in consequence

out of employment. The moral atmosphere was charged with excitement and unsettlement ; it is irksome and very difficult, after a paroxysm of intense agitation, and while still in the midst of magnetic forces of varying strength pulling in a dozen different directions, to settle down to quiet, steady, unexhilarating routine work. The stream of national life had risen in a flood, had overflowed its banks, and the waters were slow to find their accustomed channel again. Not knowing what a day might bring forth, conscious of the growing antipathy between the masses and the upper middle classes, fearing changes which might adversely affect their interests, the people who had money to spend thought it wisdom and policy to keep a tight hold of their purse-strings. Little money spent means little money earned. The national exchequer was all but empty, and the nation was heavily in debt ; it was questionable whether the Provisional Government had standing and authority enough in the eyes of the nation to secure the collection of a revenue, and the discharge of the country's obligations to its creditors. Within a fortnight the Five per Cents. fell from 116 to 75, and the Three per Cents. from 73 to 47. It is true that France soon began to manifest her unrivalled powers of recuperation from distress or disaster ; our remarks bear upon the state of things on the very morrow of the Revolution.

Among the victims of hard times and political disturbance, the preachers of the "social revolution," the new earth which was to be made by the universal substitution of the principle of co-opera-

tion for that of competition, found ready disciples. The workers were taught to believe that all their wrongs could be righted, all their miseries removed, by the action of Parliament. In this state of unenlightenment their antagonism to improvement in the tools of industry and the instruments of commerce was to be expected; that they should seek to lay violent hands upon machinery, upon the railroads and the railway stations, though deplorable, was not amazing. Their first and widely comprehensive demand was that the State should constitute itself the chief, and ultimately the only, employer of labour. The Provisional Government, while anxious not to discourage private enterprise, so far conceded to the exigencies of the Socialists as to guarantee work for all. This declaration, though it fell far short of the ideal proclaimed by Louis Blanc with so much acceptance among distressed workmen, was nevertheless the admission of a vital principle, the right to work, viewed with profound repugnance and disgust, even at the present hour, by many publicists who are sincerely sympathetic towards those who earn their living by the sweat of their face. It was followed, as a matter of course, in the state of the labour market at the time, by the opening of "national workshops," or, to speak with more definition, of a bureau where all who sought employment were hired by the Government, for work chiefly upon roadways and bridges.

Louis Blanc, still pressing, out of season, as it was—for the General Election being still to come, the will of the nation was not yet ascertained—for the nationalisation of industry, was placed at

the head of a Labour Commission for the investigation of industrial problems. The object of the Provisional Government in setting up this Commission was to gain time and to save themselves from being committed too deeply to extreme views, but the Socialist leader to this extent made the Commission serve the purposes of his propaganda, that it became a very effective medium for the advertisement of extreme Socialist doctrine.

The appeal to the country was made in April. Every Frenchman of twenty-one years of age and over was entitled to a vote, and every Frenchman of twenty-five years of age and over was eligible for election as a deputy. Polling was by ballot. Nine hundred representatives were to be chosen. It was agreed that the deputies should be salaried, and a democratic Government thought to please the workmen, whose wages are so much per day, by adopting this system of daily reckoning in the payment of the nation's representatives. Twenty-five francs per day were to be the honorarium of each deputy. Up to that time the members of the Assembly had served their country without fee or pecuniary recognition, and the granting of what was generally considered a very comfortable salary was an innovation particularly unwelcome to hard-beset workers, and a subject of sharp criticism and cynical derision. The elections were a triumph for the moderate Republicans, and a distinct set-back to extremists. Of twenty workmen, belonging to the Socialist group, who had been put up for the thirty-four seats in Paris, not one had been elected. Lamartine, who had distinguished himself by boldly confronting and

repudiating the red flag of the social revolution, was at the head of the poll in the capital, and was also elected in ten departments. In all he had received the suffrages of 1,820,000 of his fellow-citizens. With an electorate of 10,000,000, this was a very striking mark of popular confidence. It was the proudest moment in the life of the great poet and orator; but only for a very brief time did he stand upon this dazzling eminence, too soon was he to be cast headlong into the abyss of obloquy and popular oblivion.

The last thing that entered the mind of the Socialist party was to take their defeat with resignation. On the whole, however, the elections passed off without disturbance, but at Limoges and Rouen the workmen, because the candidates whom they supported were not returned, took to rioting; in the latter city barricades were erected in the streets, and blood was shed.

The new Assembly inaugurated its career with an immense shout of "Vive la République!" repeated, in the presence of the people, the National Guard, and the Army, under the peristyle of the Palais Bourbon. The scene, touching and impressive in the extreme, was never forgotten by those who witnessed it. Yet the unanimity was only momentary and superficial; it was a unanimity *de circonstance*; the nation was linked to Republicanism as to a casual mistress, not a wife; stated at the highest, it was a marriage of convenience rather than of affection. At this period it was that Thiers first uttered the memorable phrase,—*la république est le gouvernement qui nous divise le moins.*

The authority of the Provisional Government naturally came to an end with the meeting of the Assembly. The executive power was conferred upon a Commission of five deputies, who were to choose the Ministers. Lamartine, the leader of the moderate Republicans, and Ledru-Rollin, who inclined towards the extreme section, were both members of the Executive Commission, though they received the fewest votes of the five. During the reign of Louis-Philippe, at a time when it was illegal to take upon oneself the name of Republican, Ledru-Rollin had boldly presented himself to the electors of Paris in that character, and had been by them sent to the Assembly; he had converted the question of universal suffrage from a matter of mild and not pressing interest into a raging and tearing propaganda; for these reasons he was regarded as a dangerous man by the Conservative element in the new Assembly. Lamartine and Ledru-Rollin had been closely associated in the agitation for reform, in the terrible days of February, and in the work of the Provisional Government; they had that feeling for each other which belongs to men who have stood side by side on a field of battle under a murderous fire, or who jointly have shared some experience of awe and terror, like that of shipwrecked mariners who have helped and comforted each other in the midst of privation and anguish upon a derelict raft. Lamartine had now been asked to break with his more violent friend, but he refused, and hence his position as fourth on the list of the five members of the Executive Commission.

The labour crisis remained acute. There were

few indications of that revival of industry which it was hoped would rescue the Government from its difficulties with the labouring classes. The experiment of the national workshops was not developing in a satisfactory way. In a word, the State was unable to find wealth-producing occupation for the hundred thousand men who applied to it for work. The artisans themselves felt that the labour given to them to do was mere trifling, an excuse for the granting of the pittance which they received for their industry. In four months only £560,000 had been spent. The men were dissatisfied, their leaders were dissatisfied. Louis Blanc suggested that the State should acquire all the factories and workshops and hand them over to associations of workers, every man to be paid the same wages. The Socialist leaders conceived that the interests of their propaganda lay, not in easing the situation, but in getting together the elements which should produce a crisis. The prospect of a revival of private enterprise, of prosperity among private firms, gave them no pleasure. They dissuaded the workers against accepting employment from these quarters, and pressed them to apply at the national workshops. In the Assembly the orators of the Extreme Left persisted in demanding work and bread for the toilers. The Executive Commission was driving straight up against the leaders of the Socialists; a collision, the emission of sparks, possibly a conflagration, was inevitable.

It is a hasty and imperfectly warranted conclusion that the failure of the national workshops is final proof of the unwisdom and danger of any

such experiment in the future ; it has to be remembered that large sections of the community were unsympathetic, and that others actually hoped and worked for failure ; the circumstances of the nation and of industry were abnormal ; the issue might have been otherwise under more genial and friendly auspices ; but a failure they undoubtedly were, and the policy of the Executive Commission was to close them gradually. The director of the workshops was instructed to refuse all further admissions ; men of from eighteen to twenty-five years of age were enlisted in the army ; and all workers who had been less than six months in Paris were sent away from the city. These measures created great apprehension among the artisans who remained in the workshops. Each one feared that he might be dismissed at any moment. From these incidents, combined with the general wretchedness of the workers and the wild expectations that had been excited by the preaching of Socialist doctrine, sprang the insurrection of June.

In the meantime, at the supplementary elections rendered necessary by the multiple elections of April, Louis Napoleon had been returned to the Assembly for Paris. He was sixth on the list of the eight representatives at that time elected in the capital,—Thiers and Hugo before him and Proudhon after him. Thiers was also elected by five Departments and Louis Napoleon by four. The Pretender was obviously becoming formidable ; yet, in spite of the law against the presence in France of members of families that had reigned in the country, the Assembly allowed the election.

Thereupon Louis Napoleon from London made one of those enigmatic declarations in which he was so fecund and so proficient ; he should know, he said in the course of this, how to discharge any duties which the country laid upon him. Dark hints were read into the obviously designed ambiguities of the document, a feeling of great uneasiness was immediately created, and it was proposed to call the attention of the law officers to the terms of the letter. Louis Napoleon saw that his hour had not yet struck, and surprised the world with a second letter announcing that, rather than be the involuntary cause of disorders, he resigned his seat.

But the Pretender's agents continued to be busy, stirring up discontent against the Executive Commission. The sympathy of Louis Napoleon with the aspirations of the artisans was proclaimed in many a working-men's club and from many a street corner. Great play was made with the book on *The Extinction of Pauperism* which he had written during his captivity at Ham. In that volume he had proposed that the unemployed should be placed upon the uncultivated lands of the country, that thereby they might earn a comfortable livelihood. The Napoleon of history had drained the best blood of the working-classes in the pursuit of conquest and the gratification of insane and insatiate ambition, and he had inflicted cruel wounds upon the industry and commerce of his country. This was forgotten by the poor ; the Napoleon of history had sunk beneath their horizon ; in his place had arisen a Napoleon of legend, a figure oddly composed of military glory, demo-

cratic sentiment, progress, and liberty. Pictures of the great Emperor were conspicuous on the boulevards, songs of Napoleon and his wars were sung in the cafés and at the corners of streets; a sight of the uniform of the old Guard sent people into ecstasies of tenderness, pride, and joy. It is difficult to estimate with confidence the share of responsibility which belongs to Bonapartism for the harrowing events of June 1848; but two things are certain,—first, that Bonapartism would have had little power for mischief among the working-classes if it had not linked itself to their social miseries and grievances; and second, that the very unsuccess of the insurrection served, and that right speedily, the ambition of Louis Napoleon.

The reply of the Executive Commission to the complaints of the artisans was that the Government had no intention of abruptly dissolving the national workshops, and that they desired to find work for the unemployed by buying back the railways. But while the insurrection was still at the incipient stage a proposal was made in the Assembly that the national workshops should be dissolved within three days. This was the blunder which gave the forces of disorder the accession of strength and the impetus they needed. Thousands of those who had halted between two opinions, as soon as they learned from this proposal the spirit which possessed a great part of the Assembly, passed to the side of insurrection. It was to no purpose that the dissolution of the workshops was to be attended by various measures which would mitigate or altogether transmute the harshness of this proceeding. The men knew

nothing of these alleviations, or if they knew they depreciated and disregarded them. Then followed four days of horror. Never has the world witnessed a labour riot of such appalling proportions. The figures, over 1500 dead and 2500 wounded, tell their own tale of sorrow and woe.

The Government, no doubt considering that the promises to the workmen were cancelled by the failure of the latter to perform their share of the implicit contract, namely, the preservation of order, dissolved the national workshops early in July, and withdrew the Bill for the State acquisition of the railways. But several measures of an ameliorating character, breathing a spirit of sympathy with the aspirations of labour, were carried. £120,000 was voted to the labour associations, whether composed of workmen only or of workmen and masters conjoined; the Minister of Public Works was authorised to entrust to the workers' associations any labour which it was not essential should be performed by direct employees of the Government; if the estimates of these associations and of private firms for Government contracts were the same, the preference was to be given to the former; there was also a general limitation of work to twelve hours a day. The value of some of these enactments obviously depended upon the spirit of the Government administration, but in the meantime the artisans had little reasonable ground of complaint against the authorities.

There is no nation more liable to political panic than the French. They are a people of great intelligence, but of little faith. They have mind

enough to discover and understand the true principles of liberty, but not will nor character enough to believe in them steadfastly. Let the edifice of their faith be shaken but a little, and it falls to the ground with a mighty crash. No doubt the history of the nation during the last hundred and twenty years accounts for the political timidity of the French. The insurrection of June should not have been a severe trial to the faith of any man who had intelligently apprehended democratic principles. It was not a product of universal suffrage; it was the monstrous offspring of wretchedness and ignorance; and the destruction of these evils was bound to be wrought by the progress of enlightenment and a longer enjoyment of liberty.

Nevertheless, seven months after the Revolution of 1848 there set in a violent reaction against the principles which had triumphed in the downfall of Guizot and Louis-Philippe. The strength of the current was shown in the results of some elections held in September: of fifteen seats, thirteen were won by Conservatives, and two by Radicals. The moderate Republicans had sunk out of sight. Louis Napoleon was again elected by five departments. His policy as a candidate was the use of vague phrases which might be interpreted to their several satisfaction by all parties. He took his seat on 26th September, professing his respect for the law and devotion to the Republic.

The Executive Commission had in the meantime been superseded at the head of affairs by General Cavaignac, a brave, honest, patriotic soldier, who had commanded with great skill the troops employed in the suppression of the insurrection. The up-

rightness of Cavaignac commanded the respect of the solid people in the country, but he was lacking in the essential power of impressing his personality upon the heart and imagination of the people. He was not an interesting nor a fascinating figure, nor did he exhibit any conspicuous talent for statecraft. The main business of the Assembly during his possession of the executive authority was the preparation of a constitution for the country. It was decided that the President of the Republic should be elected by a direct vote of the people, and that he should not be eligible for re-election, two disastrous provisions as it turned out. The first made the President independent of the legislature, and left it open to a masterful and ambitious man to declare, in the event of a conflict with the Assembly, that *in him* was concentrated the will and the strength of the nation. It was calculated to give an air of plausibility, speciousness, even of reasonableness, to arbitrary proceedings directed at the authority or even at the existence of the legislature. As for the second, that the President was not eligible for re-election, how great was the impetus and the temptation supplied by this disability to a popular, successful, and ambitious chief magistrate! If such a man were compelled to choose between political nirvana and a *coup d'état*, was he not likely to offer up the constitution and perhaps the peace of the State as a sacrifice to his ambition? These possible dangers were clearly foretold in the discussions on the constitution, but the eyes of the majority were holden.

It was known that the virtual choice of the nation for the position of President was between Louis

Napoleon and Cavaignac. The former, in his manifesto, following his policy of appearing to be all things to all men, found a phrase for each section of the community. The artisan, anxious for work and bread; the capitalist, timid about the safety of his business and his investments; the peasant, looking fearfully at the little horde in the heel of his old stocking, and shuddering at the thought of the red flag; the landowner, concerned about the protection of his château from the incendiarism of hungry mobs, and desiring above all things the secure enjoyment of his possessions—each of these was able to claim that Louis Napoleon was the President for him. The leaders of the Bonaparte campaign had played upon the ignorance of the peasants and the fears of the substantial classes. The former were told that if Louis Napoleon became ruler of the nation he would abolish all the taxes, because he was rich enough to do without them and govern with his own private means; the latter were won over to the cause because they dreaded the spoliation of their goods and were persuaded to see in Louis Napoleon a bulwark against confiscation and anarchy. On the other hand, many members of the Socialistic section favoured his candidature, because they hated Cavaignac as the stern suppressor of insurrection and the representative of that portion of the bourgeoisie which was most distinguished for complacency, petty-mindedness, and a selfish limitation of its interests. For Louis Napoleon, then, there were the artisans, the peasants, the aristocracy, the army (the glamour of his name secured him this support), a considerable proportion of the

substantial people whose one desire was for peace, order, stability, secure possession of the money they had already accumulated, and reasonable opportunities of accumulating more. The supporters of Cavaignac were drawn almost entirely from the bourgeoisie.

The election was held on the 10th of December 1848. Out of 7,327,345 votes cast, Louis Napoleon received 5,434,226, and Cavaignac 1,448,107. The French nation had thus deliberately placed its destinies in the hands of a man whose original pretensions, never formally discarded, were fully known to the country. It had only its folly to blame if it allowed itself to be deceived by declarations of fervent zeal for the Republic. Louis Napoleon might plausibly plead at the bar of history that he was merely adapting himself, histrionically, to the situation in which he stood. His antecedents told their own story to anyone who had the slightest skill in the reading of events.

On the morrow of his election to the Presidency, Louis Napoleon could not do otherwise than declare that he would devote himself to the strengthening of the Republic. That was the language demanded from him by the *convenances* of the part he was playing. It were pedantry and weak-mindedness to expect a close correspondence between the language he held and his real ideas and intentions. His words corresponded to his actual situation. Who did not know that the desire of his heart was to become Emperor of the French? If the nation had finally condemned this ambition, why had it placed him in a situation where, very conceivably, it might become possible and even

easy for him to snatch the imperial diadem? Yet it could not be expected that he would avow his hopes and purposes at so unseemly a time as that to which he then had come. His term of office was to extend until the second Sunday of May 1852,—that period would yield its opportunities and its fit occasions for more intimate converse with the nation. In the meantime he had to play his part with decision and abandon. “I shall see enemies of our native land,” said he in taking the oath of allegiance to the constitution, “in all those who attempt to change, by illegal methods, what the whole of France has established.” What if this was precisely what he himself intended to do, if opportunity allowed? That was not the statement demanded by the occasion. He went on to declare that his mission was to establish a Government animated by a sincere love of progress, without being either reactionary or utopian.

The obvious policy of Louis Napoleon, for the attainment of his ambitions, was to manœuvre the Assembly into a wrong relation with the people, and then seek to justify a *coup d'état* as an act by which he, the representative of the national will and the depository of the national authority, vindicated the rights and secured the safety of the sovereign people. It must be admitted that he pursued this policy with subtlety, pertinacity, and success.

Louis Napoleon was able to turn to his own advantage the embarrassing expedition to Rome. The subjects of the Pope, goaded beyond endurance by one of the most corrupt and oppressive Governments in Europe, rose in revolt against his Holiness,

drove him out of the Eternal City, and established the Roman Republic. Frenchmen received the news of these proceedings with divided sympathies: Good Catholics, of course, favoured the restoration of the temporal sovereignty to the Pope. Many sincere lovers of liberty doubted the stability of the Roman Republic ; it would perish, they thought, if not of its own inherent weakness, then at the hands of the Austrians, who ruled Venice and Lombardy with a rod of iron, hated liberal institutions with a perfect hatred, and could not endure a Republic as a near neighbour in the Italian peninsula. It seemed, on the whole, that the policy to be pursued by a French statesman, who desired to give the most general satisfaction possible to his own people, was at once the restoration of the temporal sovereignty and the granting of a generous measure of constitutional liberty to the people of the Papal States.

Hence the expedition to Rome. The predominant idea among those who supported the project was to anticipate the Austrians. It might almost seem that France was going to make war upon the Romans in order that the Austrians might be prevented from so doing ! A strange way of protecting Roman liberty was it, to make war upon the Romans ! One grave miscalculation caused very considerable embarrassment to the army of the French Republic, and brought a flush of mingled pride and shame to the cheeks of many honest men. The Roman Republic, far from crumbling away, showed a magnificent, a heroic vigour. As the French troops approached the ancient capital of the Cæsars they were confronted at intervals

with stakes planted in the ground, on which was inscribed the fifth Article of their country's constitution : " The French Republic respects foreign nationalities, and never employs its force against the liberty of any people." At the news of the first conflict between the armies of the two Republics there was something of a revulsion of feeling in the French Assembly. French blood had been shed in behalf of tyranny, against a people seeking to defend the life of their new-born liberty ! A proposition to withdraw the troops from Rome to Civita-Vecchia was carried.

✓ Louis Napoleon at once perceived an opportunity of winning favour with the army, and at the same time diminishing the prestige of the Assembly in the eyes of the soldiers. In a letter to General Oudinot, the French commander, he declared that the military honour of the nation was pledged to the success of the expedition. " I shall not suffer our honour to receive a wound ; you shall receive the reinforcements that you need." The French army, overcoming the obdurate, heroic, yet helpless resistance of the Romans, inspired and led by Mazzini and Garibaldi, entered the city on July 3, 1849. It was a sorry triumph, an occasion of shame rather than of pride, the beginning of a long train of humiliations and embarrassments for France.

Within a month the ecclesiastical government was set up again in the Eternal City, and the Inquisition re-established. Meanwhile the liberal institutions and the reform of abuses tarried. The French Assembly was now overwhelmingly Conservative, and not disposed to exert pressure

upon the Papal Government in a liberal direction. Louis Napoleon saw another opportunity of depressing the Assembly in the estimation of the nation. He knew that the masses of the French people, whatever the character of their representatives for the time being in the Assembly, could not contemplate with satisfaction the re-establishment, by the power of the French sword, of oppression and obscurantism at Rome. In a letter to Lieut.-Colonel Edgar Ney, a son of "the bravest of the brave," he wrote that the French Republic did not intend that the Papal authority, as restored, should be erected upon a foundation of proscription and tyranny. He stipulated for a general amnesty, the secularisation of the administration, liberal government, and the adoption of the code of laws which went by the name of Napoléon. The Pope had not yet returned to Rome when he became acquainted with the contents of this letter. Appalled and indignant, he seemed inclined to prefer exile from his dominions to the acceptance of terms that cut so deep at the roots of his sovereignty; but the emissaries of the Emperor spoke him fair, calmed his apprehensions, persuaded him to manifest some signs of clemency and benignity, to make some concessions, and to seat himself once again upon his temporal throne.

In sum, Louis Napoleon had strengthened his position with the army and the people, and he had soothed the susceptibilities of the clericals without detaching himself from the movement for the unity of Italy which he perceived was to be a prominent feature in the history of approaching

years, and with which, for the sake of diversion and popularity in France, and for the purpose of securing a recognised position for himself and his country in the concert of rulers and nations, he intended to associate himself actively.

But we have been anticipating a little. When the Assembly elected in April 1848 had given a constitution to the country, its work was done. After the insurrection one bold decided line of cleavage divided political opinion into two sections: on the one side of it was the party of Conservatism, which included in a temporary coalition Legitimists, Orleanists, and Bonapartists, and all those who in a moment of exaggerated alarm had recoiled from the principles of progress; on the other side was Radicalism, which, in illustration of the truth that action and reaction are equal in strength, decidedly leaned towards violence both in opinions and methods. The ear of the country had for the moment become dull of hearing towards calm counsels and moderate views. The General Election of May 1849 resulted in a great triumph for the Conservatives. Four hundred and fifty members of that party were returned to the Assembly against 180 Radicals—or Montagnards as, in ill-omened reminiscence of the days of the first Revolution, they took pleasure in calling themselves—and from 70 to 80 moderate Republicans.

Lamartine, who thirteen months ago had been elected eleven times over, and had received in all nearly 2,000,000 votes, had on this occasion failed to find a seat. The violence of the stream of reaction may be measured by the destruction

of an argosy so bravely and tightly built as had seemed to be the craft in which that noble and eloquent patriot had sailed the sea of politics. Louis Napoleon was now riding on the crest of the wave which had submerged Lamartine. There are few more striking and more painful illustrations in history of the insecurity of popular favour. The sensitive genius felt acutely the affront and humiliation which a forgetful and ungrateful nation had inflicted upon him. He had served his country with wisdom and conspicuous zeal in times of personal danger and with rare disinterestedness, and behold his reward! He lingered out the rest of his days a sad and somewhat embittered man.

The crushing defeat of the democratic party was followed by an unsuccessful insurrection in Paris. Ledru-Rollin had involved himself in this foolish and criminal adventure; but he made good his escape from the country, and in this exit his career, which was for long recalled by many lovers of liberty with gratitude and tenderness, came to an inglorious end.

The Government, heartily supported by the Conservative Assembly, entered upon a campaign of repression. The more violent of the Opposition newspapers were made to cease publication, the right of public meeting was suspended, and stringent regulations were enforced regarding the character of the polemic literature hawked about the country. At the supplemental elections even Paris, where advanced opinions had flourished as in indigenous soil, Paris, the very breeding-place of insurrection, delivered itself into the

hands of the Conservatives. The Bonapartists, feeling that increasing boldness was now safe, began to speak openly of a life-presidency for Louis Napoleon, and to suggest that the mind of the people regarding this proposal might be ascertained by a plebiscite.

The President himself walked the boards in the rôle of humility and penitence in which he seemed to find so much satisfaction. There must have been times, however, when he found it hard not to burst out laughing in the face of the spectators,—as, for example, when, on a visit to the fortress of Ham, he publicly confessed that in that place he had endured a just expiation for his rashness against the laws of the country.

At Tours he announced, as the motto of his policy, “No *coup d'état*, no insurrection!”

Towards the close of the same year, however, he boldly turned his face, in the sight of all men, towards his goal. In October he dismissed the Ministry presided over by Odilon Barrot, and selected very properly from the predominant section of the Chamber. He felt, he said, that he ought to dominate all parties by the appointment of Ministers who did not represent any of them. This meant that he intended to govern the country by means of his own nominees, responsible to him alone. France, he affirmed, was feeling the need of one strong hand at the head of affairs. He persuaded or intimidated the Assembly into granting him the right to appoint or dismiss the mayors or the deputy-mayors of the 45,000 communes, and for a whole year, by a similar enactment, the teachers in the elementary schools

were helplessly in his hands, retaining or losing their appointments according to his good pleasure. In these ways one of the largest and most influential professions and the whole organisation of government throughout the country became composed of his creatures and slaves, potential allies and fellow-conspirators. His hold upon the affection of the army, listening with eager delight to the voice of the charmer who bore the name of its glorious Emperor and shared the same blood, was strengthened by the granting of an increase of pay to the non-commissioned officers.

Louis Napoleon set himself diligently to cultivate popularity, to encourage conspicuous and unmistakable demonstrations in behalf of his imperial ambitions, or at least to receive such demonstrations with undisguised tokens of gratification. "My most sincere and devoted friends," said he at Saint-Quentin, "are under the roofs of thatch, in the workshops, and in the country districts. I feel, as the Emperor used to say, that the fibre of my being thrills responsively to yours, that we have the same interests and the same instincts." And forthwith he summoned a common farm-servant from the crowd and fastened on his blouse the decoration of the Legion of Honour. At Chauny the artisans welcomed him with shouts of "Long live the Father of the workers!" which he acknowledged by saying: "I love to see myself surrounded with workers. They are the object of my constant solicitude."

At a review of the troops held by the President at Satory, near Versailles, and witnessed by a great multitude of citizens, several regiments, incited by

their officers, uttered cries of "Long live the Emperor!" The commanders of these were thanked and congratulated by Louis Napoleon in a manner the significance of which could not be mistaken. The colonels of regiments that had remained silent were ungraciously received. A regiment which had distinguished itself by its demonstrations on behalf of the President, being on the point, in due course, of leaving the capital, was nevertheless, in reward for its devotion to his interests, retained in Paris. Incidents such as these were common talk: the meaning of them could easily be read by all men.

But of course all these manoeuvres, successful as they were, would have been of little service to Louis Napoleon if the Assembly had striven to remain in heart-touch with the people. Unfortunately the deputies strayed very far from the paths of wisdom, reason, and honour. The Conservative reaction was as shortlived as it was violent, and an election for three seats, held at Paris early in 1850, resulted in the return of the Radical candidates. At the same time La Haute-Saone had selected eight deputies whose politics were of the most decidedly crimson hue. The explanation of these violent swings of the pendulum is that between the Conservative party, which desires order at any price, and the extreme Radicals, whose main concern is for liberty, there is in France, and especially in Paris, a middle party which carries its weight to the one side or the other according as order or liberty appears to it to be threatened.

These results filled the Conservatives with consternation. It does not seem to have entered their

minds to avert the danger by making concessions to the changed temper and opinions of the nation. On the other hand, they adopted a proceeding which was altogether unjustifiable and profoundly immoral, a very negation of reason, truth, and honour. They had been elected by universal suffrage, by the votes of ten million electors, and they carried a measure which had the effect of disfranchising nearly a third of these voters. It is really all but impossible to find language which can adequately condemn so indecent an outrage upon the principle of equity. The history of representative assemblies cannot produce a more flagitious and nefarious act. The authors of it had simply placed themselves outside the pale of honour. It was not simply an exhibition of defective morality in politics, it was not merely a denial of morality; it was a proof that the Conservatives were strangers to the very conception of morality,—their offence, in its own sphere, might be compared to the unpardonable sin in the spiritual realm.

Suppose the ten joint-owners of an estate of untold value had appointed a certain man to be their trustee. Suppose this trustee, for ends of his own, were wicked enough to deny the right of three of these trustees to any share in the property, though they had won their part by toil and blood, and though it had been by aid of their votes that he had received his appointment. Suppose he was clever enough to strip those three naked of their possession. Suppose he did this in order that the remaining seven might seize and divide among them the proceeds of this violent robbery, and might oppress the victims. What would be

thought of such a man? Is not a fraudulent trustee regarded with the severest reprobation by the law of the land and all honest people? And has a fraudulent trustee ever been guilty of conduct so irredeemably base as that which we have supposed? And if he had, would he not be set down as a man of unmatched audacity, not merely guilty of dishonesty, but utterly lost to all sense of probity?

This is the nearest parallel we can think of to the conduct of a body of men, elected by universal suffrage, who should disfranchise one-third of the electors whose very votes gave them all the power and authority they possessed. "We send you to Parliament by our votes in order that by your votes there you may deprive us, if you think fit, of our votes,"—it is not to be supposed that such thoughts could ever have entered the minds of the electors. Such a mandate was simply not conceivable. The conduct of the Assembly was, in the political point of view, betrayal in the dark and assassination with a poisoned dagger.

Such was the infamous law of 31st May 1850. In our view it would have fully justified an armed invasion by the people of the Assembly, and the trial of every man who had voted for it on the capital charge of high treason against the rights of the sovereign people. No offence against the majesty of kings, short of regicide, could parallel the monumental iniquity of this law. By its enactment, as the sequel will show, the Assembly had delivered itself to Louis Napoleon, had given him the plausible pretext for a *coup d'état* that he was seeking, and had dealt a fatal blow at the

public liberties. At the time of its passing the President did nothing to stay the hand of the Conservatives; of set purpose he adopted an indeterminate attitude to his Ministers, at one time seeming to inspire them, at another to countenance them, and yet again merely to acquiesce passively in their proceedings; the object was that he might be free to disavow, without too glaring scandal, any of their measures which were unfavourably viewed by the country, and so with a fair face make himself the instrument of national indignation against the Assembly.

Louis Napoleon's tenure of the Presidency was due to end, as we have said, on the second Sunday in May 1852. It so happened that the term of the Assembly also expired about that date. The menace to public order involved in the simultaneous disappearance of the chief of the executive power and of the Assembly seemed amply to justify the demand of Louis Napoleon for a revision of the constitution of 1848. What the President especially desired was a prolongation of his term of office. There is no doubt that a majority of the nation eagerly wished that this request should be granted. But the Conservatives now held the President in suspicion; they considered that he showed a decided leaning towards liberal opinions; and the three-fourths majority requisite for the appointment of a Commission of Revision was not obtained. 446 deputies voted for the proposal of the Government and 278 against; to be effectual for the purpose in view the majority should have numbered 543.

The ultimate objects of Louis Napoleon were

not impeded by a decision which denied to the people what they had set their hearts upon. The next act of the President fell like a thunderbolt upon the majority, spreading desolation and panic in their ranks. He proposed the withdrawal of the law of 31st May and the return to universal suffrage, pure and simple. "No one," said he, "foresaw," at the time when the law was passed, "the suppression of 3,000,000 electors, two-thirds of whom are peaceful country people." The substantial part of the sentence was accurate, but it was quite the reverse of truth to say that no one foresaw the effect of the law. It may indeed for the moment have escaped the notice of Louis Napoleon that the law of 31st May disarmed or disabled a large part of his strength in the country. "The constitution requires," he continued, "that the choice of the nation for the office of President must have at least two million votes; if that figure is not reached," pursued the speaker amid ironical interruptions, "the election falls to the Assembly; this proportion of two to ten millions is changed by the law of 31st May into that of two to seven; that is an inversion of the constitution." After a stormy debate, in which liberal and reactionary views of public policy were set in sharp and violent conflict, the Assembly by a majority of two refused to abrogate the law.

An attempt at a *coup d'état* on the part of the President was now believed, by a large section of the Conservative party, to be inevitable. Terror pursued them through all their waking hours and in the visions of the dark. On one occasion

a large number of the deputies sat up all night in the house of one of their leaders in expectation of the catastrophe. Nothing happened; and next day the town rang with the mocking laughter of the President's partisans. The fearful ones felt that they had been made to look foolish; they tried to join in the merriment, but though the mirth rattled in their teeth it did not sparkle in their eyes. The thing which they greatly dreaded had not come upon them; the shadow at which they shuddered had not yet taken substance, perhaps it never would clothe itself in a body of might, perhaps could not. Might it not be that their fears were so continuously falsified simply because they were empty, as little significant of serious mischief as the terrors of a nightmare? The friends of arbitrary power were secretly gratified at finding their opponents, after the exhaustion of their nervous attack, sinking into this couch of comfort, and made some pretence of arranging the cushions nicely for them; they made themselves sedulous nurses—to change the figure—of the feeling of false security, so delicate an infant was it. Yet many of the deputies found themselves unable to pluck up their distrust of Louis Napoleon, for the roots were deep, wide-spreading, sinewy, strong as steel, tenacious as the fibres of a mandrake.

Accordingly the Assembly was invited to renew a declaration of its predecessor that its President had the right to address a requisition for troops directly to the officers of the army, and that the latter, under severe penalties, were bound to obey. It was proposed that the declaration should be issued as an order of the day, and posted up in the

barracks. The Government, which opposed this move, exhibited itself during the debate in a very unfavourable light. The Minister of War first vehemently denied, and then ungraciously admitted, that instructions had just been given, and obeyed, for the taking down and tearing up of such copies of the original declaration as still remained upon the barrack walls. This confession, painfully extracted from a reluctant and embarrassed Minister, might have seemed proof conclusive of the President's sinister intentions. Strange to say, however, Louis Napoleon found his warmest defenders among the extreme Radicals, who declared that the object of the motion was not the protection of parliamentary institutions against arbitrary power, but the intimidation of a people justly indignant with the Assembly at being robbed, by base and cruel fraud, of elementary rights. The proposition was repelled by 404 votes to 300.

The Radicals were a small minority in the Assembly, but their votes tipped and weighed down the balance on the side of Louis Napoleon, and it is impossible to find wisdom or patriotism in their conduct on this occasion. They professed to believe that a large section of the Conservatives were contriving the restoration of the monarchy, and under the guise of evading a merely supposititious danger, of laying a shadow, they were accentuating a real and imminent peril, the destruction of parliamentary government and representative institutions. In order to be revenged upon the Conservatives, they were prepared to inflict a deadly wound upon the dignity, influence, and power of the nation's representatives. If they escape the con-

demnation of evil intention it must be by pleading guilty to the charge of egregious folly. They ought to have presented a common front with their opponents in the defence of their own Chamber. Like the Dissenters of England, when James II. sought to seduce them from the cause of national liberty by the Declaration of Indulgence, they ought to have declined a party advantage which could be won only by the sacrifice of wide, general national interests.

It may be doubted, however, whether the conduct of the Radicals, blameworthy though it was, had any decisive influence on the ultimate issue. The President had invited a large number of guests to the Elysée for the evening on which the vote was taken. While the issue hung in the balance the distinguished company were allowed to nurse their appetites. When the result was known, "Now, gentlemen," said Louis Napoleon with a gracious smile, "we can seat ourselves at table." This was in the middle of November 1851. If the proposition submitted to the Assembly had been carried, would it not have been quite ineffectual to stay the rush of events towards a crisis? Do not the words and the conduct of the President broadly hint that the adoption of the proposal would simply have hastened the *coup d'état*? Was not a great part of the nation looking forward with certainty, without dismay, even with satisfaction, to this consummation? The forces of disintegration were as ravening wolves, panting for prey. "Strike without pity," cried the Socialists in an appeal to the workmen; "traitors do not deserve any mercy. It is time to make an end of an

incorrigible caste. We shall never get the better of them until we have stripped them of their ill-gotten riches." Declarations such as these struck terror into the hearts of large masses of a population one of whose main characteristics is a fervent desire and determination to keep what it has and to add, by peaceful means, to the store. The ground of the French character is conservative. Who can wonder that the country was ready to throw itself into the arms of whoever could save it from such terrors and dangers ?

On the night of the 2nd December 1851 the long-expected happened. Louis Napoleon and four conspirators—one of whom, de Morny, was an arrant knave, and another, de Maupas, a man of pleasure without a conscience—planned and effected the arrest of all the dangerous men among the deputies. When the morning of 3rd December dawned the Palais Bourbon was surrounded with a hedge of bayonets, and a proclamation dissolving the Assembly had been posted on the walls throughout Paris. The President kept up the pretence of devotion to the Republic: "The men who have destroyed two monarchies wish to bind my hands in order to overthrow the Republic. My duty is to checkmate their perfidious projects and to maintain the Republic." He declared his intention of asking from the electors their approval of a new constitution, the only salient point of which, in the circumstances of the moment, was the election of the Head of the State for a period of ten years. Louis Napoleon and the people well understood that if the heir to the Napoleonic traditions obtained the mandate for which he asked, this involving the

sanction of the *d'état*, he was master of the country

Barricade was thrown up here and there ; but the democracy of Paris, for the most part, contemplated the evil which had fallen upon the Assembly with amusement, if not with pleasure. Some individuals who had made what feeble resistance was possible to them, and had been troublesome enough to make the police take notice of them, were being driven along the Faubourg Saint-Antoine under a strong escort. The workmen on their way to their daily toil inquired what this might mean, and on being informed merely exclaimed : " Ah ! there are the twenty-five francs going to the lock-up ! That's a fine game ! "

Another significant incident : a deputy belonging to the extreme Radical section loudly expressed his indignation at the indifference of the people. " Bah," to him replied one standing by, " do you fancy we are going to get our heads broken for your twenty-five francs ? " " Well," replied the incensed patriot, " I am going to show you how one dies for twenty-five francs." He seizes a flag, runs to the nearest barricade, ascends to the top of it, and waves the tricolour, shouting, " Vive la République ! " In a moment he is dead, riddled with bullets.

The national plebiscite decisively ratified the conduct and the demands of Louis Napoleon : 7,500,000 votes were given for him, and 640,000 against. A solemn *Te Deum* was celebrated in the Cathedral of Notre Dame of Paris ; for the Church professed to see in the villainy, accomplished and successful, the work of Providence. A year

later the national plebiscite, which resulted in the proclamation of the Second Empire, took place. Three days before this vote the Duke of Wellington had been laid to rest in St. Paul's Cathedral. "We might picture to ourselves," said Cobden, "the third Napoleon rising from the yet open tomb of the vanquisher of the first."

CHAPTER X

THE CHARACTER OF NAPOLEON'S RULE

NAPOLEON III. is frequently branded with the epithets of tyrant and despot, and his Government is stigmatised as absolutism. We are certainly not concerned to defend the career and policy of this extraordinary personage, whose good fortune has always seemed to us more signal than his ability. We are not impressed by the air of mystery his character so often wore; it reminds us of the weirdly secret, awe-inspiring casket which was believed to contain the tokens of the Humbert millions; when it was opened it was found to be empty. A silent man with a pensive cast of countenance sometimes acquires reputation as the possessor of deep revolving thoughts, when the simple and sufficient explanation of his taciturnity is that his inward parts closely resemble the interior of the Grenadiers' big drum. We consider the nephew of the great Emperor to have been a selfish, shallow-hearted, mean-spirited, unscrupulous adventurer. Indeed, the contemplation of his character inspires us with something approaching to physical repulsion, as if one should unawares place one's hand upon a slimy creature in the dark. Nor can we think without disgust about the crowd

of ravenous and sometimes unclean beasts, male and female, that swarmed about his Court. Too much by far has been written about the brilliancy of the Court of the Second Empire; it was vain, frivolous, gaudy, ostentatious, and shady,—it has provided many a fine feast of scandal, but that is all that anyone who has serious work to do need care to know about it.

Nevertheless, in spite of the little worthiness of Napoleon personally, it is much to be desired that just and true views concerning his position as the ruler of France should be held. It might seem, on a quick and superficial view of the matter, that, with the accession of Napoleon to power, France was in as evil case as in the days before the Revolution, that the new Emperor was more tyrannical than the old Kings, that the protagonist of the *coup d'état* exercised powers not less sweeping than those which belonged to the Roi Soleil in his palmiest days. There is a fair show of truth in this misconception. There are, however, vital and far-reaching differences both in the theory of their positions and in the effects which flowed from the theory. Louis did not consider himself as responsible to the people, but to God only. The piety of the Bourbons was sometimes perverted and sometimes conspicuously absent, and in such cases this theory of responsibility was in practice a negation of responsibility altogether. The mass of the people, as far as we can judge,—for the proletariat had not yet grown to the stage of distinct articulation,—were content to accept this view. At one period in the career of Louis XIV., so potent was the divinity that hedged him about that the

French may be said to have conceded him all but celestial honours; the majesty of his person and the splendour of his achievements inspired his people with sentiments similar to those which prompted the deification of Roman Emperors, which lead a Japanese or a Chinaman of our own time to acclaim his sovereign as the Son of Heaven.

There is no obvious analogy to this in the position of Napoleon, nor in the feelings of which he was the object. He never denied his responsibility to the people; sometimes, indeed, when it suited him, he insisted upon this with something like pedantry, and he gave practical expression to this view by taking several national plebiscites. It is not a cogent plea that elements of fraud and violence entered into these manœuvres; a whole nation in the middle of the nineteenth century could not be cheated and intimidated; the employment of artifice and coercion was made possible and successful by the presence of a majority on whom it was not necessary to use these appliances. The French nation, as a whole, cannot evade its responsibility for the Second Empire. Napoleon was the arm of the nation, and he was invested with very wide powers, because the nation desired a strong arm and a strong arm unfettered. He recognised that it was his business to govern France according to the ideas of the French people. There is not the slightest doubt, for example, that the government of Napoleon III., once the infamy of its origin was overpast, was much less arbitrary than the government of England in the early years of the nineteenth century; William Pitt in the heyday of his power had frequent recourse, in his treatment of popular

feeling, to methods of repression more cruel by far than those employed by Napoleon.

The history of the years which had passed between the first Revolution and the *coup d'état*, and the state of enlightenment to which the nation had attained, made impossible the kind of Oriental absolutism suggested by the words tyrant and despot. It is, indeed, doubtful whether a Government with absolute power over life and limb, and owning no responsibility, has ever been recognised as legitimate by any society of men even the most primitive, the most debased, and the most submissive in temper. Burke dealt with this point, in opening the impeachment of Warren Hastings, with the amplitude of understanding and nobility of sentiment which are the most splendid characteristics of the greatest mind ever devoted to the consideration of public affairs. Tamarlane, the founder of the Mogul Empire, who established his dominion over an alien people by the edge of the sword, and approaches as near to the entirely absolute in his temper and methods as any figure in history, regarded the poor as his children, and considered it his duty to make himself acquainted with the temper and disposition of the people and to appoint over them governors adapted to their manners and their wishes. He acknowledged that the only security for the grandeur and power of an Empire was that it should be built upon foundations of laws and regulations, morality and religion. It is true that Oriental despots have frequently allowed themselves a savage freedom in their methods of handling malefactors and foreign enemies, but how far soever the practice of their

administration may have been estranged from the theory of it, they have not sought to deny that their people had a right to demand of them justice and good government.

There was no question, then, in Napoleon's rule of any despotism approaching the traditional European view of Oriental absolutism. With the spread of education the ruler of the nation, whatever the form of government under which it lives, is compelled to take more and more into account what we describe as the state of public opinion ; in the case of a thoroughly educated people, that means the whole community. The growth of enlightenment, therefore, diminishes the temptations to ambitious men of ruthless and arbitrary character. Napoleon may have been a despot—if etymological exactitude is to be insisted upon, but his government was far removed from the Oriental absolutism under which for the most part subjects have neither the intelligence nor the desire to form or hold political opinions. When Orientals rise against a despotism, they are impelled not by an abstract resentment of absolute power, but of the abuse of it in the infliction of intolerable oppression. They are not aiming at free institutions, but at the substitution of a tolerably righteous overlord for an intolerably unjust one. Disguise it under what form of words we may, the literal truth is that Napoleon could maintain his position only by governing the country in substantial harmony with the obviously cherished wishes and ideals of the bulk of the French people.

All this may seem obvious and elementary, but it is desirable to say it lest, frequently meeting

the word "despot" in the history books, we may allow our thoughts to become tinged with the very misconceptions that we are trying to be on our guard against.

But there is another criterion—and that the most significant and valuable—according to which France under Napoleon III. was much more advanced in the scale of political development than the France of Louis XIV. Whatever rulers France has had since the Constituent Assembly of 1789, or can have in the dark and possibly tumultuous future, the Revolution has been and must remain a gulf that cannot be bridged over. More important by far than the political results, which have shown themselves eminently liable to interruption and frustration, were the social and economic effects which have been maintained, with wonderful persistency, in their substantial integrity. All that was really oppressive and characteristic in the *ancien régime* is buried beyond all hope of resurrection. Under the Kings of old France justice was corrupt, the civil service oppressive, extortion rife; the people were held down in extreme poverty, taxation was crushing, and laid upon the class least able to bear it. The friends and favourites, the palaces and paramours, the wars and wickednesses of the Kings kept the people and the nation always on the verge of bankruptcy; all manner of unrighteous exactions were practised by the landed aristocracy upon the peasantry with impunity; there was the ever-present peril, and the frequent experience, of starvation; there was the permanent subjection of the poor and weak and miserable to the conditions amidst which they were born. No

one can read the story of France's inward history without the profoundest sympathy for her workmen and peasants. It is no exaggeration to say that France under Louis xv. was a worse governed country than Turkey under Abdul Hamid at the present day. The administration manifested all the vices of an Oriental despotism as they are revealed to us, for example, by the records and monumental inscriptions which have come down from the days of the Pharaohs in Egypt.

When the day of retribution came, the innocent suffered with the guilty, the sins of the fathers were visited upon the children ; but of the Royal House and aristocracy of France it may be said without hesitation, as they had sown the wind, so did they reap the whirlwind. The members of the privileged classes which had profited by iniquity, even though they had not committed it, could no more than the active wrongdoers escape the fiery dart of Nemesis. It is not good to perpetrate injustice, it is not good to profit by it even passively, for vengeance will overtake both the doers and the receivers. Let not anyone hope to employ successfully, in dealing with Destiny, the tricks of chicanery, to plead at her bar, in extenuation or justification, that not at his instigation nor at his request (though indeed to his profit) was the injustice done. We must repel favours to which we are not entitled when they work mischief and wrong to others not less deserving than ourselves.

But the most debilitating and disastrous condition of life under the ancient régime was the fettering of trades and handicrafts, their exclusive possession, secured by law, in a few families, who

admitted to their fellowship whom they would, according to the freedom of their will, and as their interests suggested, and the multitude of regulations, which sometimes prevented, and always impeded, the natural operations of commerce, manufactures, internal communications, and foreign business. In these circumstances initiative and progress were impossible. When one speaks of the artisan or working class to-day one means practically the whole population of the towns. But in the days before the Revolution the practitioners of arts and handicrafts, masters and men together, were a comparatively small section of the community, a privileged class, a sort of aristocracy. If a man were compelled for any reason whatever to quit the countryside and betake himself to a town, he was restricted to the callings of adventurer, beggar, or thief. Beggars and blackguards constituted quite a considerable proportion of the population. Thousands of men well qualified to support themselves honourably, and to enrich the nation, were hurled into mendicity and crime by the unwisdom and injustice of the laws. The Revolution sought to make each man contribute to the public expenditure according to his ability, and liberated industry and commerce from the useless, galling, injurious restrictions to which they had been subject. It opened a market for all the powers and productions of man, extended hospitality to every sort of talent, sought out and rewarded every species of merit. And these principles were as vital in the days of the third Napoleon as in their first dawning upon France.

What, then, were the hopes and interests of the

people when they placed entire power in the hands of Napoleon III.? They desired social security and just government at home, victory and glory abroad. Justice and peace would not have maintained the position of the inheritor of the Napoleonic traditions any more than victory and arbitrary rule. The common allegation is not quite justified, that the military adventures in the Crimea, China, Italy, and Mexico were intended to distract the attention of the people from their domestic wrongs ; no doubt it was hoped that successful warfare, conjoined with internal prosperity, would check any tendency on the part of the nation to meditate upon the imperfections, from the point of view of liberal and constitutional theory, of the political system under which they were living. But might the people be satisfied with the internal economy of government or might they not, a policy of military adventure was an inalienable part of the new Emperor's heritage as his uncle's successor. Without the associations attaching to his name he would not have attained unto the inheritance, and the associations were meaningless unless they implied the satisfaction of the unfortunate national thirst for glory. The great Emperor and his lesser nephew both made their appeal to the passion for "drums and tramlings" which cannot be uprooted from unregenerate human nature.

In a separate chapter we shall deal with the wars of Napoleon III., their motives and their results ; we shall show how they changed the colours of the map of Europe in a most salient manner, and how most of them were linked together by a common principle. In this place we note how

whole-heartedly he devoted himself to the cause of social amelioration. All classes of the community, from the highest to the lowest, benefited by this activity. The aristocratic landlords were enabled by Government aid to find money for the development of their estates, on the security of their property, under easy conditions. The people who had cash to invest were gratified by the throwing open of State loans to direct subscription. France at the time contained no fewer than 8,000,000 landed proprietors. These small owners, who hated the very memory of the ancient régime, because their hearts burnt with indignation when they thought of the insolent oppression under which their fathers had groaned, and who were inclined, though without good reason, to suspect the Orléans dynasty of rapacity, were the most zealous supporters of Napoleon; and he showed his gratitude in ways which they clearly understood and appreciated. The parish roads were improved, elementary instruction in agriculture was given in the country schools, prizes were awarded for the best methods of tillage and breeding, and boards of agriculture were established in order that the latest word of skill and knowledge should be immediately available for the whole countryside. Common lands were divided up and sold, large sums were spent on the reclamation by draining of waste lands, and the mountain-sides began to clothe themselves in vigorous young forests. The favour of the commercial community, that *haute bourgeoisie* which has been in ordinary times since the Revolution the most influential class in France, was courted by the rapid pushing forward of railway

construction, the improvement or the construction of roads, canals, and ports, and by the subvention of new lines of steamships from the Atlantic ports to America and from the Mediterranean ports to Asia. International exhibitions, stimulating industrial activity, were held in 1855 and in 1867.

Of course, the working-classes shared the benefits of these enlightened measures; and their special needs received careful attention; justice was brought within easy reach of the poor, the sanitary condition of workmen's dwellings was improved, medical relief at a cheap rate was brought within their reach, and establishments for convalescents discharged from the hospitals were founded. The right of workmen to combine for securing higher wages was recognised by law, co-operative societies and mutual benefit societies were encouraged, imprisonment for debt was abolished, and the savings bank system was extended. Public works from which naturally the commercial classes and the artisans, as forming the larger part of the urban population, received the chief advantage, were carried out on an unprecedented scale. Paris was almost rebuilt. Crowded and unhealthy areas were opened up or swept away, great shafts of air and sunshine being driven through them, as it were; boulevards were cut through the city, promenades and gardens were laid out everywhere. Similar operations were performed in other towns on the model of this most eminent example. The secular and moral education of the people was promoted by the multiplication of schools, the establishment of 13,000 school libraries, the opening of evening classes for adults and of technical institutes, the

improvement of the status of the farmers and the restoration of churches. The peasants were gratified by the institution of the *Facultés des Hautes Etudes* for advanced scientific research. A conspicuous result of these measures was the diminution of pauperism and crime.

A salient item in Napoleon's policy of economic amelioration calls for a word of special mention, to wit,—the negotiation, mainly through Cobden, of a commercial treaty with England in 1860. The narrative of this episode, supplied by Mr. Morley in his biography of the great protagonist of the anti-Corn Law agitation, shows the Emperor in an amiable and altogether favourable light. Though on every question, according to Rouher, then Minister of Commerce, the Emperor gave the initiative to his Cabinet—in the *Moniteur* there frequently appeared decrees of which they had never heard,—he is revealed to us in Mr. Morley's account as a careful, cautious, anxious, almost timid man, more deeply impressed and weighted with the dangers, difficulties, and responsibilities of his position than conscious of his elevation and power. The ironmasters, cotton-spinners, and woollen manufacturers of France enjoyed a monopoly of their trades within the realm, for the importation of the goods with which they dealt was prohibited; Napoleon, hardly concealing that he stood in some fear of the magnates, was very hesitant in the matter of abridging their privileges. "The protected interests are organised," said the Emperor,—"the general public is not." "Your Majesty is the organisation of the masses," was the apt and pointed reply of Cobden. The great agitator, a

man whom it was impossible to bamboozle and very difficult, we could think, to blarney, was obviously impressed by Napoleon's genuine sympathy with the mass of the working people and by his real understanding of the conditions of the poor. The Emperor sorrowfully informed the great Englishman that ten millions of the French people hardly ever tasted bread, but lived on potatoes, chestnuts, and the like. Cobden, as a Manchester man, with an eye to the main chance of English manufacturers, remarked that many millions of the Emperor's countrymen did not wear stockings; if the admission of English goods on reasonable terms enabled the stockingless ones to afford these useful articles of apparel, in what way, he asked, would the cotton-spinners and woollen manufacturers of France be injured? The operatives of France, said Cobden, in the course of the discussions which were frequent and prolonged, were working twenty per cent. more time for twenty per cent. less wages, and paid upwards of ten per cent. more for their clothing, as compared with the same class in England.

The principle of a commercial treaty being accepted by the Emperor and the British Government, a vast labour was expended by Cobden, together with his English and French colleagues, in the preparation of a tariff. It is unnecessary to enter into details; but the sum of the matter is that, while on the one hand the taboo upon the importation of iron, coal, cotton, and various other goods into France was withdrawn, and a scale of moderate duties substituted for prohibition, the British Government on its part abolished all

duties on imported manufactured goods, and diminished the imposts on wine and brandy. There is, of course, nothing protective in these last duties, wine and brandy not being produced in this country ; they had been retained by Sir Robert Peel at a high figure, not only for the sake of the revenue they yielded, but also for the express purpose of facilitating just such an arrangement as that which had now been entered into between England and France. A sequel of this commercial treaty was that within two decades the trade between the two countries was more than trebled. The conditions accorded to France by the treaty of 1860 were in the very act, agreeably to the established economic policy of England, given to every other country, and within five years France had made similar treaties with Belgium, the German Zollverein, Italy, Sweden and Norway, Switzerland, and Austria.

It is well worth remarking that by this treaty of 1860 the autocrat of France effected in a few months a revolution in the fiscal system of his country which might not have been accomplished under a democracy in as many years. The agitation for the abolition of the Corn Laws, even after it became an elaborately and carefully organised movement, involving a great expenditure of money, labour, and emotion, and stirring up the black deeps of civil discord, lasted for seven years, until famine itself, against which Cobden and Bright had warred, joined the crusade and carried it to an unexpectedly early success. Even the friends of government by popular opinion are sometimes depressed, and shaken in their faith, by the diffi-

culties which it seems to present to the accomplishment of the simplest and most clearly desired reforms, by the enormous expenditure of money, enthusiasm, and time necessary in the work of propaganda. The movement for the legalising of marriage with a deceased wife's sister has only just been crowned with triumph after a struggle of more than fifty years. The great majority of Englishmen, to whichever party they belong, would agree, in a quiet discussion by their own firesides, that there is at least twice the number of public-houses in the country that there need be, and that there is nothing more urgently necessary for the protection of the national character and of civic purity than the promotion of temperance and a masterful control over the drink traffic, yet so intricate, so fettering, so demoralising are the interdependencies of the party system of government that two generations have passed away without seeing anything deeply effective accomplished by Parliament for the welfare of the nation in this one of its most vital interests. We would not dogmatise, but we suggest as a possibility that, further trial being made of democratic government and ample proof being afforded of its drawbacks and heartbreaking vexations, as well as of its undoubted excellencies, the theory of Napoleon's position may come to be regarded with more favour, even by persons zealous for the material and moral progress of the race, than it has hitherto enjoyed.

The rapid summary which we have just given of the social and economic reforms effected by the Emperor makes a highly honourable record for a reign which lasted less than eighteen years, during

which the attention of the monarch was distracted by the conduct of several great wars and the management of many difficult problems of foreign affairs.

In the meantime what was the history of the political relations between the Emperor and his people? The constitutional apparatus set up at the commencement of his reign consisted of the monarch, responsible to the people, his Ministers responsible only to their master, a Council of State, nominated by the Emperor, for the preparation of the laws, a Senate also nominated by the Emperor for the purpose, according to the ironical or cynical statement of its creator, of guarding the constitution and the liberties of the country, and the Legislative Body elected by universal suffrage, but possessing no right of initiative and restricted to the discussion and the voting of the laws. In sum, the Emperor was absolute, the other part of the constitution existed merely for the execution of his will, that is, in Napoleon's theory of his position, the nation's will. As the years passed, this original framework was modified in the direction of liberalism, very slightly for the most part, until on the eve of his downfall Napoleon made the fundamental concession of a Ministry responsible to the Legislative Body.

At the beginning of the reign everything went well with the Emperor and the nation. The Opposition bore, in the eyes of the people, the character of a knot of canterkerous pedants, wildly beating the air. The masses trouble themselves little about the abstract imperfections of their government; they may not be deeply stirred even

by acts of arbitrariness, when these affect only a few individual persons ; they can be incensed only by real, tangible, concrete, palpable wrongs and grievances, bearing down, or likely to bear down, a large section of the community. The love of liberty, except in Burke's sense of "equality of restraint," is really not strong among the French masses ; at the present hour they submit to restrictions on their personal freedom which would be galling to Englishmen ; what they feel their need of, and deserve to have, is good, sound, just government. The natural man—man is very natural in France—looks on his own things ; it is hard to persuade him that trade is in a bad way if the business in which he is a partner or shareholder is paying ten per cent. France was flourishing at home, reaping glory abroad. Why this pother ? Accordingly, in the Legislative Body, which proceeded out of the elections of 1857, when Napoleon was at the height of his glory, there were only five members opposed to the Empire. But the success of the first days was not maintained, the brightness of the Emperor's sun became clouded, the glamour of the ideal began to fade in the experience of the real, and the people commenced to remember things, to ask questions—of themselves and of their ruler. The explanation of this gradual but, in the advance of time, decided change in the feelings of the nation towards its ruler lies in the history of his wars and foreign relations, which it has seemed most clear and convenient to us to treat all together in a separate chapter.

In the consideration of this matter two propositions must be held clearly in mind. The first

is, that an absolute monarch, if his enterprises miscarry, cannot lay the blame on others ; he quite fails to convince if he seeks so to do. When that absolute monarch is a usurper, who has to earn forgiveness for a great crime, and who aspires to found a dynasty, he must be uniformly beneficent in his domestic policy, and uniformly victorious on the field of battle. The benefits that Napoleon conferred upon his people were apt to be received passively ; they were regarded as the price to be paid the beneficiaries for their acquiescence in the *coup d'état* and its sequel ; on the other hand, any injuries that he was believed to have inflicted inspired active animosity. To him was appointed by fate an almost unbroken succession of wars, with this relentless corollary, foreseen from the beginning, that an irretrievable military disaster would ruin his career.

The second proposition is, that Napoleon's theory of his position, namely, that he gathered up in himself the aspirations of the nation and was the weapon of its will, was bound to break down in practice. To be successful, on this conception of his office, Napoleon would have needed the gift of always reading, accurately and fully, the thoughts of the people. The danger to which the frailty of human nature constantly exposed him, was that of mistaking the reverberations of his own voice for the applause of the nation. A skilful ventriloquist, standing at one end of a long corridor, can in his own person produce noises which suggest the multitudinous hum of responsive voices from the other end. The capacity of human nature for self-deception is boundless. Rulers of men are apt,

unconsciously — their ears feeding their inclinations—to make themselves the willing victims of such a trick. The severe restrictions on the freedom of the press barred the supply of that corrective to the naturally biassed views of the Emperor, refracted through the medium of autocratic prepossessions, which might have been of distinct aid and value to him in the work of government. Napoleon's concessions to the liberal spirit, though until the close of his reign they amounted to little, are the measure of the extent to which he was compelled, silently and reluctantly, to admit that he was ineffectively discharging his mission as the mind, will, and arm of the nation. It is altogether absurd to represent these reforms as the unfolding of plans which he had in his mind from the beginning of his reign. The citation of his own words in support of this favourable view would not convince us; for Napoleon's language was never designed to conform to absolute truth, but to the *convenances* and the necessities of the actual situation in which he at the moment stood.

The first distinct blow to his prestige was dealt by the weak, inconclusive, nugatory Treaty of Villafranca, which followed the successful war against Austria in the interests of Italian independence and unity. Accordingly, his popularity and strength weakening, Napoleon deems it advisable to make concessions to the Legislative Body; by the decrees of 24th November 1860 publicity is given to its discussions, it is granted the right to move an address in reply to the speech from the throne, and is allowed a more effective control of the budget. The modesty of these concessions,

the mere fact that it was within the power of Napoleon to represent the return of these elementary rights as tokens of his goodwill, reveal the weakness and futility of the position which the Legislative Body had up till then occupied. At the General Election of 1863 the number of seats carried by the Opposition, in spite of a liberal application of threats and bribery to the voters, rose from five to more than thirty. It was significant that most of the new deputies came from the great cities, from Paris (which did not return a single Government candidate), Nantes, Lyons, and Marseilles. This would have been a feeble enough minority, almost negligible indeed, against a Cabinet responsible to the Legislative Body, but under a system of absolutism these thirty were, in effect, thirty personal enemies of Napoleon, hostile critics of his conduct, pledged to destroy, if they could, his personal authority, if not to strip the imperial diadem from his brow and drive him out of France.

Early in 1867, after Sadowa, when the ancient military reputation of Austria suffered shipwreck in her terrible collision with Prussia, and the French vessel of state, trembling in all her timbers on the edge of the maelstrom, seemed threatened and warned by the forces of suction, the Emperor granted to the Senate and the Legislative Body the right of interpellating the Government concerning its general policy.

A bye-election, in a rural district of the Jura, at which Jules Grévy, who had sat in the Constituent Assembly of 1848 and had manifested his wisdom by opposing that Article of the Constitution

which decreed the election of the President by direct universal suffrage, defeated the official candidate, much to the surprise and consternation of the Court party, gave a rude and unpleasant shock to the Emperor's confidence in the fidelity of the country people. The mountaineers, making a fête of the occasion, were bold enough to present themselves at the polling place proudly bearing upon their heads, by way of cockade, the voting paper upon which they had inscribed the name of their choice.

In November 1868 the Republicans held a humble demonstration in the cemetery of Montmartre around the grave of Baudin, a deputy who, waving a flag in his hand, had met death upon a barricade during the *coup d'état*. The Opposition newspapers opened a subscription for the erection of a monument to the memory of this loyal witness to their faith. Gifts flowed in from all quarters, the Government became alarmed, and, very unwisely stirring up memories which might have been allowed to die away, entered upon a prosecution against the demonstrators and the newspapers. The accused parties, becoming the accusers, converted the occasion into a striking manifestation of public abhorrence for the authors of a great crime. How should it be reprehensible to honour the memory of an honest man who had fallen beneath the bullets of those who had outraged the laws, swept the boulevards with a rain of fire, and confiscated the national liberties? The origins of the Second Empire, as of many another dominion, if we trace them to their source, were not respectable; why, then, after seventeen years, drag them

forth to the light of day from the comparative obscurity into which they had sunk ?

The Baudin affair supplied a battle-cry, a programme, and an impetus to the campaign of the Opposition at the General Election in the following spring ; it encouraged the entrance of extremists into the field of political warfare, and in cases numerous enough to be very alarming to the Empire secured their success. And, let us repeat, it must be remembered all the while that, so long as the Cabinet was not responsible to the elect of the nation, every member of the Opposition bore the semblance of, and quite conceivably was, a personal enemy of the Emperor and his dynasty. At the elections of 1869 the party of opposition was greatly strengthened. The Emperor's conduct of foreign affairs had by this date clearly demonstrated his want of discernment and his insufficiency for the ever-increasing difficulties in the situation of France towards other Powers. The nation, in short, was rushing with headlong speed to the conclusion that Napoleon could no longer be reckoned on for a series of successes, that his star, in which he was fond of proclaiming his faith, was sinking into darkness. It was not really that the people were rallying themselves to the principles of liberty, but that the experiment which Napoleon represented had failed, that the concentration of power in the hands of one man had proved practically disastrous. The success of his sins was exhausted, and men who would have shown a discreet regard for their skins in the days of his pristine glory and unimpaired power summoned up courage, now that he was ceasing to be formidable,

to denounce him from the heights of heaven. The moral sentiments which had slumbered while the Emperor was successful awoke in radiant vigour when good fortune began to draw away from him. As long as the sequel of his great misdeed continued to be the profit and glory of France, the national conscience was dumb.

During the concluding days of 1869, the last complete year of his reign, just before the tragic last scene in the last act of a drama so full of movement and colour, Napoleon wrote his famous letter to Emile Ollivier, in which he summoned him to form a Ministry composed of men "fully representative of the majority in the Chamber." On 6th May 1870 the people were asked to approve by plebiscite the liberal reforms introduced by the Emperor. They did so by an overwhelming majority; but by what process of argument can it be maintained, as it has been maintained, that this was a vote of confidence in the Emperor? Napoleon asked the people to agree to a fundamental alteration in the constitution which, if carried out in the interpretation which he desired the nation to put upon it, abolished his autocracy and restored to the country its political liberty; and the people said "Yes." Where is the compliment to the Emperor, where is the confidence in him? The people simply approved Napoleon's implicit avowal that he was no longer strong enough, in wisdom, power, success, and prestige, to hold the reins of absolute sovereignty. Is there not the very strongest reason for believing that, if the fortune of war had been reversed, if French arms had been overwhelmingly victorious in the

conflict with Prussia, the heir of the great Emperor would have withdrawn the substance of what he had granted, resumed the unquestioned supremacy which he had held at the beginning of his reign, and found at his feet a gladly submissive people? There is more sharpness than Frenchmen care to confess in the taunt of the Germans, that to their victories France is indebted for the restoration of her political rights and liberties.

Yet it is not just and true to make the declaration, which generally passes unchallenged, that an all-sufficient condemnation of the Empire lies in the fearful disasters amidst which it ended. If unsuccessful war, a Sedan and a Treaty of Frankfort, are the absolute condemnation of a ruler, why is it that Magenta, Solferino, and Sadowa have not shaken the throne of the Emperor of Austria; why is it that in our own day we often hear Francis Joseph praised as a pattern of goodness, wisdom, and patriotism; why is it that the misfortunes of the venerable ruler of Austria have transmuted cold respect into sympathetic interest, that his moral authority over his subjects was never so strong and so beneficent in its results on internal policy and foreign relations as in the closing years of his reign? This is not to say that the loss of Napoleon's throne was not the due, expected, and foreseen penalty of disaster; it is simply to refer to these obvious peculiarities in his situation of which we have already spoken.

CHAPTER XI

THE WARS AND FOREIGN POLICY OF NAPOLEON III

THE description of battles and campaigns does not come within the scope and purpose of this volume, nor of the writer's capacity; he will confine himself to the simpler and, as he thinks, more generally useful function of narrating the cause, meaning, intention, and result, as these appear to him, of the numerous armed conflicts in which Napoleon sought glory and found, in the end, direst confusion and disaster irrecoverable. We think that without difficulty we shall be able to show that the significance of these wars is vital at this moment, and that no man is more entitled than Napoleon to be called the maker of contemporary Europe. Not that he deliberately set out to earn this appellation, but that in the issue of things it is the position he holds. The map of Europe, as it now is drawn, is largely the work of this man, among the most wonderful of adventurers.

Napoleon, then, made seven wars or military expeditions: war against Russia in the Crimea (1854-1856); war against Austria in Italy (1859); an expedition to Syria for the protection of Chris-

tians in that country against the fanaticism of the Moslems (1860); an expedition to China in order to open the ports of that country to foreign trade (1860); three campaigns against the Emperor of Annam, which ended in the cession of Cochin-China (1867); war with Mexico, having as its sequel the execution of the intruded Austrian, the Emperor Maximilian (1867); and the war with Prussia (1870); which, for Napoleon, ended everything. In the Crimean War, France was allied with England, Turkey, and Sardinia; in the war against Austria, with Sardinia-Piedmont; and in the expedition to China, with England.

As the heir of the great Emperor, and in order to the consolidation of his popularity and his position, Napoleon was bound to seek conquest, in the beginning of his reign at anyrate. The ostensible object of the Crimean War was to frustrate the alleged designs of Russia upon Constantinople, upon "the integrity of the Turkish Empire"; but Napoleon, having no considerable interests in the East, near or far, would not obviously have been injured if the guile of the Great Bear had been successful. Certainly, France had no clamant interests in the quarrel. But the Emperor thought it necessary, on behalf of his own security, to minister to his countrymen's love of glory. While the Napoleonic legend was in its greatest vigour, a successful war with Russia could not but be congenial to France; for was there not Moscow to be avenged, had not the Czars shown themselves especially virulent towards the First Empire, a chief inspiration of the coalitions against it; had they not been the warm friends or the con-

descending patrons of the Bourbons? Further, Russia's claim to be the natural guardian of Christianity in the Near East, planted in the midst of rampant and intolerant multitudes of another faith, was an offence to the Catholics of France, who liked to think of their own country, as the eldest daughter of the Church, discharging that office. Not that the desire to please the clerical party entered powerfully into the motives of Napoleon at this time, though it probably was not absent from his mind, but that his policy and conduct had their satisfaction as a subsidiary effect. Of this war, alone of all the great military enterprises that he conducted, can it be said that it had exactly the consequences on which he had calculated. The allies were victorious; Russia was glad to enter into negotiations for peace; and the treaty which closed this phase of the perennial Eastern Question was signed at Paris. After being condemned during more than forty years as a thing of naught, as far as concerned her influence in the regulation of relations between the members of the European family of nations, France at one bound stepped into a front position. Henceforth she must be reckoned with; her Emperor must sit down, as among his equals, at the Council Board of Europe. His position among his own people was for the moment rendered unassailable.

These benefits to France and the Emperor, notable and valuable as they were as factors in the immediate situation, did not carry with them a train of durable consequences,—their effects were soon exhausted; far otherwise was it with the war against Austria, the beginning of a sequel of events

whose results are writ large upon the face of the map of Europe now in use.

The Italian peninsula, when Napoleon began his reign, was split into seven distinct and independent governments. Piedmont formed part of the kingdom of Sardinia, and was ruled by the only royal dynasty in Italy. Lombardy and Venetia were under the sway of Austria; the central part of the country comprised the duchies of Parma, Modena, and Tuscany and the territories of the Pope; while in the south was the kingdom of Naples and Sicily. To Italian patriots the foreign domination was a bitter and shameful thing; in their mind's eye there arose a glorious vision of an Italy united and independent from the Alps to the sea. The King of Sardinia watched the fermentation of the feeling of nationality with interest, sympathy, and the keenest vigilance; it was not for him to embroil himself prematurely with the Emperor of Austria and the other potentates of the peninsula; but he perceived that the moment might soon arrive when he ought to place himself at the head of this movement, that if he did so he would be accepted by all but the zealots of republicanism as its natural leader, and that, if successful, he would reap an abundant harvest of territory and renown. That the King of two such modest territories as Sardinia and Piedmont should swell out into the monarch of a United Italy, with an area nearly as large as that of the British Isles, would be a triumph ever memorable and shining in the annals of Europe.

The initial item in the programme of the Italian patriots was the expulsion of Austria from Lom-



EN ITALIE.

«Crédienne», en été faut manger sa soupe vite dans ce pays-ci. . . tant plus qu'on attend tant plus qu'elle devient chaude !.....

A CARICATURE RELATING TO THE CAMPAIGN IN ITALY

By H. Daumier in "La Charivari," 28th July, 1859

bardy and Venetia. The geographical position of these provinces made Austria the dominant power in the peninsula. Her rule was rigorous, her Italian subjects were seething with discontent and ripe for rebellion. They were held down with strenuous difficulty, and at an expense which outweighed the value of the provinces to Austria ; yet the oppressor kept his iron grip upon the quivering victims. The proceedings of the Italian patriots were observed with much ardent sympathy in France. Napoleon knew that a war for the liberation of Italy from the foreign yoke would be popular ; and accordingly, in 1859, allying himself with the ruler of Piedmont, he entered upon the conflict, and on the plains of Lombardy struck down the high hand of Austria in signal defeat. The eagles of France reaped fresh glory on the fields of Magenta and Solferino. Austria sued for peace ; she was allowed to retain Venetia ; but Lombardy was united with Piedmont and, as a mark of gratitude, Piedmont ceded the province of Savoy and the county of Nice to the Emperor Napoleon. The Treaty of Villafranca, which concluded the war, has been described as the most absolutely nugatory instrument in the history of diplomacy. It contemplated the formation of a confederation of Italian States under the presidency of the Pope !

Napoleon made the honourable boast that France, in the Italian campaign, had gone to war for an idea, and that she was the only nation then existing capable of so knightly an adventure. However respectable the source of his inspiration, his manner of handling the question of Italian unity when it

came to close quarters was a prolific parent of mischiefs for himself and France. He spent his prestige in a vain attempt to satisfy two opposite parties: the party that aimed at nothing less, and would be contented with nothing less, than the complete unification of Italy under one Government; and the other party, which resented any menace, or semblance of menace, upon the integrity of the papal dominions. Those of the French people who were really interested in the Italian question belonged in a decided majority to the former party, and were inclined to consider any holding back from the full programme of the Italian patriots as a betrayal of the good cause; the minority, feeling that encouragement of the Italian movement meant at least the condonation of its final ambition, were apt to discount as mere lip-service Napoleon's repeated declarations in favour of the Pope's temporal sovereignty. The Emperor dreaded, perhaps to an unnecessary extent, the hostility of the latter party; the great Emperor had said that with the army and the curés on his side he would feel sure of France, and his nephew seemed to be under the influence of a similar idea. He authorised or allowed his Minister to declare that France would never, never permit the entrance of the Italian troops into the city of St. Peter. This vehement protestation of devotion to the cause of the Pope did little to conciliate the affections of the Catholics. All that they remembered was that he had lent his puissant arm to the party whose avowed object was the establishment of a united Italy under a secular sovereign, with Rome as the capital. Napoleon, then, lost the

bulk of the clergy and the clericals, without gaining the bulk of the people.

In the meantime, though the subjects of the Pope were the worst governed in Europe, the Pope was maintained on his throne by a French garrison, too small, it is true, to offer any effective resistance to an Italian army at the gates of Rome, yet large enough to daunt and irritate the immediate subjects of his Holiness, to excite anger and shame among the lovers of liberty and the enemies of clerical despotism in Italy and France alike. It may be retorted that the lovers of liberty in France were few, but the thrust is without point ; for Napoleon III., whatever the defects, theoretical and practical, of his government, was the elect of France, and there was the best reason to believe that the Roman populace, left to its own choice, would have immediately extinguished his Holiness as a temporal sovereign. They had simply doted upon his absence.

The whole object, then, of Napoleon's intervention in Italy, from the point of view of his position in France, was lost. He had advanced the cause of Italian unity, it is true, but then, it was argued, it seemed to be almost against his will ; he was not a whole-hearted friend of the cause, he had even made himself conspicuous by his persistent efforts to put a spoke in the wheel of the chariot of Italian unity. That was how the enthusiasts of Italian independence and unity regarded his conduct. When the clericals were asked to admit that he had shown himself honestly zealous for the rights of the Pope, it was answered : " Yes, perhaps, but certainly he has helped to let loose the flood

which seems likely eventually to submerge the successor of St. Peter in its cruel waves." In sum, Napoleon's treatment of the Italian question, beyond securing the cession of the province of Savoy and the county of Nice to France, did little or nothing to improve his position among his own countrymen, and certainly weakened his reputation and authority among foreign nations and their statesmen.

The Pope's feeling towards his protesting champion was something other than gratitude. Pius IX. was not wanting in shrewdness, he was quick enough to discern, whatever might be the intentions or pretences of Napoleon, in which direction the results of his policy and his arms moved. The syllabus of 1864, in which appears more evidently the Peter who smote off the ear of the high priest's servant than the Peter who was commissioned to feed the sheep and the lambs, denounced "all doctrines based upon national sovereignty, universal suffrage and liberty of commerce," the groundwork and pillars, as it happened, of Napoleon's position and policy, and the very doctrines which agreed with the Pope's character as temporal sovereign to the same degree in which light has fellowship with darkness. The French Government refused to allow the priests to read the document from their pulpits. This, then, is the result of Napoleon's careful ménagement of the sentiments of Rome—the Pope sends a message to the faithful which the Government of France thinks it inexpedient that the people should receive. No more conclusive condemnation of the Emperor's statesmanship could be produced!

One criticism frequently directed against the Emperor we cannot admit to be justified. The spectacle of the author of the *coup d'état* battling side by side with Mazzini and the carbonari seems, at the first glance, bizarre and incongruous, calling for explanation and apology. How could the man who had robbed his country of her liberty be himself zealous for the liberty of Italy? The question arises from a confusion of terms. There is no real inconsistency in the conduct of the Emperor. The cause that Napoleon championed was the nationality of Italy; it was only incidentally, from his point of view, that the individual liberty of her citizens was involved in this crusade; it was the liberation of Italy from a brood of foreign kings that formed the avowed objective of Napoleon's wars and policy; his intent was to help her to win her Bannockburn, not necessarily to secure her Magna Charta or her Reform Bill. National independence and personal liberty are two distinct things. Mazzini was preaching and plotting and fighting for both, for the former, mainly because the attainment of it was necessary to the acquisition of the latter. Napoleon's attachment to the cause of Italian unity, which he had actively shown when he was still a youth, and while his prospects of dominion in France were of the remotest, need not be pushed to mean more than a desire for the consolidation of the various States under one sovereign belonging to a native dynasty, possessing just that hold upon the confidence of the people that he himself enjoyed in France.

That he was not able to prosecute this course

with an undivided mind was due, as we have already said, to his fear of giving serious offence to a strong, united, influential section of his countrymen whose goodwill could be purchased only at a large price and, even so, was held on an insecure tenure. Napoleon frequently fell out of sympathy with the practising Catholics among his subjects, but he sought to make amends, as occasion offered, in ways that did not bring him within the danger of incurring the deep displeasure of his other subjects,—for example, by sending French troops to protect the Christians of Asia Minor from pillage and massacre, and by opening the doors of China to the Catholic missionaries. It was well understood that he would never screw up his courage to the point of a definite and final break with the zealots of the faith. When the Italian people were knocking at the gates of Rome, it was certain that Napoleon would not be by their side; he was more like to be found within the walls, offering resistance to their entry.

The future was to show that, in helping to secure the unity of Italy, Napoleon was aiding and abetting the silent, relentless, persevering ambitions of Prussia, and building up the storm of destruction which was to burst in consuming fury upon his own head. At this time the hegemony of the German race, of the loosely linked-together princedoms, duchies, grand duchies, and kingdoms was wielded by Austria as the permanent president of the German Confederation, just awaking into the full consciousness that there had grown up in the North a powerful rival, moving quietly, swiftly, and without resistance towards

the day when she should be strong enough to wrest the sceptre from her weary old hands. The loss of Lombardy was a severe blow to the influence of Austria among the German States. Her difficulties with the races which compose her heterogeneous Empire—Germans, Magyars, Slavs, Poles, Italians, and the rest, held together only as a schoolboy's marbles are held together within a bag, or rather like beads upon a string—the string being the personality of the Emperor Francis Joseph—were always pressing and always dangerous. Great part of the strength of the Empire was employed in the mere effort to keep it in being. Prussia, on the contrary, may be described, with little qualification, as a homogeneous State, Teutonic and Protestant, perfectly disciplined, with the nerves of the body politic as strong as true steel. In proportion to total population she was the most powerful military State in Europe, whether in point of numbers, discipline, or efficiency, fully resolved, moreover, that while Austria decreased she would increase and would ultimately erect on the ruins of Austria's power and influence a grander, more powerful, more soundly welded Confederation than had ever acknowledged the hegemony of the southern State. The bulk of the North German States were naturally drawn towards Prussia, or more towards Prussia than Austria; a beginning must be made by detaching them from Austria; at the same time a stroke should be directed towards bending the reluctance of the South German States; they must be taught to turn their eyes away from Austria by a clear demonstration of her military

inferiority to her northern rival. Therefore Prussia must provoke Austria to war, and beat her decisively.

The policy of Bismarck in the meantime was so to isolate Austria that when the day of trial came she should fall an easy and helpless victim. For that purpose it was necessary to secure, above all, the neutrality of Russia and France. The former, which had a natural affinity with the Slav population of Austria, and scented possible opportunities of aggrandisement in the dissolution or dismemberment of the Empire of the Hapsburgs, could not see her own interests in any way menaced by the victory of Prussia.

France, however, might have been supposed to be awake to the danger of a new German Empire with enormous military strength under one supreme control on her Eastern frontier. But the designs of Prussia were as yet hidden from the eyes of the Emperor. Very unwisely he allowed himself to enter into personal negotiations with Bismarck at Biarritz. The wily Prussian saw that he had his adversary at a disadvantage. If any proposal were sprung upon the German diplomat to which he did not desire to commit himself, he could always plead that he must refer the matter to his august master; even when he granted consent or compliance with the Emperor, there was no security that he might not be disavowed by King William of Prussia,—Bismarck was only a servant; and in these circumstances the Emperor could make no just complaint of hesitation, delay, uncertainty, or change of mind. Bismarck was thus free to employ all the tricks—the evasions,

subterfuges, and prevarications — of diplomacy upon an adversary who was as clay in his hands, without skill in these matters, and who had sacrificed a hundred advantages by dealing without an intermediary. Change of mind, uncertainty, delay, and hesitation were not equally permissible, and might become a subject of grave reproach, to the possessor of supreme power; these familiar and indispensable weapons of diplomatic warfare had been voluntarily laid aside. To change the metaphor, it was easy and reasonable for Bismarck to hide his hand, while Napoleon was all but compelled to place all his cards on the table. Those conferences at Biarritz, pregnant with the destiny of three great nations, were a complete triumph for Bismarck. Napoleon agreed to remain neutral in a conflict between Prussia and Austria.

A pretext for the decisive struggle was easily found. The war between the rivals for the hegemony of the German race was decided in six weeks; Austria was overwhelmingly defeated at Sadowa, and expelled from the Confederation. Prussia acquired a considerable accession of territory, and became the president of the North German Confederation, comprising the States north of the river Maine, with supreme command of their armies. She also entered into treaties of offensive and defensive alliance with Baden, Bavaria, Hesse-Darmstadt, and Würtemberg. The victory of Prussia seems to have been a surprise to every nation in Europe except herself.

On the morrow of Sadowa, Napoleon woke up to the grievous blunder that he had made. He perceived that by defeating Austria in Italy, and

standing idly aside while she was being pounded in the mortar of King William and his diplomat, he was allowing Prussia to test and perfect the weapons, and to enlarge the armoury, which were to be used against himself as the duly appointed next victim.

Little understanding the character of the man with whom he had to do, Napoleon requested of Bismarck that France should be granted an extension of her frontier towards the Rhine as a recognition of her neutrality in the late war. But the Prussian diplomatist had now altogether forgotten his obligations to the Emperor of the French. There have been few statesmen in the history of the world who have been as absolutely impervious as was Bismarck to all but sheer business considerations; gratitude was a sentiment which should not be so much as named in the vocabulary of a Prussian diplomatist. The accepted code of political ethics may be much the same among all those whose care it is to regulate international relations; but such infirmities of human nature as honesty, truthfulness, affection, sentiment, and a consciousness, more or less vivid, of the altruistic demands made by Christian morals seem to mitigate, from time to time, the rigours of the code. Bismarck was free from such weaknesses, or at anyrate, when he indulged them it was by calculation, not by imperious instinct. Honesty is the best policy; but he who is honest only because it is politic wears only a simulacrum of probity. Such was the garment in which at times Bismarck arrayed himself; more often he made naked and unashamed display of selfish motives, backed

by the threat, or the employment, of brute force. Accompanying his reply to Napoleon with unnecessary vigour and flamboyancy of language, he declared in the hearing of Europe that Prussia could never consent to the cession of one yard of German territory.

Napoleon then entered into negotiations for the acquisition of Luxemburg, which, though not a Dutch State, acknowledged the King of Holland as its sovereign. Bismarck again offered uncompromising resistance, intimating in language whose significance is well understood that the passing of Luxemburg to the rule of Napoleon would be an unfriendly act; and the Emperor was saved a deep personal humiliation only by the reference of the dispute to the friendly offices of outside parties.

Bismarck's was a character which neither invited nor inspired sympathy outside the ranks of his own countrymen, but it is possible to regard him, in his dealings with the author of the *coup d'état*, as an instrument of Nemesis who, though slow of foot, was overtaking the guilty man and the nation which had condoned his crime. Not, indeed, that any sanctity necessarily attaches to Bismarck in this character, for destiny is not fastidious in the choice of persons to serve even her most righteous purposes. The tenderness and affection with which France is regarded by all unprejudiced persons who know the true character and inward history of her people cannot blind us, as the best and wisest of her own sons have not been blinded, to the justice of the vengeance which was pursuing her.

The removal of Luxemburg as an immediate stone of stumbling did not improve the ordinary general relations between the two countries. The international industrial exhibition held at Paris in 1867 was the occasion of various visits of foreign potentates, and the external shows of friendship were not wanting, but no one cherished any illusions—not even the Emperor of the French, who was under a strong temptation to deceive himself—as to the portentous realities of the situation. It was noted that the principal exhibit in the Prussian section was a monster cannon which had just been cast at the Krupp works, the deadliest weapon of warfare up to that time invented, which seemed to dominate the entire scene with a baleful augury. Among the illustrious visitors was the Czar, whose goodwill Napoleon was nervously anxious to conciliate; but if the Czar had any inclinations to yield to the undoubted personal fascination of the French sovereign, they were arrested by recollections of the favour which Napoleon and his people had shown towards the Polish patriots and by the attempt on the Czar's life which fatally marred the graciousness of the occasion. Russia, whose ambitions ran towards the East, had powerful reasons for desiring to stand well with the great and ever-growing military strength of her immediate neighbour on the West. Besides, she cherished a traditional hostility towards the Bonapartes. France was compelled to see that her hopes of countenance or succour from that quarter were vain. Meanwhile, aggrandised and elevated, Prussia was showing herself anything but a pleasant neighbour, and it will scarcely be denied that to

provoke a war with France was at the moment the settled and deliberate policy of Bismarck.

Napoleon, worn out with labour and anxiety, almost bankrupt of hope, was becoming feeble and old while yet several years from the allotted span of man's life. He and his country were both exhausted ; and he knew it. The people had had their fill of wars and rumours of wars. The carousal of glory was ended, and it was the morning after ; the long-indulged thirst for military fame, like long continuance in dram-drinking, produces nausea, headache, and a vast, quite respectable, if only temporary, passion for various insipid waters. The prospect of war with Prussia filled Napoleon with dread. In his desperation he turned towards Austria, Austria whom he had humiliated, and from whom he had torn two of her fairest provinces. Austria had known the terrors of the Prussian right arm ; with her large German population she could not feel sure that she had yet drained the bitter cup of shame and loss which her victorious rival had presented to her lips ; and she would greedily have grasped an opportunity of revenge had she been confident that it would be effectual. To venture and not to win would be more disastrous than not to venture at all. She knew that there was rottenness at the heart of France, that Napoleon had spent lavishly the resources, the strength, and the spirits of his army and people ; that he had not shown himself skilled in the good husbandry which might have enabled him to repair the natural exhaustion ; that, in short, another war with Prussia, even with France as a fellow-combatant, would be an enterprise of the last desperation.

If Italy could be persuaded to link her fortunes with France and Austria, the matter might seem to wear a more comfortable aspect. But Italy would come to terms only on consideration that Austria and France would support her views concerning the Roman question. As a sequel to the Austro-Prussian War, in unavailing hopes of advantages from the intervention of Napoleon with the victor, Austria had surrendered Venetia to France, and France had thrown it to Italy, as one throws a bone to a dog. Mazzini and the Italian patriots, as often as they thought of the manner in which Venetia had been added to the growing Italian State, were filled with vexation and shame. We are afraid that it must be admitted that Italy has never been duly grateful to France for the help she contributed towards the accomplishment of that unity which, without her aid and stimulus, might long have remained a dream. First Lombardy, and now Venetia, had been added to the dominions which owned the sway of Victor Emanuel; then the Duchies of Parma, Modena, and Tuscany had passed away unregretted; the kingdom of the Two Sicilies, amid the acclamations of all who prized honest, just, and humane government, had ceased to be. The capital of the infant State had been transferred from Turin to Florence. The States of the Church had been shrivelled up to a mere parcel of territory. Yet, in spite of this rapid advance towards the consummation of their ambition, the Italians only remembered that the keystone remained to be placed upon the edifice which had been reared with the swiftness of a dream; that the Eternal City, the former mistress



THE CAPITULATION OF SEDAN

of the world, designated by the unmistakable fitness of things, with a voice of thunder, as the seat of government for the kingdom of Italy, remained in the hands of the Pope, and that his Holiness sat upon his throne girt about by the bayonets of France.

Neither Francis Joseph nor Napoleon could face the wrath of the virile, masterful, valiant old man who occupied the chair of St. Peter.

Two objects of the French Emperor's policy were to resist the aggression of Prussia and to maintain the temporal sovereignty of the Pope. He was not prepared to sacrifice the latter in order to secure the former; and he lost both. The Emperor Napoleon with 85,000 soldiers surrendered to the Prussians at Sedan on 2nd September 1870; on the 20th of September 1870, the soldiers of France having quitted the Peninsula early in the previous month, the troops of Victor Emanuel entered Rome. Alsace and Lorraine were being wrenched from France just at the moment when the consummation so ardently desired by the patriots of Italy was reached; the dismemberment of France and the unification of Italy were contemporaneous events. The cause to which Napoleon had given its most decided impetus triumphed, in spite of him, to the accompaniment of the crash caused by his own fall.

When the Austrian troops finally turned their backs upon Italy they carried away with them the last true hope of the Pope and the foreign despots; when the sound of their tramlings died away on the other side of the border, the heralds of fate filled their trumpets with a reverberating

blast to announce the swift coming of United Italy. Napoleon seems to have stopped his ears to the clamour which filled the heavens ; his deafness or heedlessness was a solid contribution to the disasters which sank him in hideous ruin.

But we are anticipating somewhat. All hope of relief cut off, Napoleon was like a caged rat, running about within the bars of its prison in helpless misery and despair, awaiting in restless anguish the arrival of the terriers. The influence of the Empire in the Chancellories of Europe had sunk almost to vanishing-point, and the magic wand that he had waved in the eyes of his own people was broken by the inglorious sequel to the war in Mexico, a failure so patent and so absolute that nothing could disguise it ; mitigation of its futility and its horror there seemed to be none ; they were as unmistakable as the brand of Cain. Why should the Emperor of the French, whose boast and strength was that he was the elect of his nation, send a French army to impose an Austrian Emperor upon a people of Spanish blood three thousand miles away who could not possibly do him any real mischief, and desired nothing more than to be left alone with their republican institutions ? Most human acts are capable of some defence or explanation, but the war with Mexico has strained to the breaking-point the ingenuity of resolute eulogists. That there was a debt to be collected, that it was hoped to gratify Francis Joseph by placing his brother Maximilian on the throne of an Empire, that the acquisition of the land which Cortez had conquered, with an area nearly three times as large as that of the Austrian Em-

pire, with its fertile fields and mines of gold and silver, would make up for the loss of Lombardy and Venetia ; that, in short, this was a new application of the old principle of bringing in the new world to redress the balance of the old—such are the feeble shows of reason that have been offered for as mad an enterprise as ever adventurer embarked upon.

But it is impossible for anyone who attempts to arrive at the meaning of events to rest in these pretexts. Napoleon made mistakes enough, and it is easy for arm-chair critics, with the consequences of these errors patent to their eyes, to reprimand and condemn. But if an act committed by a man who has been accustomed to comply with the canons of obvious convenience and plausible reason has an air of the inexcusably absurd and stupid, the safe course for the smaller men of the after days is to conclude, not that the actor suddenly took leave of his senses, but that they have not been able to place themselves at his point of view. The career of the third Napoleon would have been impossible without a strain of the dreamer and the romanticist in his constitution, and unless we take this into account we shall fail to discover in him a wholly intelligible personality. A great part of his career was formed upon patterns presented to him by visions born and nurtured in the secret places of his heart, that restlessly sought, and only seldom found, their embodiment within the cold, inhospitable, closely sealed-up world of external things. The unrealised ideas of Napoleon were like the demons of whom we read in the New Testament, they

wandered about seeking a home, swept and garnished and warm, in the minds of men. At the inauguration of Napoleon's Mexican adventure the colossal struggle in the United States between the Northern and the Southern people was proceeding, and the omens pointed to the success of the secession cause. If the Union had not been struggling for its very life the armed intervention of France in the affairs of an adjoining Republic on the American Continent would not have been permitted. If the Slave States had vindicated on the battlefield their claim to an existence separate from their Northern neighbours, the result would have been the establishment, in the confines of Mexico, of a political organisation considerably less democratic in character than the Union in its entirety, an organisation less decided, by reason of its history, traditions, and social polity, in its repugnance to the institutions of Empire. The idea of a great Imperial State, thousands of miles away, in substance, if not in form, tutelary to France, by the side of great English-speaking communities, may have exercised a powerful fascination upon a mind in which grand visions continually floated in a golden haze. Might there not be here the opportunity of a glorious revenge for the epoch-making defeat inflicted upon the ambitions of France on the heights of Abraham above Quebec? Would not so romantic an adventure appeal to the ardent imagination of the French people? Might there not be gathered from this harvest of renown a fresh wreath of laurel for the now naked brow of the great Emperor's nephew?

It is easy to show that the material interests of France were not engaged in the Mexican War. But had the time arrived when military glory had ceased to be, in the estimation of France, one of the chiefest of interests? Was not the hot pursuit of this bubble a necessity imposed upon the Emperor by the exigencies of his situation, his history, the traditions he inherited, by considerations of self-interest? If the expedition to Mexico had been a triumph as conspicuous as it was a failure, would not the organiser of victory have been able to look in the face of his people with confidence and pride? Were not Canada and India among the brightest jewels in the crown of Victoria? Did Napoleon cherish such hopes? And if he did, were they from the beginning futile?

As it happened, all the expectations of the Emperor were lost like streams in the desert. Maximilian, hedged about by French troops, was secure from bodily harm; but scarcely were the eagles of the legions out of sight of the Mexicans when they rose in revolt against the monarch who had been imposed upon them, captured him, and after trial by court-martial shot him as a traitor in the public square of Queretaro. The manner in which he faced his doom on the 19th of June 1867 added a fresh dignity to the traditions of the race of valiant soldiers from which he sprung. It deserves to be noted that in the case of the third Napoleon, as of the first, it was in war with the Spanish race, in Mexico and in the Iberian peninsula respectively, that the stars to which their destinies were hitched were seen suddenly to become very pale.

It has been objected to Napoleon that, knowing Prussia was resolved to provoke France to war, he did not show himself punctilious in the removal of all causes of offence between the two countries. If he had been left with a friend in Europe it might indeed have been worth while to observe an attitude of meekness, so that he might have been able to point to Prussia as a wanton aggressor, and on that ground to have demanded the moral sympathy and material support of any genuinely peace-loving nation, of any nation which might consider that Prussia's bellicose and aggressive temper called for repression and chastisement in the interests of the balance of power and of civilisation. But, alas! he knew that he stood alone. It takes two persons to make a fight, but if one of the two is fully resolved to fight, and if the other is equally resolved not to strike the first blow, the latter merely gives his adversary an undeserved advantage by allowing him to choose, for the opening of hostilities, the time which is most convenient for himself and the most awkward for his opponent. For this reason we consider it unjust to Napoleon to represent the war with Prussia as a gambler's throw, made in the hope of retrieving popularity and assuring the immediate prospects of the dynasty. Not he who strikes the first blow, but he who has made the conflict inevitable must bear the responsibility. Napoleon and Bismarck were in part the creators, and in part the creatures, of that tide in the affairs of the world which carried the one to crowning triumph and the other to overwhelming ruin; but it will scarcely be denied, with all the evidence supplied


by the intervening years in our possession, that if the responsibility is to be charged upon one person, that person must be the Chancellor of blood and iron. It must needs be that offences come, but woe to that man by whom they come !

In what cold and distant relationship the immediate occasion and the real cause of the Franco-Prussian War stand to each other may be inferred from the fact that little or no account is ever taken of the former, and that the humble Prince around whose person the storm-clouds gathered passed away from this earthly scene of things, a few years ago, with almost as little notice as the sinking of a pebble into the ocean. The candidature of a Hohenzollern Prince to the vacant throne of Spain was opposed by France ; the candidature was withdrawn ; not considering this satisfaction ample, Napoleon sought to exact a pledge from the King of Prussia, binding him for an indefinite future that he would not sanction the candidature of any prince of his house ; the pledge was refused and war broke out. But Prince Leopold had just as much to do with the matter as Jenkins' ear with the conflict which is known in the history of England as the war of the Austrian succession.

Prussia considered that a war with France was necessary to consolidate the Confederation of the North German States, to strengthen by exercise the rather delicate body of bond and sentiment represented in the relations of the South German States to their northern neighbours, to create the German Empire under the leadership of Prussia. The humiliation of France, the dismemberment of her territory, the outpouring of

her blood like water, were to supply the costly seal upon the covenant of German unity. The French armies, deficient in numbers, organisation, and equipment, were smashed by the Prussian forces like a tinder box under a Naysmith steam hammer. Paris, deceived by hopes, deferred from morrow to morrow, that relief would surely come, offered a vain but truly heroic resistance to the invader. France found herself under the heel of the relentless Prussian. She was deprived of Alsace and a part of Lorraine, and mulcted in an indemnity of £200,000,000. Until that was paid her house was occupied by bailiffs in the guise of German soldiers. King William of Prussia was proclaimed the first German Emperor, of the new style, in the gallery of the palace of Versailles, erected by the proudest of French monarchs out of the spoils of foreign conquest and of domestic exaction. Napoleon found himself first a prisoner, then an exile. His star had sunk for ever. His day was done, and the Third Republic dawned in cold and gloom and storm.

As we suggested at the beginning of this chapter, there is no more vivid way of realising the issue of Napoleon's wars than a comparison between the map of France, Germany, Austria, and Italy as that portion of Europe was in 1859, and what it was in 1871 and continues to be at the present day. At the end of that period we find that France has gained Savoy and Nice and lost Alsace and a part of Lorraine. The face of the map of the ancient German land is greatly altered. The erstwhile second-rate kingdom of Prussia is no longer a subordinate member in a family of nations ;



THE PROCLAMATION OF WILLIAM I AS GERMAN EMPEROR. VERSAILLES, 18 JANUARY, 1871

From the painting by Anton von Werner

it is the head of a great new Empire with an area more than twice that of the kingdom which owned the sway of Frederick the Great. Its sovereign, as the German Emperor, determines the foreign policy of the whole Confederation ; in his hands are the issues of peace and war. Austria, which from 1815 to 1866 was the acknowledged leader of the German race, has not only lost that position, but has been compelled to surrender all right of influence or interference in the affairs and destiny of her kinsmen outside her own borders. When the reign of the Emperor Napoleon began, the map of Italy bore seven colours. Turin and Genoa acknowledged the sway of the House of Savoy ; Milan, Verona, Mantua, Padua, and Venice, some of the fairest and most romantic cities in the world, were within the dominions of the Emperor of Austria ; Parma and Modena were the capitals of duchies which bore their respective names ; the city of Dante was the seat of government for the Grand Dukedom of Tuscany. Parma enjoyed a measure of freedom and good government ; but Modena and Tuscany, though no part of the Austrian Empire, were ruled by dynasties of Austrian origin, and were to a considerable extent subject to the influence and intimidation of that powerful and rigorous neighbour. The States of the Church, under a government the most cruel, the most corrupt and least enlightened in Europe, comprised within their borders, as well as the Eternal City, Ferrara, Bologna, Ravenna, and Perugia. The southern part of the Peninsula, comprising a third of its whole area, formed, with the island of Sicily, what was known as the kingdom

of the Two Sicilies, under a Bourbon dynasty which has stamped that ancient house, with its mingled records of glory and shame, with its deepest die of infamy. Italy has ceased to be a mere geographical term ; it is now a political entity. A great civil revolution, followed by no really significant signs of reaction, has been accomplished. Italy is united, independent, and free.





ITALY
IN
1870

0 50 100 Statute Miles

CHAPTER XII

EMPEROR, KING, OR REPUBLIC?

THE Republic has now lasted thirty-seven years, a much longer period than any form of Government has enjoyed in France since the Revolution. It is still vigorous and healthy, and, in the language of the insurance offices, granted that it is not going to be exposed to any special risk or encounter any dangerous accident, it may be accounted a "good" life. It is the government of the actual hour, and it is still, we hope, in the earliest stages of evolution. These two circumstances make it in one respect impossible, and in other respects difficult, to apply to it the methods which we have adopted in handling other régimes. We cannot sum it up, of course, and it is something of an adventure to discover the great trunk lines of movement which would form the outline map of the regions it has traversed. As we have approached the history of contemporary France, the temptation has been strong upon us to abandon the plan on which the previous part of the book has been written and to become an unambitious annalist. The natural man tells us that such is the path of least resistance, and seeks further to persuade us that it is the only safe course. We have overcome

this assault upon our virtue, however, and we have endeavoured to strike out a few broad pathways through the jungle of French politics under the Third Republic. It is very desirable, nevertheless, in treading these roads, to proceed cautiously, to make sure of each step.

In this first chapter dealing with the Third Republic we shall seek to show that the question of the form of government under which France was to live has remained alive all the time ; that, though it sometimes goes to sleep, its slumbers are light, and it is easily awakened to vigilance and activity. We shall indicate that the Republic has had to be continually on guard for its life ; that this fact has restricted its energy in the production of remedial legislation ; that it has complicated the organisation of political parties and retarded their development on the lines natural to countries under a settled and assured government ; that it has tended gravely to impair the efficiency of the army, navy, and civil administration. We hope before this chapter is concluded to make good these general observations.

THE USURPATION OF PARIS

The surrender of Napoleon III. at Sedan meant the end of the Second Empire. As we have explained in a previous chapter, that was in the nature of things. Nothing else can be conceived as practicable. The Government of the National Defence, formed on 4th September 1870, and composed of the deputies from Paris to the Legislative Body of the Empire, was republican as obviously as

it was also provisional. How did the representatives of the capital dare to assume authority over the whole country? Why did the whole of France quietly submit to this usurpation? Let M. Hanotaux answer: "It has been the habit of Paris to govern France. For centuries, in that centralised country, the *mot d'ordre* has come from the capital. Accordingly, from the very beginning no one was astonished to see Paris take possession of the empty seats of authority and place her representatives in them." The Government of the National Defence, shut up in Paris, with the exception of the delegation at Tours, finds itself compelled to sign an armistice on 28th January 1871, in order to make possible the convocation of a National Assembly at Bordeaux to decide whether war shall be continued or peace concluded.

THE POSITION OF PARTIES

The elections under universal suffrage were to take place on 8th February. The question before the people was simply peace or war. The ordinary party labels scarcely came in view. The candidates did not offer themselves as Bonapartists, Orleanists, Legitimists, or Republicans, but simply as Frenchmen, eager to fight to the bitter end or resolved to submit to defeat and the hard conditions which it was well understood that the acceptance of defeat would involve. Some Departments sent representatives of all the four parties to the National Assembly. But it is important to note that not a single candidate protested against the Revolution of 4th September.

As a necessary sequel to the disasters from which the country was suffering the Bonapartists hardly made an appearance among the candidates. They had been so accustomed to be told precisely what they were to do that when this minute direction was withdrawn they were at a loss how to act. The Republicans, Legitimists, and Orleanists reckoned each about two hundred members in the Assembly; there was a very decided majority, therefore, against the principle of Republicanism. It was mainly from the towns that the Republicans gathered their strength; in the country districts it was naturally difficult for a popular party to organise itself among a sparse population, a portion of which was under the influence of large landowners and of priests, and all of it subject to the dread of spoliation and of the Terror, provoked by the very word "Republic." The days of horror in 1848 were vividly recalled to personal or historic memory. The Republican party, therefore, was practically unknown to the rural electors. The Legitimists had no hold whatever upon the masses of the people. Those of that party who were returned to the Assembly owed their election to the personal consideration which they enjoyed in their districts, to the bravery which they had displayed during the war, and to their present desire for peace. That in their view the true and only sovereign of the country was the Comte de Chambord—Henri v. as they affected to call him—son of the murdered Duc de Berri and grandson of Charles x., had little to do with the matter. The situation of the Comte de Chambord had no bearing upon the question of peace or war, and it was not in the serious thoughts of anyone

that the Assembly would take into consideration the summoning of Henri v. to the throne of France. The partisans of the Orleanists belonged to the middle classes, who remembered the power and influence which they had enjoyed under the Monarchy of July, their creation and their very image.

THE INEVITABLE MAN

M. Thiers was immediately perceived to be the inevitable man demanded by the crisis. He had protested against the war and warned the country of the impending disasters. He had received the treatment always accorded to statesmen who address words of soberness and truth to an inebriated nation. He was shouted down in the Chamber, denounced as unpatriotic, and threatened with the destruction of his house. His sentiments and his experience, though not in complete harmony, conspired in his favour. He greatly admired the spirit of the Revolution and the institutions of the First Empire. As a Minister of the Monarchy of July he had leaned towards the party of moderate parliamentary reform, but, as we have seen, he had been ready to compromise and temporise. He had parted company with Guizot, but his opinions were not advanced enough to secure his acceptance at the hands of the people who made the Revolution of 1848. He was now elected Chief of the Executive Power, remaining a member of the Assembly and intervening in its deliberations, frequently and with marked effect. His position was exceptional, in that he exercised the functions both of a President and of a Prime Minister. There can be little doubt

that, though he concerned himself more with the spirit than the form of government, his predilections were towards Constitutional Monarchy. However, the form of government actually on the ground was a Republic, and at the request of M. Thiers the nomenclature of his position was extended to read, "Chief of the Executive Power of the French Republic." But he always professed to recognise while in office that the form of government was not definitely settled, that his business was so to acquit himself that the question should remain disengaged and open. As placed against Gambetta, who was a democratic and a vehement Republican, Thiers was the representative of moderate views, the opponent of extreme theories.

It is an ardent patriotism or a strong personal ambition or a tremendous impetus of native energy which carries a man of seventy-three years of age, already bearing on his shoulders the weight of forty years of public conflict, to an undertaking so vast, so laborious, so difficult as the rehabilitation of France after the disasters of 1870. M. Thiers, luckily for France and himself, had his share in that species of vanity, if so hard a name is permissible, which leads some great persons to borrow other men's opinions of their position in order to think themselves happy. He was one of the very few men who, finding felicity and distinction in literature, have shown a pre-eminent talent in affairs of state and in the management of conflicting parties. Essentially a child of the Revolution, he had absorbed the best ideas of that epoch and process, along with its too great insistence upon centralisation, as being necessary for the healthy

circulation of blood throughout the body politic of France, which otherwise would grow cold at the extremities, but he was never seduced into the idolatry of mere ideas ; good thoughts would remain no better than good dreams were they not put into action, and Thiers, preserving a lively sense of actuality, and not willing that the best should become the enemy of the good, was ever ready to compromise with the exigencies of the time. He had the rare felicity at this epoch of inspiring among all, even among those who disliked him, a complete confidence in his competence for the position of unexampled difficulty to which his personal history and the circumstances of the nation unanimously called him. In his younger struggling days he had been restless and sometimes violent, but now, placed in a position of commanding authority after more than thirty years' exclusion from real influence and power, long enough to have entirely destroyed the habit of affairs, he showed himself settled and calm.

TERMS OF PEACE

The immediate question was not constitutional, but the determination of peace or war. An overwhelming majority of the Assembly were in favour of seeking terms from the Prussians. Resistance was hopeless, and there was no sign that any of the Powers would exert themselves in mitigation of the sentence about to be pronounced upon poor France. It is unnecessary to enter into the details of the negotiations. France was compelled to cede Alsace and a part of Lorraine, and to pay an indemnity of £200,000,000. French territory was not to be

entirely liberated from the German soldiers until the whole of this enormous fine was discharged. The Assembly pronounced Napoleon III. responsible for the ruin, the invasion, and the dismemberment of France. Presently the sessions were transferred from Bordeaux to Versailles. It was considered that Paris, a prey to the stormy passions engendered by the sufferings of the siege and the paroxysms of rage which followed upon the repeated deferring and the final destruction of her hopes, would not surround the Assembly with the calm necessary for its deliberations. The Assembly chose to consider as presumption deserving punishment the conduct of Paris in assuming, through her representatives, authority over the entire nation by the constitution of the detested Government of the National Defence. Paris had prolonged the war; even after its surrender it had proclaimed for a fight to the finish. Besides, it had returned Radicals to an Assembly the majority of which were Monarchists. Louis Blanc declared that if Paris were deprived of her rank as the political capital there would be civil war. Paris would give herself a government of her own, and a horrible foreign war would be followed by an internecine conflict even more horrible. The future had in store a full and vivid verification of this prophecy.

THE MEANING OF THE COMMUNE

The tragic story of the Commune is familiar to most educated people. The power in the capital was seized by men who created Paris for the nonce into a separate State, who claimed that the Queen



M. GAMBETTA PROCLAIMING THE REPUBLIC IN FRONT OF THE CORPS LEGISLATIF, SEPT. 4, 1870

of Cities had the right to live apart from the rest of France, who were prepared to vindicate by arms the right of secession. This was a challenge that the National Government was bound to take up at once, a claim that it could not give place to, no, not for a moment. The Commune was a rebellion, of colossal dimensions, which must be suppressed in a thorough and relentless manner. The end was reached only through scenes of horror and carnage in the streets, through a wild carnival of fire, riot, massacre, and fearful destruction of life and property. But why should Paris have behaved in such a way as to bring this fearful punishment upon her? That inquiry is not always answered in narratives of this direful calamity, and indeed it is not easy to give a clear and satisfying answer.

The root reason seems to be simply that *Paris was wretched*. Its sufferings during the siege had been great; it had been filled with deceitful hopes by the leaders of the defence; it had been led to believe, day by day, that succour was at hand; but succour never came; its privations and sacrifices had all been in vain; it was compelled to surrender; it was humiliated; therefore it was unhappy, sullen, inclined to be vindictive; the ashes of savage passion were smouldering in its heart, and ready, if stirred ever so little, to burst into devouring flame. The embers were provoked into activity by the attitude of the rest of the country and of the Assembly towards the capital; the provinces did not seem disposed to yield either gratitude or admiration to Paris for its heroism and self-abnegation; *this* was chosen as the time to deprive it of

its historic and hitherto unchallenged prerogative as the metropolis, the mother city of the State. "Paris was slighted," said Victor Hugo five years afterwards in pleading for a complete amnesty of the communists; "it was deprived of its title as the capital. It was then nothing more than the capital of the world! Then the first of cities wished to be equal at least to the smallest hamlet, it wished to be a commune?" These sentences are equally epigrammatic and misleading, but they indicate the view that the communists wished others to take of their conduct. A man flies into a violent temper, provoked by some cause of irritation which he is ashamed to acknowledge, but immediately the heat of his irritation begins to cool he seeks for respectable reasons to justify his outburst.

The government of Paris was captured by the revolutionary Socialists, who had a plausible programme, and were largely reinforced by hordes of blackguards, native and foreign, whose political creed contained but two articles—riot and spoliation. The programme of the Commune, while having in view a federation of the communes throughout France, claimed for Paris the right to give herself the administrative and social reforms that she desired, to universalise power and property. The number of electors in Paris was 481,000; 224,000 of these ratified the establishment of the Commune, while 257,000 absented themselves from the polls; but it is necessary to add that a large number of electors had withdrawn from Paris. It is further to be said that, in seeking to appraise the significance of the 224,000, we must consider that many of them only dimly understood what

was on foot, and that Paris is a city in which small parties of violent agitators have time and time again intimidated and subdued large masses of sober-minded but timid citizens. Once the Government of Versailles had within its grip victory over the rebels, the Assembly insisted that the suppression of the revolt should be "complete, brutal, violent." Doubtless this urgency derived part of its inspiration from hatred of the persistent Radicalism of Paris, the right hand of the Monarchists was no doubt strengthened by the belief that in striking the Commune they were also dealing blows at the idea of a Republic. "Paris cruelly expiated the error into which light-minded and criminal men had precipitated her. She lost 80,000 citizens. After the heroism and the suffering of the siege," says Hanotaux justly, "Paris did not deserve a destiny so cruel."

The programme of Thiers was to restore the moral self-respect of the nation, to set it on the way to recovery of its normal health and activity. The reconstitution of the army was an essential part of this programme. The Assembly, making ostentatious show of its monarchist opinions, abrogated the laws which had decreed the exile of the royal princes and declared valid the election of the Duc d'Aumale and the Prince de Joinville, sons of Louis-Philippe. Public opinion was greatly excited by these decisions, which had been made contrary to the vehement opposition of Thiers. They were generally interpreted as a prelude to a new royal restoration. The opposition to them in the Assembly had come from the Republicans; and Thiers, acting energetically

with them on this occasion, was drawn a step towards a definite acceptance of their principles.

THE RISING TIDE OF DEMOCRACY

Once the terms of peace had been settled a question had arisen as to the extent of the mandate of the Assembly. The armistice which had been arranged to enable its convocation had stated that the object was the settlement of the question of peace and war, and no other object had been mentioned. The Republicans, insisting on this point, and being a minority, naturally maintained that the competence of the Assembly was strictly limited, that the nation did not contemplate that it was electing a body for the drawing up of a constitution. Gambetta distinguished himself by his vehement denunciations of the alleged usurpation of the Assembly, and by his persistent demands for its dissolution. All the available evidence tends towards the justification of this contention. Peace or war was undoubtedly the only issue about which the electors had troubled themselves, the only issue that had been definitely put before them. The majority, however, being a majority, and scenting an opportunity of bringing back the monarchy by a side wind, took the other view of the Assembly's competence. Their work was not accomplished, they maintained, until they had given a definite form of government to the country; and—no revolution interposing—they were obviously in a position to make that view prevail. Thiers could not compel the members to seek a renewal of their mandate

from the country ; for it had been expressly stipulated that he derived his authority from the Assembly, and held it at the pleasure of the nation's representatives.

The people quickly comprehended the spirit and contention of the majority, and at the earliest opportunity marked its disapproval of both. In July 1871, owing mainly to multiple elections five months before, one hundred and eleven seats, situated in forty-six departments, had to be filled. A hundred of these were won by Republicans. The other eleven successful candidates had presented themselves as men of Conservative opinions, but not one of them had officially avowed himself a Royalist. The significance of this condemnation of monarchical projects could not be mistaken, for the two branches of the Royal House, the Legitimist and Orleanist, had made ostentatious proclamation of their unity. The Duc d'Aumale had declared that there was only one Royal Family, only one monarchy, and that the Comte de Paris (the grandson and heir of Louis-Philippe) was going to ask the Comte de Chambord to name the day, the place, and the hour which would suit him for a meeting. This self-abnegation of the Orleanist Princes was made easy by this, that the Comte de Chambord was now a man of over fifty years of age, married and childless, that with his death the elder branch of the Bourbons would be withered up and ended, and that the next heir was the Comte de Paris, who, when his hour struck, would have claims upon the country both as its "legitimate" King and as the due successor in the parliamentary and constitutional

monarchy begun in the person of his grandfather.

That this marked partiality of the country for Republicans was not a passing mood was proved by the results of subsequent elections. At these the cause of the Republicans triumphed and the Monarchists hardly dared to avow their hopes and principles. The royalist majority in the Assembly, much diminished as it was, had ample reason to suspect that even in its impoverished importance it was assuming more authority than the country, if consulted, would grant it; that its continuance in power was a betrayal of the spirit of representative institutions. But of this state of things, and of the consequences that to men at once honest and enlightened would follow from it, they had no conception. They considered that it was their business and duty to use their position, whether acquired fortuitously or by the design of the people, to bank the rising tide of democratic opinion which seemed to them to threaten ruin and devastation to the prosperity of the country,—nay, more, to all the institutions which protected society from dissolution into warring atoms.

How did Thiers comport himself in these circumstances? His personal position was that he held the presidency of the Republic during the lifetime of the National Assembly. The bulk of his first Ministers were Republicans, though they were distinctly moderate in their political views. This may be a convenient place to remind the reader of what he knows, but is apt to lose sight of, that a Republican is not necessarily a man of what are called advanced views. Indeed, a lasting

impression made upon the mind of any careful student of the early years of the Third Republic is the grotesque absurdity, judged by modern standards, of the fears entertained by the Conservative politicians of France. Gambetta inspired the sentiments of fear and horror and aversion with which an Old-Tory member of the House of Lords may be supposed to regard Keir Hardie or Victor Grayson; yet Gambetta was a mild Whig compared with Mr. Joseph Chamberlain in the part the latter was then playing on the political stage. Gambetta was a Republican by conviction; he had no love for the Empire or the Monarchy, though the language he held towards those régimes does not seem, in general, to have been disrespectful; he pleaded again and yet again, with eloquence now rousing, now touching, that in the days to which we had come statesmen must have regard to the sentiments and the needs of the lowest strata of society, of the people upon whom had been conferred political rights; in this demand he seldom went beyond general terms, though these were enough to mystify and terrify the Conservative classes; his only really violent antipathy was for clericalism, not for religion, but for the claim and the attempts of priests to dominate the conscience and all departments of private and corporate life.

Thiers' attitude towards the four parties was simple, though it demanded considerable subtlety to maintain it in its ostentation of cold neutrality. The Republic was the Government in being. He was President of it. That system must be given a fair trial; it must not be a reactionary Republic,

it must, indeed, be in the true sense conservative ; at the same time, no undue pressure must be brought to bear on the will of the nation, no steps must be taken to hamper the people's liberty of choice if they should set their hearts upon some other form of government. For the moment the Republic was indispensable ; as for the Bonapartists, the Orleanists, and Legitimists—well, there was only one throne, and three persons could not sit upon it. The Empire was impossible ; neither Orleanists nor Legitimists could claim to represent the majority of the nation, and there was fundamental disunion between them as to the foundations and the proper extent of a sovereign's power.

THE DOWNFALL OF THIERS

Thiers was impressed by the results of the elections supplementary to the general consultation of February 1871 ; the majority of the nation was indisputably republican. The clearer the indications the Monarchists received of the trend of popular opinion, the more their representatives in the Assembly were resolved to resist it. Each of the parties in the Assembly sought to enlist the co-operation of Thiers. He, on the other hand, was resolved to represent France ; in the name and for the sake of the nation he exercised practically dictatorial powers in the early days of his office, and when he saw that the people were clearly expressing their preference for the Republic he too was drawn in that direction. The majority of the Assembly, though it had voted that he had

“deserved well of the fatherland,” considered, now that the war was over, the indemnity paid, the territory evacuated, France once again on her feet, that Thiers was no longer, as he had been, the indispensable man. Accordingly, on the 24th of May 1873, it adopted an order of the day demanding a “resolutely conservative” policy, and expressing regret that recent modifications of the Ministry, which had been of a republican character, did not give to the conservative interests the satisfaction which they had a right to expect. This meant, in a word, that the Monarchists were annoyed with Thiers because he would not introduce a measure to check and suppress the democratic tendencies of the time, because in modifying his Cabinet he had not drawn the new members from them, because he seemed to be prejudicing the monarchical solution of the constitutional question. This motion was carried by 360 votes against 344.

Thiers had spoken with feeling and reason against it, and had clearly intimated the result of its adoption upon his personal position. But the menace of resignation, by which he had on more than one signal occasion rallied the support of threatening recalcitrants, had now no terror for the majority. It was his resignation they wanted, and they obtained it.

MARSHAL MACMAHON

On the morrow of the declaration of the Assembly that Thiers had “deserved well of the country,” Jules Simon said laughingly to the President, “Your work is now accomplished, you must

say your *Nunc dimittis*." Looking at his friend with an expression of pensiveness, Thiers replied, "But they have nobody." "They have Marshal MacMahon," returned Jules Simon. "As for him," retorted Thiers briskly, "I can answer for it that he will never accept." Within three months MacMahon was President of the Republic!

MacMahon had won fame and title under the Second Empire; as a politician he had been simply naught, and as the head of the State, but for his simple uprightness, he might have been the instrument of disaster. His honour was of the character that feels a stain like a wound. He had commanded the army of Versailles in the suppression of the Commune; the severity of the punishment inflicted upon the rebellious city had created among men whose opinions were advanced, though not immoderate, a feeling of tenderness towards the chastised criminals; a schoolboy, undeniably guilty of some mean and shameful offence, may be flogged with an excessive severity which creates sympathy for the offender rather than abhorrence or avoidance of his misdemeanour. MacMahon's accession to office, therefore, was witnessed with apprehension not only by the revolutionary Socialists whom he had castigated, but also by many democratic Republicans. It was feared that he would play the part of Monk, that MacMahon would lead the Comte de Chambord by the hand up the steps of his ancestral throne; in this anticipation the majority of the Assembly had elected him President. Subsequent events showed that they had misread his character. MacMahon would certainly not stand in the way of a restora-

tion, if the nation manifestly desired it, but it did not enter into his thoughts to pursue this end by a *coup d'état*.

The Duc de Broglie, who now became Prime Minister, was a supporter of Constitutional Monarchy, but he did not share the sanguine anticipations, entertained by many members of the majority, of an early realisation of his hopes. Beyond saying that de Broglie's political temperament was akin to that which a modern English Radical would describe as "Whiggish," it is difficult to define the programme which he desired to carry out during his term of office. French politicians are, as a class, peculiarly reserved, just because they are peculiarly timid. They feel that they are moving about in a world of darkness and uncertainty; they can only dimly divine the state and contents of the minds with whom they have to deal; they are afraid to strike out boldly lest, in the dark, they knock themselves violently and painfully against objects whose presence was not known. French politicians, as a body, often carry the art of reserve to a ridiculous extent, and the same is true, in great measure, of the whole people. It is easy to strike up a pleasant acquaintance with a Frenchman, difficult to get to know him well. The explanation of the political reserve seems to be fear and suspicion. Each one knows himself in his heart to be an honourable and loyal man, but he has his doubts about his neighbours, and this attitude of suspicion encircles each man with the very atmosphere which seems to justify his neighbours in not feeling very sure about him. Let this characteristic be pondered and in it will be found

to lie, we believe, a part explanation at least of the surprises, small and great, mild and violent, of which French politics are so prolific.

However that be, the conjunction of MacMahon and de Broglie bore a sinister import in the eyes of the Republicans. Gambetta entered upon a vigorous oratorical campaign in the country, demanding the dissolution of the Assembly on the ground that it had no mandate to deal with the constitutional question. As for the monarchical majority, it entertained the confident view that a genuine union of its Legitimist and Orleanist members would lead to the proclamation of Henri v. in Paris within twenty-four hours. But was such a union possible ?

UNDER WHICH FLAG

The great question was—Under which flag ? Would the Comte de Chambord abandon the white flag of old France ? Would he accept the tricolour which the armies of the Republic and the Empire had carried in triumph into every capital of the Continent, the flag under which Louis-Philippe had been content to reign ? This matter of the flag carried much more than a sentimental significance. For the Comte de Chambord the tricolour would mean the acceptance of the works of the Revolution ; the tricolour, as the emblem was at that time understood, implied the sovereignty of the people, constitutional and parliamentary government, a monarchy, limited by the laws, working through Ministers responsible to the representatives of the people. The Orleanists were the advocates of Constitutional Monarchy, and many of the Legiti-

mists were willing to mitigate the extremity of their own views with regard to the indefeasible prerogatives of a king by divine right. But compromise was not in the nature of the Comte de Chambord, and the sum of the matter—for there were many subtle negotiations and many mysterious comings and goings—was that rather than come to the throne under false pretences he preferred to die a disinherited exile. He was so eager to rule that he was content not to reign.

The Comte de Chambord was a man of lofty character, without taint of impurity in his ambition, and sincerely religious; but he had been educated under unmitigated clerical influences, and so ill-instructed was he in the origins of history that he believed in the divine right of kings; he regarded himself as the pre-eminent representative of that principle, a principle as sacred and as morally cogent, in his eyes, as any commandment of the Decalogue. Conscience cannot sanction a compromise with sin. He *was* the King of France. If the people summoned him to rule over them, let them clearly understand that they were making restitution for a sacrilegious theft of double-dyed iniquity, that they were presenting no gift, that they were restoring to him the position and authority which were his by the grace of God and by no other donation. The people, in short, were asked to make confession of a monstrous national sin, the mountain of their transgression had reached to the very heavens. As King he would be responsible for them, not to them; to God alone would he give account of the deeds done in the high and holy position in which He had placed him.

Rumour ran among the people that the Comte de Chambord, if he were permitted to mount the throne of France, would actively seek the restoration of the Pope's temporal power, would bestow upon the nobles and clergy the privileges and immunities which they enjoyed before the Revolution, that France would return to the days of the old régime, and to Absolute Monarchy. The Comte treated these suggestions with disdain, but on his own theory of his position he could not offer the nation any effective safeguard, beyond his autocratic will, against such measures of reaction. His attitude towards representative institutions would have been in spirit, if not in literal exactitude, identical with that adopted by the Czar towards the Duma. They would have had no claim to independent life, they would have existed merely to aid him by their counsel in the discharge of his duties towards his people, in the exercise of his unshakable will and autocratic power upon his subjects. When the views of the Comte de Chambord were clearly and finally understood his restoration was immediately perceived to be impossible. A nation whose heart had once been made glad and strong by a deep draught of revolutionary principles, and from whose eyes the scales of superstition had fallen, could not submit to a King who claimed to rule by divine right, and intended, if occasion required, to have recourse to conduct which could be justified only on that theory. Legitimacy and Revolutionism—to use a figure from Bacon—are like the iron and clay in the toes of Nebuchadnezzar's image; they may cleave for a while, but they will not incorporate. The Comte de

Chambord was hardly more likely to be received as King of France than the Czar would be welcomed as the successor of President Roosevelt. He accepted this result without surprise and with perfect calmness. France had not yet repented; the day would come when she would seek absolution with tears, and on that day, near or distant, France would pay homage to the sacred faith for which he had lived and in which he died.

Only one incident in these transactions perturbed the Comte de Chambord seriously. He paid a secret visit to Versailles some time after the failure of the negotiations for a restoration, and sent a trusty adherent to the President to arrange for an interview. The honest old soldier was completely taken aback, but he did not find it difficult to frame an answer. "I should be happy," he said, "to sacrifice my life to the Comte de Chambord, but I cannot sacrifice my honour to him!" When the response of the President was carried back to the Comte he received it with astonishment amounting almost to stupor. For two hours he did not say a word. A member of his suite who had been with him for thirty years said that he had never seen him so sad or so discouraged. What is fitted to excite surprise in this incident, and to damage the character of the Comte de Chambord, is that he should have expected any other result from his manœuvre. To tempt a man to dishonour argues a want of honour in the tempter. Either the Comte de Chambord held a poorer opinion of MacMahon's character than was just, or his own delicacy and

sensibility of honour had been impaired by long association with Jesuits.

MACMAHON'S POSITION

Thiers' tenure of the Presidency, as we have said, was to have been concurrent with the duration of the Assembly. MacMahon succeeded to the office on the same conditions; the majority of the Assembly saw no reason to deal with them, because of the confident belief that the Marshal would soon give place to the rightful King of France. With the clear failure of the negotiations for a restoration the main object of the majority became the maintenance of a conservative anti-democratic policy through the instrumentality of MacMahon. Accordingly, on 20th November 1873, by 378 votes to 310, a law was passed fixing the duration of the President's powers at seven years from that date.

This enactment was constitutional in its nature, and the Republicans had again and yet again challenged the moral competency of the Assembly for such legislation. They maintained, in season and out of season, their demand for a General Election. The results of the bye-elections were unmistakably hostile to the party then in power. In the unsettled state of men's minds this clinging to office might have been defended if the object of the majority had been to secure a firm administration of the nation's affairs, while, as regards highly controversial matters, merely marking time. But they went much beyond that. They used a position which was theirs by no moral right, which



Photo. Pierre Petit

LOUIS PASTEUR
France's Greatest Man of Science

they would immediately have forfeited if they had submitted themselves to the universal suffrage, the only source of their authority,—this position, so obtained and so held, they employed towards the suppression of the national will, the beating back of the rising tide of republican opinion and democratic sentiment. They even formed the altogether immoral and indefensible project of restricting the suffrage from which they derived all the power they possessed. If there is any person to be found who can support such a proposal, he cannot be argued with. It is a watershed question of politics. The rivers which have their source in the eastern slopes of the Cotswold Hills can never meet those that spring from the western slopes. The Thames and the Severn can have no communion. He who says “yea” to this question and he who says “nay” are on the right hand and on the left, separated like the sheep from the goats, as light from darkness.

THE CONSTITUTION OF 1875

The paradox of the situation is that this monarchical Assembly bestowed upon France a republican constitution under which, with easy modifications, it is living at this hour, a better or at least a much more durable constitution than those drawn up by previous Assemblies of decided, nay even violent, republican principles. This constitution was contained not within one document like that of the United States, but within a series of laws passed during the year 1875. The legislative power was placed in two Assemblies, the

Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. Election for the Chamber was by universal suffrage in single-member constituencies. The Senate was to consist of three hundred members, not less than forty years of age, elected for nine years, one-third of the members retiring by rotation every three years. One-fourth, or seventy-five members of the Senate, were chosen for life by the existing National Assembly; as these seventy-five seats became vacated by resignation or death they were to be filled by the co-option of the other members of the Senate. The remaining two hundred and twenty-five senators, or three-fourths of the whole, were to be elected by the departments, the electoral body in each department consisting of its deputies, its General Council, its District Councils (*conseils d'arrondissement*), and delegates chosen by each Commune. At a later period the institution of life membership in the Senate was abolished and all the senators chosen in the same way. The President was to be elected by the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies united in a single body called the National Assembly. He was to hold office for seven years, and to be eligible for re-election. He wielded the total executive power of the country through a Ministry responsible to the representatives of the people. The ordinary term of the Chamber of Deputies was four years, but the President, with the assent of the Senate, might dissolve it within that period. Amendments of the constitutional laws could, under certain forms, be effected by the two Chambers united in National Assembly.

It was the question of the Senate around which

the most significant controversy raged. On the one hand, the necessity of the Second Chamber was denied ; on the other, among those who favoured its creation, there was acute diversity of opinion as to the manner in which it should be constituted. The problem was—to give the Senate a representative character, and yet so to constitute it that it could not claim co-ordinate authority with the Chamber of Deputies. The difficulty seems to us to have been solved in the happiest way by the selection of larger electoral areas and universal suffrage, indirectly employed, as the mode and means of election. The Deputies, the General Councils of the Departments, the District Councils, and the delegates from the Communes were all elected by universal manhood suffrage ; these together formed the electoral college which selected the senators. It is as if the members of the Upper House in the British Parliament were representative of the one hundred and seventeen counties of England, Scotland, Ireland, and Wales, county by county, and elected by a body consisting of the members of Parliament for the county, the county councillors, district councillors, town councillors, and delegates from the parish councils. Such a body would obviously possess great authority, its mode of election would prevent it from ever being hopelessly out of sympathy with what is called the Lower House, and would at the same time, even were its powers and functions not formally and legally circumscribed, render impossible any claim to equal say with an assembly springing directly from the bosom of the people.

This is not the place to discuss whether there is here any hint or suggestion of a remedy for the anachronous position of the House of Lords, a position which cannot be defended, among those who believe in representative institutions, by any argument which will bear examination. France had a clear space, and therefore the opportunity and occasion of planning what manner of edifice she would erect on it. But the House of Lords covers the ground, if it does not fulfil the function, of a revising Chamber ; and it is not the way of the British people to raze to the level of the soil an aged institution which has had its use and veneration, and to begin again at the beginning. As for France, we can say with confidence that history has justified the wisdom of those who framed the constitution of 1875.

A provision inserted in the constitution, when in 1884 it was slightly revised, seems to us a delightful sample of the simplicity or, as some would say, the childishness which occasionally characterises the proceedings of French politicians. It was expressly stated that no future revision should be carried to the extent of abrogating the republican form of government. Surely there is here revealed a touching faith in the power of parchment ! This provision had in view a time of real danger to the Republic, and a moment's consideration of the country's history would have suggested that such a stipulation, in the crisis which it contemplated, would scarcely afford a greater safety to the Republic than the reading of the Riot Act or the production of a safe-conduct would protect a solitary European in an

encounter with a horde of naked savages in the heart of Africa.

THE REPUBLIC'S FIGHT FOR LIFE

When the National Assembly had bestowed a definitive form of government upon the country its work was obviously at an end. The new constitution must be put in operation at once in a General Election. It would be an error fatal to the understanding of subsequent history to suppose that the supporters of monarchy, although the republican constitution was their work, abandoned real hopes of the triumph, perhaps close at hand, of their cause. At the General Election of 1876, and at the elections during at least twenty years thereafter, the main issue before the country was whether France was to continue as a Republic. At first the enemies of the Republic showed themselves without disguise, but as the new Government grew in the strength of prescriptive right and of success their boldness diminished, and their ultimate aims were covered as by a thin gauze under such terms as Conservatives, Boulangists, and Nationalists. In the present year (1908) there does not sit in the Chamber of Deputies any member who submitted himself to the electors as a Monarchist. The continuous presence of the constitutional question delayed the organisation of parties into the moulds which they naturally take in countries where the government is settled, as for example in England and the United States. A Republican is not necessarily a democrat; there are, according to personal circumstances and the inevitable and welcome

varieties of mind and temperament graciously provided by nature, Conservative Republicans, Liberal Republicans, Radical Republicans and Socialist Republicans ; but when the very life of the Republic was at stake these regiments of politicians closed their ranks and presented a united front to the common enemy. When the Republic for the moment seems strong and safe, the union of Republicans immediately shows signs of dissolution and the natural lines of cleavage plainly come into view. But let the enemies of the constitution hasten to profit by this slackening of centripetal forces among the Republicans, let them obtain any decided or formidable advantage from the splitting up of the republican strength, and lo ! the defenders of the existing order of things are again, in order to meet the emergency of the day, a single disciplined army. The student of French politics under the Third Republic will witness the not infrequent repetition of this simple and natural phenomenon both in the Chambers and at elections in the country.

THE EFFECT ON THE LEGISLATIVE PRODUCT

So large a portion of the strength of the Republic has been expended in the struggle to secure its own existence, so often, and at such length, have the debates and deliberations of the Chambers turned upon matters cognate to that conflict, that the output of legislation affecting the intimate interests of the people has been restricted. Not that the Republic on this account need wear a countenance of humiliation, penitence, or supplication for for-

givenness. But France has been somewhat in the position of an owner of a fine estate who has been compelled to build a chain of forts round it to protect it from his enemies, and every now and then has had to withdraw his servitors from the labours of the field to the manning of the forts. Much of the steel that should have gone to the making of pruning-hooks and ploughshares has been employed in the fabrication of spears and swords. There have been periods of calm and apparent security, but the enemy, even if in hiding, has ever been on the alert, awaiting his opportunity. He has retired from the walls, but he is not far away. Let stress of difficulty lay hold of the Republic and the hostile forces seem to spring from the ground, arrayed for fight.

It is ever to be remembered, then, that what the Republic has accomplished in the way of legislation has been in spite of harassment and distraction—within and without. Let us try to estimate what would have been the harvest of beneficent legislation in this country if, from the time of Mr. Gladstone's first Ministry until yesterday, there had been a powerful party at work putting in peril the existence of the monarchy, and if we had had as neighbours, without the intervening sea, a mighty Empire which had inflicted upon us the most humiliating defeat we had ever experienced, which suspected and feared a purpose of revenge, which for years was rendered profoundly uneasy and menacing by the rapid building-up of our armed strength and our material prosperity. Such has been the situation of France.

THE ARMY, NAVY, AND CIVIL SERVICE

Further, the efficiency of the fighting force and of the civil administration has been impaired to an appreciable, if not serious, extent by the persistent vitality of the constitutional question. Year after year, following the adoption of the constitution, the Republicans complained that influential and powerful positions in the army and navy, in the judicature and in local government, were held by men who were openly hostile to the existing order of things. Ministers, seeking, as they said, to rally all good citizens to the work of national rehabilitation, and anxious not to divide France into two camps, distinct and openly hostile, proceeded more cautiously with the work of "purification" than was pleasing to the more resolute Republicans. In 1879 two items of the programme on which all the different groups of the Left united were the suspension of judicial irremovability and the weeding out of reactionary functionaries. Of course, all the reactionaries were not Monarchists, and the motives of their opponents no doubt included factious spite as well as zeal for the constitution. It may have been argued that a Conservative was likely to be either a Monarchist by principle or a Monarchist on opportunity, and on this ground the Republicans may have chosen to consider that as Monarchists were reactionaries so reactionaries were Monarchists, and thus have sought to justify their blending of both parties in a common opprobrium. The Republicans rightly grounded their demand for purification on the interests of the State, but the door was opened for

the admission of the vicious practice of promoting men to high positions in the permanent public service, as in the army and navy, not on the ground of character and ability, but of religious and political opinion.

The practice of this abuse has not been confined to any one party. The most recent striking instance is furnished by the delation scandals of 1904, associated with the name of General André as Minister of War. We select it for reprobation just because the malpractices were employed in the alleged interests of the party which has our sympathies. For reasons still involved in obscurity, the secret organisation of Freemasonry has in France become the counterpoise of clericalism, and especially of that most vigorous, mandrake-sort of clericalism, the secret organisation of the Jesuits. By 1904 the clerical and anti-semitic revival, which first stupidly sought to cover up and afterwards wickedly to justify the conspiracy of error, vanity, fraud, forgery, diseased honour, and self-inflicted moral blindness known to history as the Dreyfus affair, had exhausted its strength, and the nation was recovering its ethical sanity. Reaction was in full swing at the War Office. It was revealed that the authorities were in the habit of making inquiries concerning the political opinions, the religious practices, and even the social relations of officers proposed for promotion. Young subalterns belonging to Masonic lodges were set to spy upon their comrades, upon their superior officers, even upon generals and commanders-in-chief. The secret reports of these members of an honourable profession hired to dishonour were carefully tabul-

ated. Certain officers were set down as "suspect," and barred from promotion, certain others were approved and raised above the heads of men superior to them in character and ability. These revelations produced a prodigious scandal. General André, after the manner of a Cabinet Minister in a tight place, wriggled and shuffled, but in the end he was compelled to admit the substantial truth of the allegations. At the same time, it came to light that the Minister of the Interior had sent out a circular recommending the prefects to inquire carefully into the opinions and family relations of every candidate for public office, and, in order to acquire this information, to have a secret agent in every commune. The Government pleaded that these methods of administration were a heritage from the days of clerical and reactionary domination, that they had to deal with pitiless and treacherous adversaries, and that the safety of the Republic was concerned.

A BOLT FROM THE BLUE

The Republic, then, lives in an atmosphere of chronic danger; and here we shall take note only of the crises, of the occasions when peril was pressing and seemed likely to be overwhelming, when the structure of the constitution appeared to be about to sink down into ruin.

The first shock to the new system was delivered from an unexpected quarter, for few persons feared that MacMahon would fail to act loyally the part assigned to him by the constitution. The first General Election under the new order

of things, held early in 1876, resulted in a comfortable majority for the Republicans, and the President entrusted Dufaure with the formation of a Ministry which should have the confidence of the Chamber. The Dufaure Cabinet was short-lived, and was succeeded by a Ministry at the head of which was Jules Simon, who was at least as good a Republican as his predecessor. Shortly afterwards the Catholics of France were deeply stirred by an allocution of Pius IX., who, having been deprived of his temporal sovereignty, enjoined that pressure should be brought to bear upon President and Parliament, in order that the painful situation of the Supreme Pontiff might be more attentively considered and effectual means employed for the removal of the obstacles to his entire independence. The Bishops made those words the text of overheated charges to the faithful, and the clerical newspapers joined in the strident chorus of condemnation and menacing supplication. The Ministry were at this moment, in the commercial interests of France, cultivating relations of especial cordiality with the very Government which, in the eyes of Ultramontane Catholics, had laid unholy and sacrilegious hands upon the inalienable heritage of St. Peter. The Prime Minister, in a circular to the Prefects, censured the attitude of the Bishops and the too zealous faithful; and some anti-clerical papers signalled themselves by the impiety, blasphemy, and lubricity of their comments on the proceedings of Holy Week that year.

The activity of the clericals was made the subject of an animated debate in the Chamber.

Jules Simon was called upon to satisfy the majority beyond all manner of doubt that the sentiments of the Government ran in a contrary direction to those of the Ultramontanes. The rules of the Chamber facilitate wasteful discussions of this sort, from which frequently nothing results but the expression of opinions which have little relation to action, immediate or remote. It is as if the House of Commons had debated Lord Halifax's visit to Rome to secure from the Pope the recognition of Anglican orders. Jules Simon, while professing a profound and sincere respect for religion and the clergy, announces the determination of the Government to suppress all demonstrations which are opposed to the interests of the country and the laws of the Republic. The idea of intervention with Italy in behalf of the Papacy is set aside; the Government have no intention of committing any act which might be prejudicial to the peace of Europe. It was in the course of this debate that Gambetta, using the words of a friend, made his famous declaration: *Le cléricalisme, voilà l'ennemi*. The debate ended with the acceptance by the Government of a resolution calling for the putting into execution of various anti-clerical enactments which had fallen into disuse. This was on the 4th of May.

The President, who, though clerical in his sympathies, had expressed to Jules Simon his satisfaction with his speech, was incensed with the rigorous language of the resolution adopted by the Chamber, and was annoyed by the Prime Minister's failure to withstand the extreme opinions represented by Gambetta. We know

now, what was not public information at the time, that he had resolved immediately to dismiss Jules Simon, but was persuaded by the Duc de Broglie, whom he intended to make Prime Minister, of the unwisdom, in the interests of the Church itself, of coming into conflict with the Chamber undisguisedly on the religious question.

The opportunity that MacMahon sought came within a fortnight, when the Chamber voted the abrogation of the law relating to the press which had been passed in the dying days of the National Assembly. The President complained that on this, as on a previous occasion, Jules Simon had surrendered to views of which in the Cabinet Council he had expressed his disapproval. "This attitude of the head of the Ministry," said MacMahon, "raises the question whether he has conserved over the Chamber the influence necessary to make his views prevail. An explanation is indispensable." Jules Simon understood at once what was desired of him: he resigned. The President had driven from office a Ministry which had not been condemned by the vote of the deputies. It will hardly be denied that his conduct, even if it can be brought within the letter of the constitution, was an offence to the spirit of the new institutions.

It was at first apprehended that the old soldier meditated a *coup d'état* and the government of the nation independently of the Chamber. But, indeed, methods of violence and dishonour were repugnant to his nature. He called to power a Ministry which represented only a minority, and which, when informed that it did not possess

the confidence of the Chamber, insolently replied that neither did the Chamber possess the confidence of the Ministry! Meanwhile the President was following the procedure prescribed by the constitution for dissolving the Chamber of Deputies with the consent of the Senate. The Government which "makes the election"—to use a French phrase—has titanic facilities of undue influence and corruption at its disposal; never were these more widely or more unscrupulously employed than at the General Election of 1877. The object of the Government was that the composition of the new Chamber should render a restoration of the monarchy easy and certain; the whole hierarchy of functionaries, from the prefects to the humble schoolmasters in the remote rural communes, were made to understand that the eyes of the Government were upon them, and that their retention in their positions would depend on the measure of zeal they displayed in the interests of the President's policy. For MacMahon, forgetting the analogy of his constitutional position with that of the British sovereign, openly took a side in the contest. The Government designated the candidates who alone were authorised to use the name of the President.

The country was under no illusion as to the real cause of the rupture with Jules Simon. The stroke of the President was a *coup de prêtres*, the answer of the Ultramontanes to the resolution of the Chamber against Ultramontanism and the Jesuits. And just at this time the anti-clerical feeling of the nation had been provoked into furious flame by the refusal of the Archbishop

of Paris to allow the funeral rites of Thiers to be conducted in the Madeleine. Clerical sentiment was clearly in violent collision with national sentiment. That the Church should withhold from the remains of the Liberator of the Territory, the grand old man to whom the country was so grateful, of whom the country was so proud, the dearest honours that it was in her power to render, was an affront to the people scarcely to be borne.

The election contest was conducted with great virulence of feeling. The Republicans, in spite of the bribes and threats employed by the Government, were confident of conclusive victory. When the verdict of the people was made known, said Gambetta, the President would be compelled to submit to it or resign. The remark seems so inoffensive as to be indeed a truism; unless the Marshal meant to extricate himself from the difficulty by a *coup d'état*, what other course was possible to him, in the event of a rebuff at the elections, except submission or resignation? and Gambetta was not to be held as guilty of insult because he had not taken the possibility of fraud and violence into account. Nevertheless, for this alleged offence against the dignity of the Chief Magistrate, the most popular man in France was fined £80 and sentenced to three months' imprisonment, but he did not pay the money and he did not go to gaol.

The anticipations of the Republicans were justified at the polls. The results cannot be better described than in the homely words—a sharp smack in the face for the President. The honest old soldier, though he made shift for a time with

an extra-parliamentary Ministry of which the Chamber refused to take any notice, perceived that wisdom and patriotism demanded that he should return to a constitutional spirit. "The exercise of the right of dissolution," he acknowledged, "is in effect nothing but a method of supreme consultation before a judge from whom there is no appeal." When within two years afterwards he was confronted by a responsible Minister with recommendations for alterations in the *personnel* of the army to which, in the interests of national safety, he could not in good conscience consent, he resigned his high office. No President has ventured to repeat the daring act of dismissing a Cabinet which had not been defeated in the Chamber and of seeking relief from an uncongenial Minister by an appeal to the nation.

A HANDSOME MOUNTEBANK

For more than ten years after the crisis produced by MacMahon's dismissal of Jules Simon the Republic lived in comparative security. The next alarming assault on its peace is associated with the name of General Boulanger. The further this episode recedes into history the more difficult will it be to realise what there was in this handsome mountebank which made him a formidable danger to the State. He had done well in his profession, but he had not given indications of more signal ability than the average possessor of his rank. Distinction had not been his, either in administrative work or on the field of battle. He was a man of overflowing vanity, supremely

skilful in the multitudinous theatrical posturings calculated to win the popularity of the streets and in the elegancies which captivate drawing-rooms. In these accomplishments there is indeed a rare ability, but not of the kind which in itself should incline a sanely regulated community to give a man a high position in the State.

Boulanger first made public demonstration of his insubordinate, spread-eagle, popularity-hunting disposition when stationed at Tunis in 1885. An Italian officer had insulted French officers; for this offence he was duly punished by the civil tribunal; Boulanger publicly proclaimed to his troops, and so to the world, his sense of the utter inadequacy of the penalty!

In the early part of 1886 he became Minister of War in the Freycinet Cabinet. A signal incident in his term of office was the expulsion from the army of the Duc d'Aumale, under whom he had formerly served, and to whom as his superior he had addressed letters breathing the spirit of a suppliant courtier rather than that of a junior in rank frankly eager for promotion. Boulanger first denied and then admitted this correspondence.

His colleagues noted with apprehension that the Minister of War diligently sought opportunities of display, and was becoming a hero at double-quick time. French politicians are peculiarly jealous of overtopping eminences in the field of public life. They are too ready to place bounds to the popularity and power of their statesmen, too ready to think that a man who has received these in overflowing measure is aiming at a dictatorship. Illustrations of this phenomenon

are not far to seek. France owed so much to Thiers that the National Assembly was not willing that he should remain in power too long. Gambetta was for twelve years the most popular man in the country,—when he spoke it was the voice of France that the world heard; but the very excess of his popularity cheated him of high office, year after year the fear of his dictatorship paralysed the partiality of his friends and admirers, and when at length he became Prime Minister he held the office for only ten weeks. In a period subsequent to that with which we are now dealing President Félix Faure cultivated a swaggering air, aped the grand style of a hereditary potentate, and with it all won great popularity; the consequence was that many politicians and many members of the quiet solid bourgeoisie were not at all easy in their minds about his intentions. There was some timid chatter—“absurd no doubt,” said the fearful ones, “but perhaps not so absurd as it seems”—about a new Empire!

When Boulanger perceived that he was feared he knew that he was formidable. He had the good fortune to incur the enmity of Bismarck. Boulanger, as War Minister, was spirited and prancing, and the German Chancellor, ever ready to seize a cause of quarrel with France, professed to be alarmed. If the thought did occur to him that his complaint against Boulanger merely added to the prestige of a man whose popularity was an embarrassment, if not an actual peril, to the Republic, the reflection would have afforded him nothing but satisfaction. France distracted and weak was a more comfortable neighbour than France united and strong. When

Boulangier quitted office, in May 1887, his faction were able to contend with plausibility that he had been sacrificed to the fear of Bismarck.

The ex-Minister now entered on a campaign of scarcely disguised opposition to the existing order. A candidature for dictatorship cannot be avowed as such ; it was necessary for Boulangier to formulate a programme, and gather a party round it. He demanded the dissolution of the Chamber, and an appeal to the nation with a view to a revision of the constitution. He soon found himself surrounded by the implacably discontented of all parties. They believed that the continuance of the agitation would result in a general scrimmage ; each side hoped that in this *mêlée* the Republic would be trampled under foot, and that the end of the conflict would find their side bending over prostrate foes. That explains why Boulangier found supporters among Monarchists, Clericals, and extreme Radicals alike. The partisans of royalty loved to see in him a possible Monk who would restore the King ; the Jesuits hoped for advantages to the Church in payment of their support ; and irreconcilables, like Rochefort, fomented the propaganda because they could not forgive the Republic for having destroyed the Commune. The Government, hard put to it, committed in their desperation an act of dubious wisdom ; they placed the General on the retired list. If he had won the favour of the soldiers, this measure of discipline would be powerless to wean their affections from him ; rather would it increase his mischievous influence over them, and by making him eligible for membership in the Chamber it furnished him

with the possibility of making very effective popular demonstrations against the Government.

The hour of doom seemed to have struck when in January 1889 Boulanger was elected for Paris by an impressive majority. Even men of great faith in the destinies of France despaired. The curtain was being rung down upon the Third Republic! The truth was that—to change the figure—the flame of the candle had made a last violent splutter just before going out. Evidences of a conspiracy against the State were discovered, the General fled the country, but in his absence his trial, exciting mere spasmodic interest and dragging its weary length throughout the summer, went on, ending in a verdict of guilty and a sentence of imprisonment for life. It was the year of an International Exhibition in Paris, and so shameful is the levity of many Parisians, in the judgment of sober-minded Frenchmen, that the fêtes of the great show in the Champ de Mars quite put out of their minds—so we are asked to believe—all energetic thoughts about the cause of their gallant General! However that be, certain it is that Boulangism expired that same year. Although the Duchesse d'Uzes, who was a particular friend of the convicted conspirator, contributed £120,000 to the joint electoral fund of the Royalists and Boulangists, and although money was spent on a scarcely less lavish scale by other eminent enemies of the Republic, the appeal to the people secured the safety of the State once again. The result was: Republicans, 359; Reactionaries, 211. Two years later Boulanger died by his own hand at the grave of his mistress near Brussels.

CORRUPTION IN PUBLIC LIFE

So long as only a generation or two separates representatives of houses that have ruled in France from members thereof that have sat upon the throne the Republic necessarily remains on strict probation. Her existence is bound up with the honesty of her public life, the efficiency of her administration, and the success of her encounters in peace or in war with foreign Powers. The conditions of her life are more rigorous than those under which most other Governments exist, but there should be a powerful incentive to good conduct in the knowledge that a lapse which in other countries might have trifling consequences may in France be fatal.

Lamentable and disquieting as were the breaches of integrity revealed by the Panama scandals of 1892 and 1893, it was to the credit and advantage of the French people that they immediately perceived the existence of the Republic to be involved, and demanded thorough probing of the fester in the body politic. The Government had granted large sums of money to aid in the cutting of a canal through the isthmus of Panama under the direction of the famous engineer, Ferdinand de Lesseps. In order to obtain these loans the Canal Company had bribed a large number of deputies and public functionaries and had deceived the people. Charles Baihaut, Minister of Public Works in 1886, had demanded £40,000, and had received £15,000, as payment for his support of a lottery loan. He was sentenced to a fine of £30,000, five years' imprisonment, and loss of civil rights. Other persons to

whom guilt was clearly brought home received punishments which did not always, it is true, fit the crime, but which nevertheless stigmatised them indelibly. The Ministry was twice changed in the course, and by reason, of the public commotion created by the revelations. There was the inevitable sequel to incidents of this kind, the feeling which *will* arise in the reaction of lassitude and grief that follows explosions of public indignation, that perhaps after all certain persons had been dealt with too severely; perhaps, though indeed guilty themselves, they had been made the scapegoats for sins more heinous than their own; perhaps discreet and cunning rogues had escaped the punishment which they had more richly earned than others to whom it had been awarded. But certainly the Republic emerged from the ordeal both purified and strengthened.

THE HONOUR OF THE ARMY

If the Panama scandal gave the French nation just cause to fear the leaven of corruption in public life, the Dreyfus affair, which produced a more prolonged and more perilous commotion, cast something more than doubt upon the honour and efficiency of high officers in the army. The story is long and complicated, and we do not propose to enter into details. Alfred Dreyfus, a Jew, was a captain of artillery. Towards the end of 1894 he was brought before a court-martial on a charge of treason. It was alleged that he had sold military secrets to a foreign Power—common report named Germany. The evidence against him was a cover-

ing letter, declared to be from his pen, enumerating documents which had been, or were to be, supplied. Dreyfus denied that he was the author of this letter; but his judges refused to believe him, and sentenced him to solitary imprisonment for life. There is no ground for saying that they consciously departed from integrity, but it is not ungenerous to suggest that they might have weighed the evidence with greater scrupulosity had not the accused been an unpopular officer—and a Jew. Dreyfus underwent the shame and anguish of public degradation from his rank in the square of the Military School at Paris. The spectators cursed him to his face, and called out for his death. A sympathetic eye-witness declared that the man convicted of treason was the only person involved in the poignant ceremony who behaved with dignity. He was deported to the Ile du Diable, a swampy, unhealthy settlement upon the coast of French Guiana.

Dreyfus never ceased to protest his innocence. He had two sweet children and a devoted wife. She begged that she might be allowed to share the living death of her husband, but her petition could not be granted. From that hour, however, at the entreaty of her husband, and for the sake of the children who bore his now dishonoured name, she laboured for the righting of what she believed and knew to be a great wrong. It was publicly stated, and not authoritatively denied, that in the room to which the judges retired to consider their decision a document was read to them which had not been submitted to the accused or his counsel. This single fact was enough, in accordance with good

sense and justice, to render the trial illegal and the sentence void. But Dreyfus was a Jew, and many of the men holding influential positions at the War Office had been prepared for the army examinations at Jesuit academies where they were taught to hate the Jews, to boycott them, to believe them capable of any iniquity.

There was, however, at least one righteous man in the French army. Colonel Picquart—a name which will be held in increasing veneration by succeeding generations of Frenchmen, by all of them at any rate who love truth and cherish the place which their country has occupied in the family of civilised nations—became head of the Intelligence Department of the War Office, the section of that institution which deals with the category of cases in which the Dreyfus affair had a place. Picquart saw reason to suspect that a certain Major Esterhazy was playing the traitor, and when he communicated his surmises to his superiors he was authorised to continue his investigations. A very short step took Picquart a further grade in his suspicions; he felt justified in stating the probability that Esterhazy had committed the infamy for which Dreyfus was suffering shame and punishment. His superiors now first bade him be cautious, then they called him to a halt. *It was not to be thought of that the War Office should confess to having committed an atrocious blunder.* “The honour of the army” was at stake. That a man who had been illegally convicted, who was probably innocent, should daily suffer torment worse, tenfold worse, than the bitterness of death; that he should be torn for ever from his wife and children; that every one who bore his



Photo. Ch. Gerschel

MAJOR DREYFUS

name should be put to an open shame—all this was lamentable, no doubt, but “the honour of the army” was at stake. This inverted conception of honour, “honour rooted in dishonour,” which owes a great part of its existence to two admitted defects of the French character, vanity and want of humour, was the upas-tree which during four years—1896, 1897, 1898, and 1899—bore an abundant harvest of lies, fraud, forgery, and all manner of unrighteousness. At the end were there any soldiers so poor in honour as the officers of the French army?

Esterhazy demanded a court-martial; his request was granted. The prosecutor and the accused man arranged the procedure between them; the trial was a farce; many persons, in the ordinary situations of life intelligent and upright, but now under the domination of “the honour of the army,” were quite willing that it should be a farce. Esterhazy was acquitted, and when he emerged into the street, leaning on the arm of his mistress, was acclaimed by the huzzas of the crowd. Picquart, when his pertinacity in the interests of justice had become inconvenient to the War Office, had been sent on a mission to Tunis and placed in the forefront of peril. His superiors would not have been sorry had his bones been left to bleach in the sands of the desert. When he returned he went about with his life in his hands, for the populace was furious at his aspersions on “the honour of the army.”

The demand for the revision of the Dreyfus trial had by this time won the support of a handful of influential men. The question was brought before the Chamber; Minister of War after Minister of War rose to declare that Dreyfus had been

justly condemned, and declined to go beyond the *chose jugée*, as if the *chose jugée* can ever be pleaded at the bar of history before the tribunal of civilisation, as if this plea would not justify the condemnation of Jesus Christ! Cavaignac, one of the egregious succession, read to the Chamber a document which, he said, demonstrated the guilt of Dreyfus beyond possibility of doubt. Picquart offered to prove that this document was a forgery. Colonel Henry, who had succeeded Picquart at the Intelligence Department, was taxed with the crime, denied, lied, equivocated, shuffled, finally confessed. He was conveyed to the military prison of the Cherche-Midi, and next day was found dead in his cell, his throat cut from left to right and from right to left and a razor lying by his side. There was a suspicion that he had done away with himself, or had been despatched, at the orders of men in higher command in whose interests he had committed the forgery. Picquart, on the point of being carried off to solitary confinement in the same prison, publicly proclaimed that if *his* dead body was found in his cell it meant that he had been assassinated.

The death of the forger Henry greatly added to the number of the Dreyfusards and the strength of their case. Among the most valiant champions of truth and justice was Emile Zola, who, seven months before the Henry forgery, had published a memorable letter setting forth the history of the case, proclaiming and denouncing the iniquity of the Generals and demanding revision. A few lines in which Zola charged the Esterhazy court-martial with having acquitted the accused

to order were extracted from this very long document and made the basis of a criminal prosecution for insulting the army. The anti-Dreyfusard newspapers published the names and addresses of the jury, so that these "good and true" men might be under no misapprehension as to their duty and the consequences which would ensue if they failed to do it. Uniformed officers swarmed in court; they made long speeches to the jury from the witness-box, and threatened them and the nation with the resignation of the army chiefs if Zola was not found guilty. Was there ever a more shameful riot, a more wanton carnival, of injustice? Zola was, of course, condemned, but the trial was quashed on the ground of a technical irregularity. He was prosecuted again; this time he did not appear personally. His counsel requested that not a few isolated sentences, but the context, and indeed the whole letter, should be taken into consideration; when this was refused he withdrew from the case. Zola was sentenced to a year's imprisonment and a heavy fine; but he was now in England, and he never paid the money nor went to gaol. When he returned to France the whole face of the Dreyfus question was altered.

Evidence of the incompetency and moral obliquity of high officers at the War Office had been heaped up so high that it was no longer possible to treat the question of revising the trial as unworthy of consideration. The highest tribunal of France, in full court assembled, after a consideration extending over four months, cancelled the sentence of the court-martial which had found Dreyfus guilty. It was within the competency

of this court to declare him innocent, but it preferred to give the military authorities an opportunity of restoring France to her honourable position in the estimation of the civilised world. Dreyfus, who in his little hut enclosed at a few paces within a palisade on his desolate island, had remained ignorant, for the most part, of the activity on his behalf, and of the disruption of the State that his case seemed likely to produce, was brought back to Rennes, tried by a court-martial of seven officers, and in manifest opposition to the evidence found guilty. Five of the judges were against the prisoner, but as two were for him he was granted the advantage of "extenuating circumstances"! Ah! how great a step forward France would make if she only perceived that she has little reason to pride herself on her methods of justice!

The whole world cried "Fie!" on France. Civilisation saw in the conduct of the Rennes court-martial an inversion of all natural law; she believed that France was living in moral anarchy, and for a moment was disposed to stand off from her as from "a leper white as snow." It is doubtful, however, whether the verdict was meant to have relation to the merits of the case, rather was it an act of satisfaction to the chiefs of the army; and the President of the Republic so far conceded to the conscience of humanity as to grant Dreyfus a pardon. The grievously wronged man, "the martyr of the century," as he had styled himself, accepted it as an instalment of justice. He announced his intention of not resting content until he was completely rehabilitated, until his honour was cleansed

of every stain, until he and his children and all those who bore his name could hold up their heads in the world. In 1906 the fullest reparation within the power of man was made to him. He was declared innocent by the highest court of France, and restored to his rank in the army. And at this moment (January 1908) General Picquart is Minister of War. A threadbare tag declares that "the whirligig of time has his revenges." The case of Picquart is a palmary illustration of this commonplace.

We are conscious that we have done no sort of justice to the dramatic situations of the Dreyfus affair. But our outline will suffice to bring to mind the details which but recently were so familiar and of such absorbing interest to our readers. We are more concerned to ask—what is the interpretation of this strange tale? What can be said to explain or palliate the conduct of the French people? for throughout the greater part of this time of stress the mass of the nation was as zealous for "the honour of the army" as the Generals themselves. Had the moral sense of the greater portion of the nation collapsed into ruin, and the ashes been swept away as the ashes of Jeanne d'Arc were swept into the Seine?

The Dreyfus affair, as by a convulsion of nature, made a vertical fissure in French society. The party of the Dreyfusards was conspicuous by the large number of men of high intellectual standing who had placed themselves in its ranks. The Dreyfus case erected a moral watershed in France. It should have served to remind the nation that God has a right hand and a left. It divided French-

men into sheep and goats. It was a winnowing fan which thoroughly purged the floor of the granary. He who had the intelligence and the opportunity to examine the matter and took the wrong side was not merely guilty of a single isolated sin, he supplied conclusive indications of the presence in his nature of moral disease which had struck deep roots before Dreyfus was heard of, and had been working continuous mischief unseen. A great and notable sin may be committed on the mad impulse of a moment, as it seems, but we do not know of the many, less heinous, secret sins which have been sapping the foundations of character, until the outwardly fair and solid structure, in the twinkling of an eye, falls into hideous ruin.

It is the humblest measure of charity to France to believe that the great majority of the anti-Dreyfusards had never made a calm and independent examination of the matter. Minister after Minister, and men occupying the highest positions in the army, had declared again and again, in full knowledge of all the evidence accumulated by the Dreyfusards, in spite of the revelations of illegality and forgery, that Dreyfus was guilty, that he had been justly condemned.

Besides, "the honour of the army" was involved. That was enough for the masses of the people. France regarded her soldiers with peculiar feelings of tenderness, affection, and hope. The garrison of a German town may march through the main street and hardly attract a single curious man or woman to the door to look upon them. But a turn-out of the troops, even in a French town

where the scene is familiar, brings men, women, and children on to the pavements, and not a few eyes are dimmed with tears as they gaze upon the dear, brave lads. The French army, in its last great warfare, suffered overwhelming defeat; therefore France is anxious to show that she is not ashamed of her soldiers, she desires to comfort them as a mother comforts her son in failure or sorrow; she loves her soldiers because they have been humiliated; she longs to convince them that she still believes in their bravery and skill, and has high hopes of them for the future.

It is the rarest thing in the world to meet a Frenchman who, having performed his military service in the ranks, declares that he was happy or comfortable during that period of his life; his term with the colours is one of the things that the average Frenchman tries to forget; but he will be forward to contend, apart from considerations of national necessity, that it is good for others that they, in their turn, should undergo the hardships and discomforts that he in his day had to pass through. The pricks against which we have kicked may become, once we are released from them and the heat of our irritation is cooled, valuable goads of discipline, activity, and skill to others who have yet to endure their sharpness.

The army is the darling of France. She could not bear to think that her dearest child was a stupid scoundrel. She had staked her heart's treasure on her soldiers; she could not endure the suspicion that she had staked and lost; to call in question the honour and competency of the army chiefs was to drag her to the edge of a black

abyss of horror and compel her to look therein. But if Dreyfus was innocent? What of that? Is it not hard to forgive persons who have been injured by those whom we love? It was indeed seriously contended that the innocent Dreyfus should have been content, as a patriot, to bear torture and the eternal infamy of his name rather than impair "the honour of the army."

The malefactors in high places well understood the feeling of the nation, and hoped to find in it an impregnable rampart behind which to hide themselves from disgrace and punishment. The anti-Semites, the clericals, and the enemies of the State, who knew that a rupture between the army and the nation would destroy the Republic, joined in the campaign against Dreyfus with a concentrated strength and fury more effective by far than the clumsy violence of the Generals,—the height of their ferocity and the depth of their baseness were alike unparalleled. Unless one could persuade oneself that a repetition of their infamy was impossible for at least a generation, one would turn sick with misery and terror in thinking upon the future of France. It is no blasphemy to compare their conduct with what is known in the realm of theology as the sin against the Holy Ghost. He who has committed that sin has looked with unscaled eyes upon the face of truth and said deliberately, "It is a lie." He has so hardened his heart that he cannot repent. That is the secular characteristic of the clericalism of Rome; it never repents. It will be a lasting memory of poignant shame to all those who profess and call themselves Christians that the voice of

the Church, which to ninety-nine out of every hundred Frenchmen represents the faith of the Gospel, was loudest in the chorus of wicked men; that the most conspicuous exponents and defenders of Christian ethics in France, at a time when good and evil in their naked strength were locked in deadly grapple, were men who had rejected the Christian faith. But had they not confounded the Catholicism of the Assumptionist Fathers with the Christianity of Jesus Christ?

The comforting circumstances of this mournful episode are that it was mainly by the ready self-sacrifice of a French officer that the true honour of the French army was redeemed, the officer who had been hounded almost to death because he had assailed the bastard counterfeit, and that France has after all returned to a right mind.

THE GOLDEN LIGHT OF OTHER DAYS

What remains of Royalism in France is merely a sentiment, not unworthy, but not energising. There are families in which the tradition of fidelity to the Royal Family is the badge of race; but there is no fierceness of propagandist zeal in their opinion. They are influenced in great part by an imaginative regard for old days, by that affection for the chivalrous past which comes upon all of us, in certain moods, in a sad and passionate yearning. The days in which we live are grey and cold, or hot and dusty; their problems wrap us close like a garment of damp cloud. We are in bonds to our own times. But the light of days that have gone into far past history seems so

clear and pure, a wide heaven of blue spreads over them; our spirits as they move among the old times are liberated from urgent harassings and from the clogging conditions of weariness, anxiety, health, climate, and temperature which weigh us down in the midst of the labours of the actual day. Past times always seem so much more simple, so much less entangled than the hour in which we stand; the view they present to souls momentarily liberated from the actualities of the present is oftentimes full of colour, romance, and winning beauty. It was the old ideal France of chivalry, with its powerful and radiant monarchy, its fair ladies, its gallant men and cavaliers, its contented and prosperous peasants, its pious, learned, and devoted priests, with the throne and the altar dividing between them the heart of the nation, with that generous loyalty to rank and sex which had produced a noble equality and all the unbought grace of life, when each one accepted the grade of society to which he was born without shame and without vexation, when it was a noble pleasure to render obedience, and when the highly born were as proud of their responsibilities as of their privileges—this was the France which warmed the hearts of the praisers of old times. What Macaulay has said of the Cavaliers of England may be applied in part to the Royalists of France. The venerable names of history have thrown a potent spell over them; their hearts swell within them as they reflect on the indignities inflicted on the old banner which has waved in so many battles over the heads of their fathers and on the altars at which they have received the hands of

their brides. Such a France as is depicted in the eye of their hearts has never existed—of that there is no doubt. In their vision there is almost as little substance as in the buried cities with golden spires and sweet chiming bells which the Breton fisherman sees and hears near the rocky shores of his own rugged and romantic land.

CHAPTER XIII

UNDER THE THIRD REPUBLIC

SOME MISCELLANEOUS NOTES

THE lava which, outpoured in a molten state, spreads terror and destruction, becomes, when time has cooled its fury and attrition has converted it into dust, a fertilising agency of rare power and graciousness. The fields which have been impregnated with it yield harvests of wondrous beauty and healthful copiousness. This act of nature is called to mind when one considers the history of France in the years immediately following the war with Prussia. Her military force had been all but annihilated, she had incurred an enormous debt in her own behalf, and she had undertaken to pay an indemnity of £200,000,000 to the conqueror. And this loss of material strength, this bleeding to the white of the body politic, might have seemed even of small account compared with the moral catastrophe which might have been anticipated, the breaking of the springs of hope, courage, and energy in the delicate mechanism of society. But, as it quickly appeared, Germany could not conquer the soul of France, could not conquer the belief of other

nations in the invincibility of that soul. The loans of unprecedented magnitude which it was necessary to raise were subscribed many times over in France and abroad. Before the close of 1871, the most gloomy year in her history, France was manifesting the elasticity of spirit which belongs only to bounding health of soul. The last German soldier recrossed the frontier in September 1873, a year before the stipulated limit. France raised herself out of the abyss as on the wings of the morning, and again presented a gracious, serene, radiant, undaunted front to the world. The rapidity of her new growth surprised the world out of breath. It seemed—to change the figure violently—as if one could hear the corn growing.

As for Bismarck, surprise is an inadequate description of the emotion with which he gazed on this spectacle. He was dumbfounded and exasperated, literally out of his senses. He had thought that France would go limping for at least a generation, and he was profoundly disquieted to observe that she would soon be in possession once again of her giant stride. He determined, therefore, to seek a quarrel, to go to war again, and crush France out of political existence. In 1875 he was on the point of putting the design into execution : the Emperor William I., shrewd old man as he was, had for a time scarcely scented the wicked purpose of his Chancellor, but in a moment his eyes were opened and the Empire was saved from a great crime. The Emperor of Russia, the Grand Duke of Baden, and Queen Victoria had interposed, not so much for the sake of France as for the

credit of humanity, and to them must be attributed part of the praise of sparing the world a monumental disaster.

Bismarck's pretext for complaint was the activity of France in the reconstitution of her military strength. Under the Second Empire the army bore the character as much of an appanage of the Emperor as of a national institution. The constitutional bodies, possessing under Napoleon only a simulacrum of power, excited only feeble interest, except in the last few years of the Empire; the young bureaucracy could not enjoy the authority which comes from efficiency and prescriptive right; the Empire was the personal will of the Emperor, and the army was his. The Republic, following in the path of the conqueror, adopted the principle of universal compulsory service, the principle of "the nation in arms." The term at first was five years, then it was reduced to three, and in 1906 was brought down to two. At the beginning young men in training for the ministry and the liberal professions were excused a part of the service, or were exempted from the duty which was laid upon the rest of the nation's manhood, but in the latest enactments exceptions have all but vanished.

The cost of the war, the loans for the payment of the indemnity, the great increase of the charges for the army and navy, and the general and seemingly irresistible tendency of administration to become more costly have saddled the nation with an appalling burden of taxation. The National Debt of France is the largest in the world. She bears the load of her pecuniary obligations

with marvellous, indeed with heroic, patience. "Everything is taxed in France" is a common observation which approaches only too closely to the absolute truth. The most notable increase in recent years has been in the duty on alcohol, which now stands at 8s. 4d. per gallon. The object of bearing so heavily upon alcohol was the conciliation of the winegrowers and the promotion of temperance by encouraging the consumption of what are called "hygienic liquors"—wine, beer, and cider. At the same time a limitation has been imposed upon the ancient privilege of landowners to escape taxation on the brandy and other spirits raised from their own crops for consumption in and among their own households. These privileges had led to gross and obvious abuses, some landowners paying, or partly paying, their work-people by means of brandy, reckoned at the market price.

The commercial treaties with England, Belgium, and other countries, founded on the principle of reciprocity, and set down by many publicists among the praiseworthy acts of the third Napoleon's administration, had always been regarded with hostility by the manufacturing interests. Thiers, the most weighty member of the Opposition to the Empire in its closing days, was a strong Protectionist. When he became the head of the State, at a time when the State was looking anxiously round for new sources of revenue, he naturally bestowed the warm beams of his encouragement upon proposals for the increase of import duties. It is so easy to think of this method of raising money. No ingenuity is called for. The mischief

of the simplicity is that it is apt to discourage the careful thinking out of ultimate consequences. We incline to rest content in the thought that the foreigner pays. However, this is not a convenient place for the discussion of "tariff reform." It is for us simply to note that France is now more than ever a Protectionist country, like Germany, the United States, or the Commonwealth of Australia. It has on occasion been a difficult and delicate operation to maintain the balance even between conflicting interests. For example, in 1884 Lyons demanded that the thread silk necessary for its trade should for a time at least be admitted free of duty. Immediately the weavers of Lille and Roubaix protested that this measure would be the ruin of their industry; and accordingly nothing was done. Incidents of this sort have not been rare. In the autumn of 1897 the price of bread, owing to the poor harvest and protective laws, rose to 9d. the 4-lb. loaf, and there was great distress among the masses. As to the general consequences of Protection in France, we shall only remark that one of the most persistent complaints among her common people at the present moment is that the price of food, clothing, and implements of all sorts has increased out of all proportion to the rise in wages.

We desire to propound to our readers a question of curious, if not unimportant, interest relating to finance. The French, as a nation, are conspicuous for the carefulness and economy with which they manage their private affairs; on the other hand, there is scarcely a session in which the consideration of the national budget is not dis-

gracefully scamped by the Chamber of Deputies. The effectual control of the House of Commons over finance has in recent years markedly diminished, but this decadence is not so well ascertained as in the French Chamber. It is true that in the latter case the budget, before coming to the deputies for detailed consideration, is examined by a Commission of the Chamber which submits a report, but this does not justify the nation's representatives in taking lightly their collective responsibility. The Chamber gives its consent too readily to the issue of loans, unduly influenced, consciously or subconsciously, by the idea that these loans offer the people a good and safe investment for their money ; and it is too often required to grant supplementary budgets. The methods of national book-keeping are defective to a degree that would not be tolerated in a nation of shopkeepers. Years sometimes elapse before a definitive statement of the accounts of any particular year are presented to the nation.

The paradox is capable of a simple explanation. In the dry discussions of finance there is little scope for the manifestation of personal characteristics which, more than the intrinsic importance of the subjects discussed, gives to debate its interest, little scope for the flamboyant oratorical displays in which the French luxuriate. Among the deepest impressions made upon a student of the parliamentary proceedings in France is a sense of the large proportion of time devoted to academic discussions, or rather to discussions which have in view mainly the purposes of propaganda in the country. The spreading of political opinions by

means of public meetings in all the various localities is not carried out to the same extent in France as in England. The rules of the French Chamber are more loose or, if the reader will, more flexible than those which regulate debate in the House of Commons, and deputies find it easy and convenient to use the tribune for purposes which in this country are served by the platform. These generous facilities for exhibitions of rhetoric tend to discourage the habit of close, prolonged, fatiguing attention to the details of financial business. Whether or not this proffered explanation be regarded as satisfactory, there is no doubt that the fact is as we have stated.

Germany is distinguished not less for her military efficiency than for the general intelligence of her people. She is the best educated country in Europe. Whether by accident or design, France has emulated her example in the latter as in the former respect, with modifications due to her history and circumstances. The education of the people has been one of the dearest interests of the Third Republic. Elementary instruction is free, universal, obligatory, and rigidly secular. Moral instruction is included in the curriculum of the schools, but the enemies of secular education declare that they cannot find any satisfaction in that fact; for in their view such teaching, unless given under clerical control, is not merely deficient, but positively mischievous, nay,—declared the Duc de Broglie in 1880,—even atheistic. The Duc proposed, during a debate in the Senate on a Bill relating to the secondary education of girls, that, religious teaching being barred, moral in-

struction should also be disallowed. This view was shared only by a small minority of his fellows. The attempt of Jules Simon two years later to place "Duty towards God" in the forefront of subjects in elementary schools received scarcely more encouragement than the Duc de Broglie's proposal to suppress "moral instruction." Jules Simon supported his demand on the ground that some consolation was necessary for the less fortunate classes, as also for soldiers who marched to the fight with "God and Fatherland" on their lips. These words are an expression of that detestable opportunism, now seldom avowed but not yet extinct, which waves aside the truth or falsehood of religion, but insists upon the national support of it because it helps to keep the poor people quiet and patient under poverty, suffering and—wrong. A brief account of the conflicts with clericalism in which the Republic has been engaged during the evolution of her education policy finds a more appropriate place in the chapter which follows on "the Church and the Republic."

The men who reorganised French society after the great war acted in the spirit of Gambetta, who declared that public instruction should be the passion of legislators. They did not all share his aspiration that education should be free from the primary school to the university. The grant from the National Exchequer towards the cost of elementary education rose from £440,000 in 1870 to £1,200,000 in 1879, while within the same period the contribution for higher education had been doubled. The figures are modest, but they show that increasingly the nation's representatives

were becoming conscious of one of their first responsibilities; and the amounts have, of course, been greatly augmented since. The State subvention for higher education is still, however, well under £1,000,000. But, however excellent the education law, the administration of it leaves much to be desired. The ratio of illiteracy in France, though education has been compulsory for a quarter of a century, is 40 per 1000 men, and 60 per 1000 women; whereas Germany has only 4 illiterates per 1000 of the population. These figures should goad the energies of the French Ministry of Public Instruction. The most recently published statistics show that of 24,000 conscripts summoned in October last in the Seine contingent—the section which includes Paris—67 could neither read nor write, 92 could read only, and 337 could scarcely be said to know how to read and write.

The tumultuous discords of capital and labour seem to have been as frequent and as difficult of settlement under the Third Republic as during the same period in England; while, on the other hand, they more often give rise to serious disturbances of the public peace than on this side of the Channel. Not infrequently there is an unpleasant suspicion of the bogus element in French industrial conflicts. The workpeople are too obviously, in the language of the streets, "trying it on," they want to see just how much they can squeeze out of their oppressors! Matchmakers employed in Government factories went on strike for more wages in 1895. They declared that certain new regulations had diminished their power of earning.

Careful investigation was made by a commission, and it was proved beyond a shadow of doubt that wages had risen during the twelve months preceding. A strike of Paris omnibus men in the same year was obviously dictated by motives of mere factious perversity.

In 1884 Trade Unions were accorded legal recognition, and the right to receive legacies and make donations, on condition of submitting their statutes to the State authorities. But the Government have persistently and emphatically refused to grant to public servants, including persons employed in national factories, dockyards, and railways, the right of combination in order to raise wages or in other respects improve their status and conditions of work. The army of functionaries in France is wastefully large, and were it not that they hold their positions at the mercy of the Government of the day they would be able, in combination, to exercise a heavy corrupting pressure upon the deputies. The power of functionaries was amusingly illustrated in 1895 when there was debated a proposal to place the public roads under the care of the General Councils of the Departments which they traversed. This common-sense suggestion was rejected at the instance of the engineers attached to headquarters of Government. Surely this is centralisation gone mad!

The Socialists have gained a considerable portion of their strength from discontented Government employees, but these propagandists, though their sayings and doings make up a great part of the interest of French politics, are picturesque supernumeraries on the stage rather than actors

who effectively contribute towards the dénouement of the drama. Their relative strength in the Chamber, excessive as that was in proportion to their feeble hold upon the *manner of thought* of the people, has diminished. As the result of the last General Election in 1906 the other sections of the Left are so strong that they can overcome, if necessary, a coalition of the Socialists with the Right. Now and again the Socialists have captured a municipality, and have essayed a practical application of their principles. In 1894 twenty-eight out of the thirty-one members of the Municipal Council of Roubaix were keepers of public-houses (cabaretiers), and, not being chemists, proposed to form a municipal pharmacy at which drugs were to be dispensed at cost price. The apothecaries naturally objected, and the Prefect disallowed the experiment. Why the publicans fixed upon the sale of medicines as the subject of their experiments can only be understood by the supposition that they were mindful of the large amount of illness which is popularly traced to their establishments.


The doctrines represented by Jaurès have never been able to secure a hospitable lodgment in the minds of the peasants, who form four-fifths of the population. The Socialist hook has been artfully baited once and again, but Jacques Bonhomme refuses to bite. His view of the matter is simply that he does not want to share his little stock with anybody; he wants very much to keep it and to add to it. The danger of Socialism in France is that a section of the party is without political scruples. On more than one occasion, in the period with

which this book deals, the Socialists have shown that they were prepared, if they had opportunity and power, to override the results of universal suffrage, and in spite of the majority of the electorate bring in the new order by violence. Socialism will secure the mastery in France, if such a consummation ever arrives, only by a *coup d'état*; and a Socialism thus established will be the most crushing of all tyrannies.

A few years ago the Labour party, which is not necessarily Socialist, formulated a programme with three items—an eight-hours' day, a minimum wage, and a pension of two francs a day to every workman who had toiled for twenty-five years. Two francs a day, if we reckon six days to the working week, comes to ten shillings a week, and a workman may have pursued his calling for a quarter of a century and be no more than forty years of age. An old age pension of ten shillings a week at forty! This may come to pass when the new Jerusalem is brought down from heaven by Act of Parliament. So much for the rights of labour! As for property, well, the same tenderness was not designed towards it. It was proposed in 1901 by some advanced politicians to introduce a new scale of duties on property, either personal or real, received by inheritance or bequest. The tax was to be levied on the net amount devolving on the legatee, and to increase in rate not only according to the diminishing degree of relationship, but also according to the value of the inheritance. Thus if a direct heir received a legacy of less than £80, his inheritance paid only 1 per cent., but if a very large estate were bequeathed to a

person who was no relation at all to the deceased the rate might be as high as 64 per cent.

The attitude of the Government towards the working-classes, while far from satisfying the exigencies of the ideologists, has been sympathetic. This is not, as it might seem, a superfluous observation; for experience proves that a Government deriving authority from a popular franchise may be harsh and oppressive in tone and conduct towards the toilers. France has shown no inclination to solve the problem of unemployment by the devices which were used in 1848—doles of money and the opening of national workshops. A deputation of Lyons artisans was sent to Paris in 1885 to make known to the Government the miserable condition of the labouring classes in that city, and to appeal to Parliament to mitigate the sharpness of their poverty. A proposal in the Chamber to grant £1,000,000 was defeated. It was contended that votes of money would fail to relieve the distress of the workmen in large towns, and would create an invidious and dangerous precedent. In 1896 the Government were urged to start public works in order to allay the prevailing misery, but they resolutely refused. The Government a few years ago issued a decree founding Labour Councils composed of representatives of employers and workmen elected by the committees of their respective organisations, and invested with large powers of preventing or ending strikes. The law forbids the employment of engine-drivers and stokers for more than ten hours a day. The workmen in the docks and arsenals belonging to the navy have been granted an eight-hours' day.



THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT CARNOT OUTSIDE THE PALAIS DE COMMERCE,
LYONS, IN DECEMBER, 1887

The laws relating to the labour of women and children in factories are of the same spirit as those which regulate such industry in this country. The number of women who at the present moment work for their living is computed to be 6,382,000, a strikingly large proportion in a population of less than 40,000,000. The rate of wages widely varies according to the nature of the employment. Tailoresses are paid "two meals and 2½d. a day." Factory hands receive from 10d. to 2s. for a day's work, according to the grade in which they are employed. In such an exceptional occupation as jewel cutting the average daily wage is 7s. 8½d.

The Government is compelled to be stern and firm in its methods of dealing with disturbances of the peace occasioned by labour disputes. Such disorders in France are more dangerous to the stability of the State than in England. The Republic as a form of government is always on probation, and doubts as to its competency for the task of preserving social order are ever ready to spring into life and activity. Two factors are to be borne in mind continually,—in the first place, the passion of acquisition, and the tenacity with which what has been acquired is held, are strong in French nature; and in the second place, no European community has shown itself during the last hundred years more subject to unsettlement. Hence it comes to pass that only a thin film of outward tranquillity covers the depths of disquiet and timidity in the hearts of men. France is liable to sudden and violent fits of terror; if the Republic gave signs of quailing in the presence of labour rioting and confusion, the sections of the com-

munity which are always anxious about their property would eagerly look round for a saviour of society, and without questioning rush into his arms for protection. It was in such a state of the public mind that Napoleon III. found his opportunity, and the existing claimants to the throne lie in wait for the recurrence of such an hour. The Government of the Republic, therefore, in the interests of its own existence, dare not show any weakness. The present Prime Minister, M. Clémenceau, cannot be accused of defective sympathy with the aspirations of democracy, yet even he has considered it advisable to make demonstration of personal fearlessness in the presence of angry mobs of strikers. He has declared to the workers, even in their teeth, that they cannot be permitted to menace the public peace. Attempts have been made to withdraw from the Government the support of the army in the suppression of disorders arising from industrial disputes. The soldiers have been reminded that they spring from the bosom of the people, and recommended to refuse service against their brethren in case of a strike; nay, more, they have been advised that, if it should be necessary, they ought to shoot their officers rather than fire upon the mob. These suggestions, subversive of the whole constitution of civil society, have been unheeded by those to whom they were addressed, and their authors have been well punished, but not more severely than they deserved.

In an appendix to this volume we give a very summarised statement concerning French foreign possessions. We shall make only a brief note here. The nation is proud of her colonies, but

she has no surplus population with which to settle them, and her colonial administration has not been a brilliant success. The extreme centralisation of French government has inevitably stunted the development of individual initiative, and the Frenchman is not a good pioneering colonist, just because he has acquired the habit of waiting for the central authorities to tell him what to do, and when that direction is withdrawn his energies are apt to dwindle. The English, on the other hand, have been disciplined by institutions of local self-government for generations, and they are happiest when the Home Government leaves them alone or confines its interference to grants of money, on occasion, and armed assistance when it is requested. Further, France does not sufficiently trust the governors of her colonies; in particular, she is obsessed by a continual dread that they may pursue courses which will lead to heavy expenditure. An item in the programme of the royalist party, when that body counted for something, was "no colonial policy." The appeal was to the parsimony of the people. The colonial governors are excessively worried by the Home Government, and petty pretexts are seized upon for their recall. Within eight years there were twenty Residents or Governors-General in Cochin-China, seven superior Residents in Annam, and eight in Tonkin. Showers of minute, unnecessary, and sometimes foolish instructions are poured upon them. There is in existence, says the Baron de Coubertin, a circular dated 1893 addressed to the governors of the colonies which orders them to buy in France everything that they require, with a list of all the

towns where the purchases are to be made ; bricks at Bordeaux and Marseilles, salt pork at Havre, straw and hay elsewhere. Thus Indo-China, whose soil is made of brick-clay and produces enormous quantities of rice, was required, according to this circular, to buy its stores of bricks and rice in France !

It is claimed that in the hearts of many Frenchmen patriotism has taken the place of Catholicism as the national religion. Said M. de Voqué, addressing a gathering of students: " Ask yourselves each evening, ' What have I done to-day for the greatness of France ? ' Try to set down some action to this special account every day ! " If patriotism is the religion of France, we may fairly ask, " What are the special sacrifices which Frenchmen are prepared to place on the altar of their country, what costly votive offerings do they bring to this shrine ? " Is not a crushing refutation of this magniloquent claim supplied by the attitude of France towards the population question ? The French love their country so little, a cynic might say, that they deliberately set a limit to the number of persons who shall be able to claim France as the land of their birth. Is it possible that love of country can be the religion, that is, the dominant motive power and the consolation, of any country in which the bulk of the inhabitants have to work hard, to struggle unceasingly for a living ? Patriotism may indeed be the religion of soldiers and sailors, and of leisured and opulent classes who devote themselves to the administration and defence of the country ; but the poor and the weak, the struggling and the oppressed, those

whose backs are continually bent to toil, who are engaged in perpetual conflict with want and difficulty, must find their strength, stimulus, and comfort elsewhere. The French are no less patriotic than the natives of the German Fatherland, or of Italy or of England, but the sole justification for the extravagant claim is that since the cruel calamities of the great war a peculiar tenderness has entered into the feelings of Frenchmen towards their country. They love her much, because she has suffered much. They desire to comfort the heart, the heart that has been broken, of their dear, brave, glorious old mother.

NOTE.—The latest annual statistics of the movement of population (published in June 1908) show an excess of deaths over births of 19,920, while the marriages numbered 314,913, a figure only exceeded in 1873 when the war and its consequences had caused many postponements. Meanwhile the population of Germany increased during 1906 (the latest year for which there are returns) by nearly a million.

CHAPTER XIV

THE CHURCH AND THE REPUBLIC

THE reader who is invited to consider the subject of this chapter would be justified in demanding from the writer in advance a statement of the point of view from which he regards the question. If the author of this book were an eminent person, or if he were writing anonymously in a periodical whose line of policy was known, the reader would not think of requiring preliminary information. The risk of misunderstanding between reader and writer would be slight, and the former would make due allowances for the prepossessions or prejudices of the latter. The author is well aware that his personal religious opinions and beliefs are a matter of profound concern, but only to himself and a few others; at the same time, these opinions and beliefs must colour his narrative, and it is only just and honest to the reader that he should have some knowledge of the atmosphere in which the writer lives.

Well then, I consider the religious question in France from the point of view of a Protestant Evangelical Christian. I try to keep in sight always a distinction between Clericalism or Papalism and Catholicism. I number the central

organisation of the Church of Rome as amongst the great enemies of the human race, and when I see the spirit of this central organisation at work, in whatever part of the world, I utterly loathe and abhor it. Its fruit everywhere is tyranny, cruelty, persecution, mental darkness, moral perversion, relentless warfare with the noblest elements of the human spirit. It aspires to lordship over the conscience, and seeks to sit upon that throne in the hearts of men that God alone has a right to occupy.

As for Catholicism, I simply say that it is a form of Christianity which, though defiled by error and superstition, has produced much fruit in lives of nobility and self-sacrifice. I admire the saints and doctors of the Church of Rome; to Cardinal Newman, one of the greatest and most gracious among them, I owe more of delight and edification than I can express, and, as the years pass away, the magnitude of this indebtedness increases and is seen in ever clearer and more convincing light. The conduct of the Roman Church in France, since the triumph of the Ultramontane faction, has generally been such as to excite the animosity of Protestants, and sometimes been such as to make one blush for the name of Christian. Yet one does not dream of fastening upon the thousands of humble, devoted, sincerely pious curés in the country districts of France the opprobrium with which the ecclesiastics have been justly loaded. I cannot gaze upon the faces of the parish priests in the villages, so often marked with meekness, patience, tender yearning, and a true and beautiful spirituality, without a strange

warming of the heart. A radiant mist of praise and gratitude to God hovers above the fount of tears, and my soul is melted within me in the sweet apprehension of the comforting truth that the Cross of Christ has worthy and faithful witnesses in these quiet men who dwell among their own people, and scarcely have fellowship with the dark discords beyond the rivers and the hills.

And therefore, though my sympathies are entirely with the anti-clerical policy of the French Government, the policy which reached its crisis, if not its consummation, in the separation of the Church from the State, a policy which is in essence only self-defence, I am not blind to the fact that the personages who have been prominent and influential in the campaign against the Church are not merely anti-clerical, but anti-Christian. If I were asked which spirit I should prefer to see dominant in France, the spirit of M. le curé, imperfectly instructed and superstitious, but simple and believing, or the spirit of M. Viviani, the Minister of Labour, who boasted that France had made an end of Jesus Christ and undertook to teach the peasants that beyond the skies there are only phantoms, I should have no difficulty in making my choice. France, Roman Catholic, is a nobler France, a France of which more can be hoped, than a France whose proudest boast would be a pagan culture and a pagan coldness and insensibility to all that nourishes the highest instincts of man.

The fairest flower of the French intellect divorced from God is, at the present moment, Anatole France, I suppose, a man greatly and justly admired, who has done noble work for many high causes. Of

the charm, the wit, the fancy, the distinction of his books there is no question, but I can name one of them which irresistibly suggested to me the reflection that the author had lent his name to Mephistopheles. It was not the grossness of the book that was its chief offence,—there may be something even of healthiness in the warmth and violence of animal passion; the fearfulness of the book lay in the naked exhibition of a hard-hearted sensuality of which the author himself was a cold-blooded, sneering, mocking, utterly unmoved spectator. This is the frame of mind in which the spirit of evil may be supposed to regard the dupes or victims whom he has allured or hurried into sensual sin. Nor does the author seem for a moment conscious of how degrading to humanity, and to himself, are the scenes which he represents. He makes his recital without shame or sorrow or indignation; these are emotions, disturbing to one's personal comfort and serenity, which it would be sheer waste to throw away upon such creatures as men and women, creatures, by the way, of whom we are taught by the Church that they are made in the image of God, and that Christ died to redeem them to Himself and the Father. The personages of the story have just as little sense of responsibility to a something higher than themselves as the worms of the dust may be supposed to have towards men. They do not merely take a bold delight in flouting the moral law; they are not even dimly conscious of its existence. And all this the author regards with perfect composure! If the spirit of Anatole France, as it is exhibited in the book before us, were to become dominant in his country,

we should have a nation of men and women moving about hopelessly from day to day with frozen hearts behind their ribs, and scarcely needing the icy fingers of death to bring to a final standstill a mechanism from which the living soul had departed. Better ignorance, superstition, phantoms, than this—yea, a thousand times better.

We strain our eyes in vain for any sure signs of the coming of a purified and strengthened Christianity in France. The dominance of Rome has been timidly challenged here and there among the Catholics, and if a great leader—of which, indeed, at present there is no suggestion—were to arise, we might see the liberties of the ancient Gallican Church successfully vindicated, and the cause of Christianity in France enter upon a strong renewed course. Our fellow-Protestants hold their ground bravely, but they have a hard battle to fight, and they cannot furnish out powerful expeditions into the enemy's country. The next stage in the religious evolution of France will not be witnessed, we think, in that quarter. We gaze into the future with misgivings, though not without hope. Despair is the crown of iniquity.

We shall now proceed with the narrative.

THE CHURCH AT THE REVOLUTION

The explanation of the bud and the blossom is in the seed ; and if we would understand the religious crisis in France we must have a clear view of the relations between the Church and State in that country since the violent political earthquake known as the French Revolution. While as yet

the first tremors had not been felt, the Church was in possession of one-third of the land and of property to the value of £160,000,000. This corporate wealth existed side by side with much individual poverty amongst the parish priests; just as to-day, though the Church of England is the wealthiest communion in Christendom, there are hundreds of shamefully underpaid curates. The Church had been the friend of privilege and tyranny, for the priest is the natural ally of the despot; she had leagued her fortunes with the aristocracy and the Court, and was deservedly involved in their overthrow and ruin.

The temper of the higher clergy, in the great days of the French monarchy, was often as haughty and cruel as that of the grand seigneur whose brutality is described in *A Tale of Two Cities*. Madame de Sevigné relates that the Archbishop of Rheims was one day driving at whirlwind speed in his carriage with six horses. A man on horseback coming in the way was knocked down, he and his animal both, and the Archbishop's carriage was overturned. The horseman, not finding any pleasure in the prospect of being lamed, raised himself and his steed and set off with all possible speed. The Archbishop was indignant, he demanded that the rascal should be stopped and that he should be given a hundred strokes. "If," said Monseigneur,—"if I had got hold of the scoundrel I would have broken his arms and cut off his ears." We cannot bring a railing accusation against all the French priests of pre-Revolution days, but of too many could it have been said, in Milton's words, and with justice, that for their bellies' sake they had "crept

and intruded and climbed" into the fold. The hungry sheep looked up but were not fed, except with the wind and rank mist, and, falling into diseases of malnutrition, spread a foul contagion. The hierarchy of France, by turning its back upon duty and sincerity, made a generous contribution to the forces that produced the Revolution.

Freedom in France owes nothing and less than nothing to Christianity—as represented by the Roman Catholic Church. The doctrines of liberty, equality, and fraternity were preached with matchless vigour and eloquence by Rousseau and Voltaire, whose hostility to the Christian faith was not disguised. If we keep these two facts in mind—that in France liberty and Christianity have been divorced, that freedom has had to seek her staunchest champions outside the ranks of the Church—we hold the key to the understanding of many elements in the present situation which bewilder and pain.

At the Revolution, then, the property of the Church was confiscated; Christianity was formally abolished; to wear the garments of a priest or to practise the rites of the faith, in public or in private, meant death. One gladly turns away one's eyes from the paroxysms and orgies of infidelity which followed. France is a country which every now and then is led and intimidated by a noisy and energetic handful of agitators; and we are not to suppose for a moment that the knowledge and the love of God had been banished from the country. When the Reign of Terror had fulfilled its bloody work the faithful began to show themselves as such; and the calling of a priest was again made lawful.

THE CONCORDAT OF NAPOLEON

But not until 1801, when Napoleon was First Consul, and beginning probably to be dazzled with visions of an imperial crown, did Church and State again enter into formal relations. Napoleon was at once superstitious and sceptical—not really an unusual combination of qualities, but the amount of reverence that he entertained for the Holy Father may be inferred from his description of him as “an old fox.” His calculations were that if the Church were established the clergy would become a corps of assistants to the police; by their moral injunctions they would help to keep the people in order; and as by nature their caste is inclined towards the support of the established order of things, they would be pillars and buttresses of the State, might even, indeed, favour his ambitious designs. It would be a great gain to France that the Pope, the head of the most conservative institution in the world, should recognise the new order created by the Revolution. It would seem to wipe out the stains of the aristocratic and Catholic blood which had flowed so freely during the Reign of Terror; in the eyes of the faithful, it might be considered the formal restoration of France to her proud and honoured place as the eldest daughter of the Church; and even in non-Catholic countries it could not be without its due effect as an indication that France had become respectable once again.

Accordingly, Napoleon, as an astute ruler, concluded with the Pope the famous Concordat of 1801. By this celebrated treaty Roman Catholicism

was recognised as the religion of the great majority of the French nation—although only a decade before Christianity had been abolished and was believed by many infidel zealots to be dead, and it was arranged that the Church in France should be governed by ten Archbishops and fifty Bishops, nominated by the Government and receiving their canonical induction by the Pope. The parish ministers were to be appointed by the Bishops and Archbishops in their respective dioceses, all appointments to be subject to the approval of the Government. It is important to note that Napoleon was opposed to the return of the monastic orders to France. “I want bishops and parish ministers,” he said, “and nothing more.” The monastic orders, or congregations, as they are commonly termed, working under secret regulations, acquiring large and indefinite quantities of wealth and influence, and taking their word of command from superiors living at Rome, are always liable suddenly to assume the appearance and function of a well-disciplined hostile army encamped in the midst of the nation. The Archbishops received the salary of £600, a very modest figure compared with the £15,000 received by the Archbishop of Canterbury, and the £10,000 by the Archbishop of York. The Bishops were granted £400, whereas the maintenance of the episcopal dignity in England is understood to necessitate a minimum income of £3000. The parish ministers were divided into two grades—the lower receiving £40 a year, and the higher £60. A special department was instituted for the transaction of business between Church and State; and at its head was

placed the Minister of Public Worship. It was this Concordat, with unessential modifications, which until 1905 regulated the relations between the Government of France and the Church of Rome. The last budget for public worship showed that Roman Catholicism in France was endowed to the extent of £2,000,000 a year.

FROM NAPOLEON TO THE THIRD REPUBLIC

Now, it is obviously impossible within the limits of this chapter to sketch the religious history of France from 1801, the year of the Concordat, to its abolition, or, as the diplomatists phrase it, its denunciation three years ago. No nation has been more liable than France to vast fluctuations of opinions and passions.

When Louis XVIII. was restored to the throne of his fathers after Waterloo, the Church as an organisation became aggressive, made exacting demands for itself, and supported Charles X. in the excesses of arbitrary power which led to the Three Red Days of July 1830.

Yet another eighteen years, while Louis Napoleon was as yet President of the Second Republic, and we find the Pope maintained on his throne by the sword of France. The friends and disciples of Mazzini had seized the Eternal City, sent the Pope flying, and proclaimed the Roman Republic. The French Republic strangled this infant Republic in its cradle, brought his Holiness back from his wanderings, and not only replaced him in the Chair of St. Peter, but again put the reins of temporal power in his hands, although it was notorious that

the Papal States were the worst governed in Europe ; nowhere was there so much corruption, poverty, vice, tyranny, superstition, and dirt.

Four years later the adventurer became Napoleon the Third, and for the Church in France there began a period of great prosperity—spiritual and material. The Empress Eugénie was a faithful daughter of the Church, devoted no less to works of piety than to pleasure ; the Church numbered among its priests and prelates some men who were ornaments of our common Christianity, and it seemed to be in heart-touch with the masses of the people.

Then came the Franco-German War, which rent the heart of France in a manner more painful than even that country in all her troubled, tragic history had experienced ; but through these gashes the light of God might enter.

The historian of contemporary France, writing of the years 1872–1880, says that during that period the great mass of the French nation lived and died in the Catholic faith. Under the overwhelming labour of daily toil, says M. Hanotaux, the masses were comforted by the hope and consolation of a sweeter destiny. The Catholic religion enveloped and wrapt in its sweet-smelling, swaddling clothes the daily life of practically the whole of France. While it is not for us to challenge this statement, it is never to be forgotten that a Church may retain its social force, nay, may even enhance its social force, while its spiritual force is declining. By “social force” is meant the formal adherence of the moneyed and aristocratic classes and of their camp-followers, the miscellaneous mob that from servile instinct or deliberate snobbishness follow

in the path of those whom they are pleased to regard as their "betters." Even to-day in free-thinking France, in a country where practically the whole manhood has repudiated the obligations of religion, it is still regarded as "good form" to take children to Church to be baptized, to have a nuptial mass said or sung after the civil ceremony of marriage, and to commit the dead to the grave under the benediction of the priest. So little is Protestantism regarded in this country, where at one time, with almost equal odds, it disputed for supremacy with the Roman Catholic Church, that to be Protestant is hardly quite respectable. Perhaps, then, the prestige of the Church in the years that immediately followed the downfall of Napoleon was the mere outward show of power, and not the inward reality thereof. Certain it is that during the last thirty years the influence of the Church on the inner life of Frenchmen has been manifestly and continually on the wane, until now it is all but extinct. How is this to be accounted for?

THE DECREE OF PAPAL INFALLIBILITY

The first stunning blow to the holding and converting power of the Church in France was given by Rome itself, by the decree that the Pope, speaking from the Chair of St. Peter on matters of faith, is infallible. At midday on the 18th July 1870, while the heavens wore the blackness of starless midnight and a wild storm was raging in Rome, Pope Pius IX., by the light of a candle, read out the assertion of his own infallibility, and of all who had held or should hold his sacred office. That same

day Napoleon III. despatched his declaration of war to the King of Prussia. The conjunction of dates deserves to be borne in mind.

In the Vatican Council, of whose deliberations this fateful and fatal decree was the chief product, the majority of the French Bishops had opposed the proclamation of papal infallibility. For one thing, it was at variance with the famous declaration of the French Church in 1682, that the pronouncements of the Pope in matters of faith might be impugned so long as they had not been confirmed by the judgment of the whole Church. But the French Bishops were voted down, and after their manner they acquiesced. For more than a generation, in their dealings with Rome, they do not seem to have possessed the courage of a mouse among them.

The decree had disastrous effects on the minds of the intellectual generation that was rising up to confront the problems of the new time. In the first place, to say that the Pope is infallible seems ridiculous; no weapon of controversy is more destructive than ridicule, and the French are pre-eminent in their sense of the absurd. If a man on Tuesday says that black is white, on Thursday that black is green, and then on Saturday demands that you shall believe that he is infallible—you laugh him to scorn. All those who had even an elementary knowledge of the Papacy knew that Popes had contradicted each other again and yet again, and that—though infallibility is not to be confounded with impeccability—some of the Popes were men of such humble moral attainments that no one could believe that their pronouncements on matters

of faith were of any value. Presently the dark miserable story of plot and intrigue by which the supporters of the decree had secured their object became known and made a most sinister impression, seriously impairing the moral authority of the Church. It appeared that the matter had not been debated with that single-minded regard for the cause of God which an affair of such transcendent importance demanded. It was rather a deep political move that was being engineered than a grave deliberation.

The intelligence of France saw that the decree of the Pope's infallibility must be an injury to the Church. Let us ask ourselves the question—what hope could there be of any human being's progress in knowledge, wisdom, and piety if he were convinced that it was impossible for him to make a mistake in the expression of his faith? An organisation of mortal men may make many mistakes, may commit many follies, yea, even many crimes, and yet may retain a principle of recovery and, by confession of error and amendment of conduct, acquire renewed and increased usefulness; but if it believes itself incapable of error it has no use for such qualities as humility, circumspection, repentance, godly resolution; and its vitality is severely lamed. In no country has this decree of the infallibility of the Pope been so injurious to the Church as in France.

The present occupant of the Holy See is not likely to enhance the authority of his office or strengthen the doctrine of papal infallibility.

In a recent encyclical, to which on the grounds of discipline Catholics owe perfect obedience, he

declared that the Virgin "filled the thoughts of Noah as he lay in the bosom of the saving ark. It was of Mary that Abraham thought when he restrained himself from sacrificing his son. Jacob thought of her as he contemplated the ladder on which angels ascended and descended; Moses, as he marvelled at the bush which burned and was not consumed; David, as he sang and danced in front of the Ark of the Covenant. Mary was in Elijah's thoughts as he perceived the little cloud rising over the sea." The successor of St. Peter declares that to be true which every intelligent person outside his own communion considers to be ludicrous assumption. How can such statements in any way help to bring new adherents into the ranks, continually being depleted, of the faithful? What Cardinal Sarto was before he became Pius x., that he has continued to be since he was placed on the throne of the fisherman,—a pious, simple Italian priest, without scholarship enough to discern between the assumptions of arrogant scepticism and the ascertained results of reverent Biblical research. His elevation has made his defective intellectual equipment a mischief such as it would never have become in the merely ceremonial splendour of his patriarchate at Venice; it has tended to diffuse the darkness of his own mind to the ends of the earth.

THE INDISCRETIONS OF THE REPUBLIC

The Church and the Republic were bound to each other in an uncongenial union. Incompatibility of temper has produced much unhappiness for

both parties, sometimes subdued and sullen, sometimes acute, violent, and scandalous. It was not to be expected that in such a case the same side would always be in the right in the many disputes which have disturbed the union. During the last twenty years a Minister known to be a practising Catholic has been as rare a phenomenon in a French Government as a Minister known to be an unbeliever has been in a British Cabinet ; on the contrary, there have been many Ministers who have been insolently and aggressively infidel. The Catholics of France are entitled to demand courteous respect for the Church, but the Republic has at times shown herself disposed to withhold even this minimum concession of consideration. On occasions, indeed, she has been guilty of what is justly described as indecent assault on the most honourable emotions not only of Catholics, but of all Christian people, and she has seemed to take a cruel delight in probing the most sensitive nerve of the religious heart.

MR. BRADLAUGH AS ECCLESIASTICAL COMMISSIONER !

It is easy to illustrate this general statement by particular examples. We shall mention three instances, glaring and conclusive. In the ten weeks' Cabinet of Gambetta the Minister of Public Worship was M. Paul Bert, who was notorious for his hostility to religion. What would have been said in England if Mr. Bradlaugh had been appointed Secretary of the Ecclesiastical Commissioners ? There is some probability that the Liberal Government now in office in this country may introduce a Bill for the disestablishment of the Church in

Wales. Would the head of the Government dream of placing this measure in charge of Mr. John Morley? Lord Halifax is lay leader of the Catholic party in the Church of England. Is there any danger of his ever being appointed High Commissioner to the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church of Scotland?

AN OUTRAGE UPON GOOD FEELING

Victor Hugo died in 1885. His free-thinking opinions were well known, and in his last hours he had been zealously guarded against the intrusion of the hopes and consolations offered by emissaries of the Catholic faith. The nation desired to do the utmost honour to the memory of the great poet and patriot. In order that the Pantheon might receive his remains, the Government decreed that that building, which had been originally a church and had since 1852 been used for religious services, should again be secularised. The priests who had charge of it were ordered to remove all the consecrated objects contained therein, including the shrine and relics of St. Genevieve. Now, we would not be misunderstood. The Pantheon was national property, it had been secularised before, and the Government were entitled to secularise it again. But the occasion they chose for exercising their right, and the object for which they exercised it, made their conduct an odious outrage upon good feeling. The Church would not have been worthy of respect if she had not deeply felt, and passionately resented, the shame of these proceedings. She was justified, in the circumstances, in describing



Photo. Nadar

VICTOR HUGO



the conduct of the Government as an affront to religion. It was as if a special Act of Parliament had been passed compelling the authorities of the Church of England to receive the dust of Thomas Huxley in Westminster Abbey.

PÈRE OLLIVIER'S FAMOUS SERMON

A fire at a charity bazaar in Paris in 1897 resulted in the loss of many lives. Many of the victims were of high station, and a funeral service for them was held at Notre Dame. The President and dignitaries of State attended. A sermon was preached by Père Ollivier, who in the course of his discourse proclaimed the kindling of the divine wrath against those who would not accept the teaching of the Church. This denunciation gave great offence to many members of the congregation, and to large sections of the community. But why? There seems to be no just occasion for surprise. The good father was only preaching elementary Catholic doctrine in a Catholic church. The truth strikingly exemplified, though not of course revealed, by the angry surprise was that many Frenchmen wished to regard the Church merely as a social institution, charged with the duties of moral police, and refused to recognise her as the exclusive repository of truth, of spiritual dynamic, and supreme religious authority. It seems to be all to the credit of Père Ollivier that he maintained the pretensions of his Church even in presence of a crowded and fashionable congregation, and made it clear that he would not silently comply with the prevailing view as to the status

and authority of the Catholic religion. Whether or not the pretensions he expressed were just and reasonable was in the circumstances an irrelevant consideration.

However that be, the sermon caused a great commotion. The Ministry was blamed for not having insisted upon seeing the discourse before it was delivered to a congregation in which the Chief of the State was included. M. Brisson, the President of the Chamber of Deputies, made an occasion shortly after to deliver a speech designed in some measure as a reply to Père Ollivier. He protested against intolerant doctrines altogether hostile to the generous instincts of France. Very good. But who has a right to expect tolerant doctrines from a Catholic pulpit? The Church does not believe in tolerance. She makes no secret of this disbelief. She has a right to demand toleration in England or in the United States, even though her people form but a small minority of the population, because toleration is an article of political faith in these countries. She would have just cause of complaint if an exception were made against her. But when minorities claim toleration from her she resents the demand when she is in a position to do so, on the ground that the granting of it is against her principles. Heresy is a very infectious deadly disease, and the Church can no more make terms with it than doctors can compromise with the microbes of cholera or small-pox. The only possible policy is extermination. A Church which proclaims, as the only certain means of salvation, membership in her communion and the acceptance of certain metaphysical pro-

positions, an acceptance which may be a mechanical act, seems to be driven by the impetus of her own sincerity, and in proportion to the strength thereof, into the work of persecution. If a man may be saved from everlasting punishment by saying "yes," it may seem reasonable and praiseworthy to compel him, by threats or violence, to say "yes"; or at anyrate to prevent him from tempting other men to say "no."

The Chamber ordered that the speech of M. Brisson should be printed and placarded throughout France. The Catholic mayors refused to obey the behest of the Chamber. It was not reasonable to expect that they would post up a document which was designed to rebut a cardinal doctrine of their faith. The order of the Chamber was in effect the imposition of a religious test, essentially contrary to a fundamental article of the constitution. The recalcitrant mayors were dismissed from their posts; but the whole incident was not calculated to increase the credit of the Republic.

THE CHURCH HOSTILE TO THE REPUBLIC

A spectator of this conflict may reprobate the faults of temper and behaviour which have marred the conduct of the Republic towards religion; he may condemn a policy of pin-pricks as both irritating and ineffectual to the solution of a real difficulty, and yet hold that the Church has not been guiltless in deportment and spirit, and with regard to the main contention between her and the Republic give his sympathies to the latter.

The Church has been an enemy of the Republic from the first hour of its life, and the hostility of the State towards religion, as represented by Catholicism, has been mainly inspired by motives of self-defence and self-preservation. The Church during many years, with amazing subtlety and audacity, conducted a campaign against the Republic in the very citadel of its security, the army. There was a moment when the Jesuits, having debauched the honour of the soldiers, seemed to be about to hurl the armed strength of the Republic against the very life of the State. For some months the Jesuits and their pupils were dominant in France; it was only the equality between the incapacity of these pupils and their iniquity which saved the Republic. The Church used her position in the schools and colleges of the country to seduce her pupils from their allegiance to the State, and to make them bond-servants of the Ultramontane propaganda. The agonising struggles that she made before relinquishing her clutch on the heartstrings of the young are the measure of her disloyalty and fanaticism. In the days when denominational schools existed side by side with elementary schools, where the instruction was wholly secular, the Archbishop of Aix (1879) declared that the latter would soon transform children into little monsters of iniquity and immorality whenever they did not leave them little prodigies of imbecility!

Part of the feeling against the interference of ecclesiastics in politics in a direction adverse to the Republic was due to the fact that, in consideration of their sacred calling, they were dispensed

from the complete fulfilment of their military duty as citizens. The attitude of the clergy, therefore, as a constant incitement to civil disturbance, even to civil war, grossly offended the national sense of justice.

THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST JESUITICAL EDUCATION

In the spring of 1880, as the Senate had rejected the Education Bill of Jules Ferry, the Government proceeded to effect its main purpose by means of administrative decrees. The Jesuits, who possessed 27 colleges with 848 teachers, were granted three months' grace in which to break up all their establishments, educational and otherwise; while all unauthorised congregations were summoned, within the same space of time, to apply for authorisation. That meant producing a statement of the names of their members, property, income, and expenditure; it was also necessary that they should submit to the State authorities a copy of their rules and regulations approved by the Bishops of the dioceses in which any branches of the congregations were maintained, and declare themselves subject to these Bishops in all spiritual things. There were 26 of these unauthorised congregations, possessing 61 educational establishments with over 1000 teachers. The authorised congregations, which were not aimed at in these decrees, numbered 28, with 768 colleges, 2443 schools, and 22,769 teachers.

It is easy to understand why the monastic orders, and particularly the Jesuits, have acquired so great an influence; the secular priests are, in

general, simple, ignorant, of mean birth, with a narrow experience of life; the members of the congregations, on the other hand, know the world, are subtle, deeply cultivated, and often of high social origin. They generally acquire considerable wealth; the exact amount not being known, their enemies probably exaggerate the figures; as a corporation never dies, the congregations escape payment of legacy duties, and have always posed as being grievously wronged when any attempt has been made to exact from them a contribution to the national revenue. Fifteen years after the period with which we are now dealing a tax of $\frac{3}{4}$ d. in the £ was imposed upon the revenue of all the congregations, authorised or unauthorised, and this very modest exaction was encountered by a policy of passive resistance.

The decrees of 1880 were rigorously executed. The establishments of men that failed to apply for authorisation were dispersed; women in the meantime were left undisturbed. The relation of the State to congregations has been a chronic difficulty in France for nearly a century; the trouble came to a crisis, we are afraid we cannot say to a termination, a few years ago; for the history of the matter is that Government after Government, finding the congregations exasperating and dangerous, have passed severe laws against them; these laws, executed at first with rigour, have gradually fallen into disuse, have become rusty, then practically obsolete. By that time the situation with which the laws were intended to cope has come into existence again, only in an exaggerated and more difficult form. It is im-

possible not to admire the pertinacity of the monastic orders. The congregations were expelled in 1901. If history were a perfectly safe guide we could with confidence predict that within twenty years from that date they will be as numerous, as powerful, and as irritating to the Government as in any previous epoch of their existence.

RECONCILIATION WITH THE REPUBLIC

It is quite just to represent Rome as the chief instigator and maintainer of the present difficulties between the Church and the Republic, but it is equally certain that were the Pope friendly to the Republic, the animosity of the extreme clericals, especially among the religious orders, would not be abated. Leo XIII.'s declaration of reconciliation with the Republic in 1884, dictated, no doubt, by the conviction that that form of Government had now securely established itself in the country, was followed by a marked decline in the Peter's Pence contributed by France. This may signify that many of the faithful resented the new attitude of the Vatican, or that many persons who had attached themselves to the Church because they saw in her a powerful instrument of their hostility to the Republic, drew off when the Pope recommended a new policy. For a few years there seemed to be reality and substance in the proffered reconciliation. Comte de Mun, a man of ability, skill, and exalted character, more clerical than the Pope, a sort of French Lord Halifax, led a movement for the creation of a Catholic democratic party. A signal incident in the campaign of

reconciliation was the entertainment given by Cardinal Lavigerie, the Archbishop of Algiers, to some naval officers towards the end of 1890. The Cardinal made a cordial speech, and when he sat down the band of his White Fathers played the "Marseillaise." Many Catholics professed to be scandalised that the hymn of the Revolution should be in the programme of the after-dinner music at an Archbishop's palace. The irreconcilable clericals raised a clamour which was silenced for the moment by a communication from Rome signifying approval of the Cardinal's conduct. The total result of these circumstances, however, was to show how little substantial, how very trembling was the structure of amity. Nevertheless, the formal withdrawal of papal support from the campaign against the Republic had a marked effect on the political situation; for at the General Election of 1893 only fifty-eight reactionaries were returned to the Chamber.

REVIVAL OF CLERICALISM

But this quiescence of conspicuous activity, if it is to be interpreted by subsequent events, did not imply a slackening of secret hostility. It would seem that the Church, having come to the conclusion that she could not overthrow the Republic, had resolved on a policy of peaceful penetration; she was willing to accept the Republic provided she was allowed to have the mastery of it, not ostensibly, but through her pupils and minions in the army and navy, and in the civil administration. 1897 was the year of a clerical

revival. The policy of the Government then in office was to revise the educational and military laws which restricted the privileges of the Catholics. The Prefects of the Departments were instructed to conciliate the clergy. Certain chapels and communities of monks, closed since the execution of the Ferry decrees of 1880, were reopened this year. The movement was checked for a moment by the "indiscreet" sermon of Père Ollivier, to which we have already referred; "to be intelligible is to be found out," and a plain, naked, uncompromising statement of the Catholic pretensions, in the fulness of their sweep, led to an instantaneous rejection of them, on the part of many who were disposed to be friendly to the Church as a useful and respectable social institution. In this same year, so strong was the current of religious emotion, it was proposed to substitute the fête of Jeanne d'Arc for the national fête of 14th July. This suggestion, coming from the Bishops, is a rather striking illustration of the words addressed by Christ to the Scribes and Pharisees; they garnish the sepulchres of the righteous whom their predecessors killed.

At the General Election of 1898 only 225 progressive Republicans, a minority of the Chamber, were returned. If the groups of the majority combined, a situation of grave danger would arise. The complete triumph of the Church seemed at hand. But one of the safeguards of progress is that just at the moment when the clericals have victory within their grasp they almost invariably commit excesses which create a revulsion of feeling, and hurl their cause down into the pit of defeat

once again. The Dreyfus case, which for a time seemed likely to carry the clericals to dominion in France, wrought their overthrow.

CLERICALISM RUINED BY ITS OWN EXCESSES

An outline of the Dreyfus affair was given in Chapter XII, and must not be repeated. The clericals at this epoch returned to their former policy of allying themselves with any movement or any party which threatened the stability of the Republic. That was the inspiration of their activity in the Dreyfus affair which brought France to the verge of civil war. The clericals zealously fomented strife, and took the lead in an unparalleled campaign of cruel mendacity. When France came to herself she began to review the situation calmly, and then she recalled the enormous activity that the various religious orders had displayed in the cause of unrighteousness, and she perceived that what had been involved was nothing short of a gigantic conspiracy against the Republic. The chief disseminator of lies, of usurping militarism, and of implicit disloyalty had been *La Croix*, a periodical with special editions for the various districts of France, and enjoying an enormous circulation. This organ was directed by the Assumptionist Fathers, an unauthorised body of considerable wealth. A raid on their Paris office in 1899 revealed £80,000 in gold and notes. Cardinal Richard, Archbishop of Paris, visited the Assumptionist Fathers, bestowed upon them his blessing, and urged them to pursue their way with simplicity and firmness. Clericalism never repents. But

Pope Leo XIII. saw that the good fathers had gone too far. He ordered them to withdraw from *La Croix* and to devote themselves to works of charity. The editing of the paper therefore passed nominally into lay hands, but there was no change, or sign of change, in the spirit of the publication.

THE LAW AGAINST THE MONASTIC ORDERS

Now we come to the law of 1901 regarding the congregations, a word which when used in reference to French ecclesiastical affairs signifies the religious orders such as the Jesuits, the Franciscans, the Dominicans, the Assumptionists, and the various other communities of preaching, teaching, or merely devotional priests. The word has nothing to do with assemblies of worshippers in the churches. These religious orders had, many of them, established themselves in the country in contravention of express laws which had been allowed to become inoperative, and they had devoted themselves with praiseworthy ardour—granted their point of view—to the work of educating the young. The chief argument for the new law was that it was necessary for the protection of the country against the teaching congregations, who, by poisoning the minds of their pupils against the Republic, were destroying the life of the nation, striking at its very vitals. It was enacted that the non-authorized congregations must apply for authorisation; though the Pope granted the orders complete liberty in the matter a great number of Carthusians, Benedictines, Assumptionists, and Jesuits refused to

comply with the law, and of those who applied for authorisation the vast majority were refused.

The French Government cannot be said to have acted with complete good faith in this matter. M. Waldeck-Rousseau, who passed the law, was succeeded by M. Combes, who had to put it into execution. The form of the law, the mere fact that it was not an express enactment for the suppression of the monastic orders, raised a reasonable presumption that the congregations which applied for authorisation would receive it unless specific acts contrary to the interests of the Republic could be proved against them. But the result of the General Election of 1902, at which the cause of the clericals was staked, and which gave a very large majority for the Republicans, was seized upon as a justification for proceeding against the congregations with a rigour which was certainly beyond the intention of the framers of the law. M. Combes described his task as a complete subjection of the monastic orders to the secular State. In practice he interpreted "subjection" as equivalent to "extinction." The applications for authorisations were dealt with in large batches,—first came the teaching orders, then the preaching and contemplative orders, last of all the more or less mercantile orders. This affectation of proceeding methodically might have been spared, for the applications were uniformly rejected.

Then followed a clearance of these congregations from the buildings that they occupied. Some of them, aided by sympathisers among the laity, offered more than a passive resistance to the authorities who came to evict them. Hence the

scenes and riots of which the papers were full at the time, and which are no doubt still fresh in the memories of readers. Brittany was the scene of the most violent of these disturbances. Ignorance of the French language had been carefully maintained among the pious and superstitious population of that most interesting Celtic province, and had made it possible for the priests to distort simple and legitimate acts of government. A sequel to these commotions was a decree restricting the clergy to the use of French in sermons, instructions, and catechisings.

The main result of the dispersion of the congregations is that education is now almost entirely a State charge, and completely secular. The orders are barred from the profession of teaching, and though the secular clergy have still the control of a few "free" schools, as they are called, these establishments are subject to the ordinary official inspection, and the teachers are required to possess the same qualifications which are essential to preceptors in the State schools. The kind of books that the good fathers used to put into the hands of little children are not much in evidence now. The illustrations in these little devotional manuals consisted entirely of red-hot fires, furnaces, devils with horns on their heads and armed with spits and pitchforks. The design, of course, was to bring before the children in a lively and ever-memorable manner the provision that the future held in store for them if they fell away from virtue and the faith of their fathers.

The friends of religion have vigorously challenged the doctrines that the education of the young is a

prerogative of the State, that the modern conception of the State limits such education to secular and moral instruction, and forbids the teaching of theological tenets, and the "League for Freedom of Education" invoked the rights of fathers to have their children educated in the faith to which their parents belong. In England this claim is familiar enough, and even those who deny its cogency cannot discern in it any hostility to the constitution. But the anti-clericals of France contend that the circumstances in that country are different. To grant "the right of the parent," they say, would mean to place thousands of children on all the seven days of the week in the hands of enemies of the Republic; and on that ground the "League for Freedom of Education" was suppressed.

THE AFFAIR OF THE TWO BISHOPS

The next incident of moment in this quarrel with the Church was the tragic comedy of the two Bishops, M. Le Nordez and M. Geay, who were summoned to Rome to answer to charges of serious delinquencies. One was accused of immorality, and the other of being a Freemason! Now, the law of the land said that no Bishop might leave the soil of France without the permission of the Government. The two Bishops placed their summons to Rome in the hands of the Minister of Public Worship, who refused them permission to make the journey. The Bishops, in a strait between the obedience due to the law and the obedience due to the Holy Father, chose to withhold the former and grant the latter,

and took the train for Rome. The French Government, declaring that the Concordat had been infringed, at once stopped the payment of the Bishops' salaries; and the Pope, to punish them for their delay or their sins, compelled them to resign their Sees. The incident, though intrinsically not of the first importance, still further widened the rift between France and Rome; and in the eyes of many Frenchmen the Pope now began to take the character of a foreign potentate interfering in the domestic affairs of France.

THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO ROME

The crisis came in 1904 with the visit of President Loubet to the King of Italy in the capital of his kingdom, Rome. The Pope has not abandoned his claim to the temporal sovereignty of the Eternal City, and he regards the presence of the Italian Royal House there as a wicked usurpation. That the head of a Catholic State should place the stamp of his approval on this posture of things was of course to the Pope an impious insult, and he protested with vigour. France, incensed beyond measure at what she chose to consider an attempt of a meddling outsider to regulate her foreign policy, replied by withdrawing her Ambassador from the Vatican and by handing to the Papal Nuncio at Paris his passport. Hardly a voice was raised in defence of the Pope's conduct, not even from among the clericals; for in alliance with the "Nationalists," their policy at the moment was blatant patriotism, and the Pope's action, which had taken them completely by surprise, and

knocked the wind out of them—if this vivid vulgarism, so close to the truth, may be pardoned—could certainly not be championed by Frenchmen on patriotic grounds.

THE SEPARATION LAW

Immediately a cry went up from the nation that the fateful hour had struck, that now or never was the time to sever the bond which united the Church to the State, a bond which had become unbearably galling to the latter. A Separation Law was drawn up, debated at great length, passed by decisive majorities in both Chambers, and ratified by an overwhelming preponderance of votes at the General Election of 1906. The Pope denounced the law as an affront to God; and many of the clericals contended, with more than a show of reason, that as the Concordat was the result of negotiations between the State and the Papacy, it would have been only courteous to have consulted his Holiness in making the arrangements for its abrogation and for the state of things which was to take its place. It was further maintained that the salaries paid by the State to the clergy were a national debt contracted by the expropriation of ecclesiastical property at the Revolution. To these considerations, whatever force of reason or of justice they may possess, the Government gave no heed. The Separation Bill granted pensions to all priests who had served charges for a certain number of years, and in proportion to the number of years they had served.

The provision of the law which was most dis-

tasteful to the Church, and around which the trouble has gathered, is that which relates to the formation of associations for the organisation of public worship and the management of church property. It was decreed that in each commune—or parish, as we should say—an association should be formed with a minimum membership of from seven to twenty-five persons, according to the population. In this association the church property was to be vested; it was to have the right of regulating the services, and of managing the financial arrangements. For obvious reasons the clericals are strongly opposed to the constitution of these associations; and indeed, it must be admitted that such associations, comprised as they may be entirely of laymen, are repugnant to the spirit of Catholicism, and the Government must have been aware of this. All power in the Roman Catholic Church is in the hands of the priests, and it must have been foreseen that they would not without a struggle, if at all, surrender their age-long prerogatives to laymen. That is the root of the objection to the associations for public worship. However, the Bishops by a majority resolved to give a fair trial to the provision. This decision was by careless intermediaries misrepresented or inversely reported to the Pope, for his Holiness gave the world to understand, while as yet the truth was not known, that the Bishops had pronounced an opinion to an entirely contrary effect. Whatever the true story of this secret manœuvre at Rome, the Pope forbade Catholics to form associations; and the Bishops and the clergy bent their heads to the papal decree. The Church of

France has surrendered priests' houses, bishops' palaces, theological seminaries, and her endowments rather than be disloyal to the Holy Father. The enemies of the clericals ask us to see in this conduct only rebelliousness and perversity; well, men's motives are often mixed, but it would be despiteful to human nature to withhold from such heroic self-sacrifice a tribute of warm sympathy and generous admiration.

According to law, the associations for public worship were to be formed by 10th December 1906; and the riots which took place here and there all over France that year—very few in all really—were caused by the taking of the inventories necessary to effect the transference of Church property to its new legal representatives. Had the clericals not chosen to interpret every act of the Government as pure enmity, unmixed with even a tincture of kindly feeling, they would have perceived that this procedure was as much in their own interests as in that of the new associations; for if any of these associations chanced to be hostile to the Church, or disposed to defraud her, the inventories would be a check on them.

THE PRESENT POSITION

The clericals have resolved to meet the whole situation with a blank opposition, declining all accommodation save the acceptance of their own terms. By the refusal to form associations the Church property is by law forfeited, but though Bishops have been expelled from their houses, and seminaries closed at the point of the bayonet,

public worship in the churches goes on in the meantime as if nothing had happened. The Government, stretching a point in favour of the Church, invited the clergy to take advantage of the law relating to public meetings, and by a simple annual declaration of their intention to hold services secure the use of the churches. The clericals again replied "No"; such possession, they said, would be merely on sufferance and would put them at the mercy of anti-clerical mayors, of whom there are many, and who might interrupt or terminate a service on the occasion of a disturbance, a disturbance created by a knot of the Church's enemies. As the matter stands at the present moment, the regulation of public worship is vested by law in the prefects or mayors, according to circumstances.

The enemies of the Church profess to believe that the priests are disappointed because the Government have not barred the doors of the places of worship against them. The clericals are declared to have reckoned with certainty upon impaling the Government on the horns of a dilemma. Whether the Government executed the law with rigour or failed to execute it—in either case, it was calculated, they would create resentment or incur the opprobrium of weakness. And, indeed, it must be admitted that the policy of the Pope appeared to be to drive the Government into harsh courses, and then to rend the air with the wail of persecution, hoping by this ancient device to secure a reaction of sympathy in his favour. The cry was raised that the Church in apostolic zeal and in apostolic poverty, casting to the winds all

considerations of mere worldly prudence, was about to go forward to give battle to the enemies of God. To those Christians to whom Christianity means Catholicism it is natural that the conflict should present itself under that aspect. At least three members of the Government (January 1908)—and these the most powerful—are known of all men as sceptics. The Prime Minister, M. Clémenceau, is a polite, unaggressive unbeliever. The Minister chiefly responsible for the Separation Law and for the conduct, on the part of the State, of the present controversy, M. Briand, has stated that the time has come finally to do away with the Christian idea, and to drive Jesus Christ out of France. Most significant of all, the Minister of Labour, M. Viviani, delivered a bitterly anti-clerical speech in the Chamber of Deputies in which he declared that they must teach the peasants and the artisans that beyond the clouds there are only phantoms. Poor peasants, poor artisans ! And the Chamber ordered that that speech should be placarded throughout France,—matter for a “heavy cogitation” here (as Bunyan would say), is there not ?

THE PROSPECTS OF THE FUTURE

What the future may bring forth only a very bold man would dare to predict ; for of all countries France is that in which the unexpected most frequently happens.

It is difficult to ascertain the elementary facts on which alone a forecast of the future can be based. There are thirty-nine millions of souls in France ;

how many of these are attached to Catholicism, and what the nature and strength of their attachment, can only be roughly conjectured. We suggest as a valuable contribution towards the solution of this problem, and an enterprise worthy of the *Paris Daily Mail*, a census of churchgoers in the French capital. One of the most respectable clerical journals estimates that the influence of the Church does not extend to more than four millions of the population. In this number there must be surely included hundreds of thousands of mere adherents ; four millions of " practising Catholics," even if a large proportion of them were women, welded together in the perfect discipline which the Church knows how to ensure, would wield a greater influence than the clericals now enjoy. It is these well-drilled battalions, acting like one man, in a country where party organisation is weak and liable to sudden dissolution, that may win back for the Church her former position in the State. We shall see.

There are many Frenchmen content to be called Catholics who are as contemptuous of all that is essential to Catholicism as the stoutest Protestant. They have been baptized, have attended the curé's preparation class for confirmation, have made their first communion, have been married in church, and have received the consolations of the faith as they stood by the graves of those dear to them. They will secure the same experiences for their own children. But they never go to church, except on the rarest occasions ; they do not believe in the confession nor in the mass ; they incline to think that devotion to a saint is a sign of a weak mind,

and they laugh at the infallibility of the Pope. "I believe in God," said one such Catholic to the writer,—“I try to do what is right; if I sin I am sorry, I repent, I resolve not to commit that sin again if I can help it; I believe that the wrong I have done, as well as my good actions, take their place in the reckoning; but I trust in the merits of my intentions and in the mercy of God. That is my religion.” Catholics of this type who, as a rule, hold sceptical views concerning the intellectual integrity of the priests, especially of the most violently clerical, and of the higher ranks in the hierarchy, cannot be a strength to the religion of which Pius x. is the supreme authoritative exponent. The author of the encyclical against modernism must desire to spue out such Catholics from the Church.

Will the generosity of the faithful, stimulated by the “persecution” of their priests, make up for the loss of the contributions received from the State? Monsignor Dupanloup stated more than thirty years ago that the French clergy were the poorest in Europe, and pointed out that there were thousands of communes without any regular provision for public worship. Very little has been done in the meantime to relieve the poverty of the clergy or the spiritual destitution of many districts. The French churchgoers have not been trained in habits of generous giving, and the likelihood is that they will be slow to learn the new and difficult lesson of Christian liberality. It may well be, however, that in the end the increased poverty of the priests and their entire dependence upon the people, low and high, will be good for both parties

and good for the cause of spiritual religion. The priests may become more sympathetic towards the peasants and workmen, and the latter, if there is sincerity in their faith, are more likely to cherish the benefits which cost them something in the way of sacrifice. In the meantime many of the clergy, in order to supplement the scanty bounty of the faithful, are devoting their leisure to secular occupation. The *Matin* (quoted by the *Westminster Gazette*) recently gave an interesting account of the trades pursued by two thousand of these poverty-pinched priests. Most of them have turned their hands to the land and cultivate all forms of produce. As for individual cases, one curé forges artistic ironwork, another makes tables, another turns out lamps for motors, another designs book-covers, and another dear old fellow knits stockings! The *Matin* rightly praises the courage of these ministers of religion.

The best that can be hoped for the Church in France is the restoration of her old Gallican liberties and release from the spirit of Rome. The paramountcy of the monastic orders over the secular clergy in money and influence has been the main strength of Ultramontanism. Now that these orders have been expelled from the country, it may be that priests and Bishops will pluck up courage to slacken the fetters which bind them to Rome. The Montagnini affair, which for months last year tickled the palates of the jaded and fastidious Parisians, and delighted or scandalised the rest of the world, revealed clericalism in the colours which, when it is brought into light, it always wears. After the rupture of relations between France and

the Vatican, Mgr. Montagnini remained in Paris as the unofficial representative of the Pope. He sat as a spider at the centre of a web of intrigue, and even went so far as to incite to acts of rebellion against the Government. As he had no official status he was not entitled to ambassadorial immunities; accordingly the Government defended itself by expelling Mgr. Montagnini as an undesirable alien and seizing his papers. Extracts from these were published in the French journals, with the result that the Vatican was still further damaged, if that were possible, in the eyes of all honest and reasonable people outside the pale of the Roman Church.

These Montagnini papers conspicuously revealed the low moral tone which prevails at the Vatican. The question of buying over the Premier, M. Clémenceau, comes up, but it is feared that his price will be too high. The rulers of the Roman Church are seen as quite prepared for transactions of this sort; they are not fettered by any sense of shame, and are not visited by any doubt as to whether such tactics serve, in the end, the cause of the Church and religion. There are light and amusing touches in the correspondence too. Mgr. Montagnini sends the Papal Secretary of State a keg of brandy, and the latter, in returning his best thanks, observes that no doubt the Pope would be pleased to receive a like gift!

Perhaps, however, the chief value of the Montagnini papers lies in the clear indications they gave of the state of profound unrest within the Church. Monsignor is deeply distressed by proofs of wide-

spread heresies ; they come pouring into his possession ; in seminaries and churches, and in presumably Catholic journals, doctrines are preached which are " more than liberal." There are even priests who refuse to believe in the treachery of Dreyfus, and are in favour of disarmament ! The poor Monsignor wrings his hands in despair, and implores Rome to issue an authoritative pronouncement, repressing these heresies and evil practices.

It has always seemed to us, even looking at the question from standpoints beneath the highest, that France has suffered incalculable loss by her ignorance of the Scriptures of the Christian faith. The English Bible, in the course of generations, has been woven into the texture of the English heart. We believe that serious men who have abandoned or never accepted the Christian faith would, with few exceptions, acknowledge the benefits which have been, and are being, conferred on the taste, the morals, the language, the manners, the tone of English life by the Bible. Huxley, as a member of the first London School Board, was anxious that the Bible should be retained as a text-book in the schools of the people. A nation without the Bible is a nation which has missed a precious treasure, and such a nation is France. An educated Frenchman visited thirty booksellers' shops in Paris in a vain search for a copy of the Bible. It was true a short time ago that there were only three booksellers in Paris, and these Protestants, who kept the Bible in stock ; it may be true still. If the Protestants of France could make the Bible as common a book in the homes of

that country, as it is in the homes of England, and could secure some serious attention, if it were at first merely literary attention, to its contents, they would confer a precious boon upon the people.

APPENDICES

SOME OF THE PRINCIPAL DATES IN THE HISTORY OF FRANCE SINCE WATERLOO

Waterloo	June 18, 1815
Return of Louis XVIII. to Paris	July 9, 1815
Execution of Marshal Ney	Dec. 7, 1815
Assassination of the Duc de Berri, second son of the Comte d'Artois (afterwards Charles x.)	Feb. 13, 1820
Death of Napoleon	May 5, 1821
Death of Louis XVIII.	Sept. 16, 1824
Comte d'Artois, brother of Louis XVIII., ascends the throne as Charles x.	Sept. 16, 1824
Issue of the Four Ordinances	July 26, 1830
Revolution, closing days of	July 1830
Duc d'Orléans becomes King as Louis-Philippe	Aug. 9, 1830
Insurrection of Duchesse de Berri to gain the throne for her son, the heir of Charles x.	May and June, 1832
Death of the son of Napoleon	1832
Guizot becomes the dominant statesman of the reign	Oct. 29, 1840
Death of the Duc d'Orléans, the eldest son of Louis-Philippe	July 13, 1842
Revolution, downfall of Louis-Philippe, and proclamation of the Second Republic	Feb. 24, 1848
Bloody Socialistic insurrection in Paris against the Republic	June 23, 1848
Louis Napoleon becomes President of the Re- public	Dec. 10, 1848
<i>Coup d'état</i>	Dec. 2, 1851

Proclamation of the Second Empire . . .	Dec. 2, 1852
Crimean War	1854-1856
War against Austria for the Independence of Italy	1859
War with Prussia	1870-1871
Sedan, and surrender of Napoleon III. to the Prussians	Sept. 1-2, 1870
Proclamation of the Third Republic . . .	Sept. 4, 1870
Siege of Paris	Sept. 19, 1870-Jan. 28, 1871
The insurrection of the Commune . . .	April 2-May 21, 1871
Constitutional laws passed	1875
The Boulanger agitation	1889
Boulanger (in absence) condemned to life im- prisonment	Aug. 14, 1889
Suicide of Boulanger near Brussels . . .	Sept. 30, 1891
Franco-Russian Alliance inaugurated . . .	1891
The Panama Canal scandals	1892-1893
Assassination of President Carnot . . .	June 24, 1894
The Dreyfus affair begins end of 1894, but chiefly falls in	1898
The law concerning congregations (or monastic orders)	1901
Separation of Church and State	1906

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12


RULERS OR CHIEF MAGISTRATES OF FRANCE SINCE 1815

Louis XVIII.	1815-1824
Charles X.	1824-1830
Louis-Philippe	1830-1848
Louis Napoleon, President of the Republic	
	Dec. 10, 1848-Dec. 2, 1852
Louis Napoleon as the Emperor Napoleon III.	1852-1870


PRESIDENTS OF THE THIRD REPUBLIC

Thiers	Aug. 31, 1871
MacMahon	May 24, 1873
Grévy	Jan. 30, 1879
Carnot	Dec. 3, 1887
Casimir Périer	June 27, 1894
Faure	Jan. 17, 1895
Loubet	Feb. 18, 1899
Fallières	Feb. 18, 1906

GENEALOGY OF THE FRENCH BOURBONS (BOTH BRANCHES)



GENEALOGY OF THE BONAPARTES



Réunion	970	173,200
Comoro Isles	620	47,000
Mayotta	140	11,640
Madagascar and Islands	228,000	2,644,700
Total for Africa	3,932,900	34,092,340
AMERICA—		
Guiana	30,500	32,910
Guadaloupe	688	182,110
Martinique	380	203,780
St. Pierre and Miquelin	92	6,250
Total for America	31,660	425,050
OCEANIA—		
New Caledonia	7,650	53,350
Establishment in Oceania	1,520	29,000
Total for Oceania	9,170	82,350
Grand Total	4,227,826	56,117,740

NOTE.—Very few of the Colonies are self-supporting. The total trade of France with her possessions in 1905 amounted to £41,539,560—consisting of £18,114,440 imports and £23,425,120 exports. Most of the colonies enjoy some measure of self-government and have elective Councils to assist the Governor. The older colonies have also direct representation in the Legislature. Algeria and Tunis are the colonies of which the French are most proud, and to which they attach the greatest importance.

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
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